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Abstract
Much of the literature has framed the study of Taiwanese politics in terms of the persistent 
existence of certain informal institutions like factional politics, patron-clientism, heijin (political 
corruption), and finally, heidao (gangsters). These institutions are perceived to be more 
characteristic of a third world country, and inappropriate to Taiwan, given it’s advanced 
economy and democratic system. This thesis looks at the contemporary phenomenon of 
heidao. Heidao, in the strict sense of the word, are a new class of wealthy and powerful 
people from the countryside who have accumulated their wealth through dubious means and 
then run for political office. The thesis relies primarily on ethnographic research and it focuses 
on the life histories of a few rural politicians who are reputed to be heidao, namely Legislator 
Yen Ching-piao of Shalu Town, and the Jen brothers from Dajia Town, Taichung County.
This thesis borrows the ‘big man’ or ‘man of prowess’ model from the traditional political 
culture of Southeast Asia. It compares the Taiwanese heidao with the Thai chaopo 
(godfather), rural politicians from Taiwan and Thailand. I argue two things. First, that 
contemporary anxiety in Taiwan about heidao represents a clash between two incompatible 
notions of politics and governance. The dominant notion involves contemporary western ideas 
of politics based on the ideal of good governance, transparency, integrity, and honesty, which 
predominate in the urban areas. The other involves traditional notions of power and politics 
based on the ideal of a benign and paternalistic patron which is prevalent in the rural areas. 
Second, scholarly literature portrays Taiwanese politics as anomalous. This is a result of using 
idealized categories of politics and governance that are characteristic of a western liberal 
democracy. The anomaly disappears when we look at the country within the broader context 
of the traditional political culture of Southeast Asia. Heidao are really Southeast Asian big 
men.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
I met PJ Huang (Huang Pong-ren) and his TV crew at the start of the annual eight day 
pilgrimage to Xingang Town in April 2003 organized by the famous Jenlangong Temple. PJ 
was a TV anchorman and he was in Dajia to cover the pilgrimage and had been doing it for 
the past several years. He agreed to let me travel with him and his crew for the whole duration 
of the journey so that I could learn more about the pilgrimage, popular religion, and 
unexpectedly, ‘gangsters’. I had arrived in Dajia a few months before the pilgrimage with the 
intention of researching religious identity and the cult of Mazu. My sudden interest in 
‘gangsters’ was unexpected. This was sparked by a realization not long after starting 
fieldwork, a few months prior to the start of the pilgrimage. Much to my surprise, I found out 
through my dealings with urban folk whenever I travelled to the big cities like Taipei and 
Taichung, that Jenlangong Temple’s chairman (dongshizhang) Legislator Yen Ching-piao, 
was rumoured to be a heidao (gangster). My urban contacts would sadly remark that many 
temples in central and southern Taiwan were being taken over by ‘gangsters’ because they 
were a very lucrative source of revenue.1
Local Dajia residents, on the other hand, were quite indifferent to the temple chairman. They 
did not so much see the legislator as a ‘gangster’, rather, he was considered an ‘outsider’, as 
he is not a Dajia native, he hails from the nearby town of Shalu. The local professionals in 
Dajia Town, unlike ordinary folk, were every bit as critical of the temple chairman as their 
urban counterparts were. Many of the schoolteachers, librarians, and journalists, I spoke to in 
Dajia were scathing of the group of people who were in charge of the temple. They even said 
that many of the dozen or so members of Jenlangong Temple Committee2 (dongshihui), a sort 
of board of directors, had criminal records, or were involved in various civil and criminal cases.
1 That temples made a lot of money was apparent to anyone who spent any length of time in one, especially a popular one. 
Temples in Taiwan make enormous profits from the ‘services’ that they provide to worshippers. The range of services on 
offer is quite vast, covering many of the spheres of human activity, which include an element of uncertainty and 
unpredictability. These services claim to ensure that, for a modicum sum, someone’s child got good marks for their school 
exams, to ensuring a pregnant woman gave birth to a healthy baby son, to protecting oneself from harm or misfortune should 
they happen to have been bom in a year that is considered inauspicious (the Chinese lunar calendar makes sure that every 
year has lucky and unlucky years to have been bom in).
21 was a guest of the famous popular religion temple Jenlangong from Dajia Town, Taichung County, on whose behalf the 
pilgrimage is dedicated. I arrived in Dajia in late January of that year and came, initially, with the purpose of studying 
Taiwanese popular religion. I had heard of the temple in Dajia while in the capital, and had used my Taipei connections to 
get an official introduction to the Jenlangong Temple Committee. Mr. Jen Ming-kuen, temple vice-chairman, welcomed me 
as a scholar of the goddess Mazu and graciously provided me with free board and lodging at the temple-managed hotel. 
From the time of my arrival I started to immerse myself in the day-to-day activities at the temple and to meet as many people 
as possible in Dajia, so as to learn about local people’s religious behaviour.
These remarks that I repeatedly heard over the first two months of my fieldwork in Dajia Town 
began to arouse my interest. I started asking myself‘what are “gangsters” doing in a popular 
religion temple?’
This thesis will rigorously study the phenomenon of heidao and what it tells us about 
contemporary Taiwanese society. I will explore the following questions: ‘under what conditions 
of looking and in whose eyes do heidao appear’, ‘how is the heidao issue seen from the city 
and from the country’, and ‘can the phenomenon of heidao reveal something significant about 
Taiwanese political life at a deeper level?’ I have imposed a strict analytical framework on the 
concept, eliminating extraneous features, boiling it down to its bare essentials. In doing so I 
have come to discover that the term heidao actually tells us more about those people who use 
it, than it tell us about the class of people it supposedly refers to.
For analytical clarity, I have narrowed the term to mean only those who are engaged in 
politics, and who are widely believed to use ‘coercion’, ‘illegal force’ or ‘illicit and informal 
influence’ in order to achieve their means. People, who most aptly fit this description, are a 
certain breed of rural politicians, who have come to power in the countryside since the mid 
1980s. I will focus on the biography of Legislator Yen Ching-piao, a rural politician with 
national repercussions. I use his life and work to exemplify the phenomenon of the rise of the 
rural politician in Taiwan. Although his life story is exceptional in some ways, he is also very 
typical of this new breed of politicians in many other ways.
In summary, heidao is not really an objective category, or a kind of person, or occupation, or 
character type. The term heidao is a morally charged accusation levelled by people who have 
certain beliefs, values and attitudes. These beliefs principally pertain to the way society should 
be run. Specifically, these beliefs have to do with how political life should be conducted in a 
democracy, how relationships between people should be governed, and about how disputes 
should be settled. In other words, when a person calls another heidao, he is merely indicating 
his disapproval that the heidao in question does not act according to his normative vision of 
society.
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Those who call rural politicians heidao have an ideal. That ideal is about a country where the 
rule of law is supreme, where formal institutions are paramount, and where politicians are 
gentle, mild-mannered, scholarly, incorruptible, and behave in ways that are totally 
transparent. Those who accuse rural politicians of being heidao have high standards of the 
political class- they expect honesty and integrity, and the refusal to derive private gain from 
public office. These rural politicians stand accused of various forms of corruption and other 
illicit deeds. Many of these rural politicians are, or have been defendants in various civil or 
criminal lawsuits filed against them by the state or private citizens (see Figure 1). Just to cite 
an official statistic, the Taiwanese Ministry of Justice stated in 1999 that 205 elected 
representatives present in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, City and County Councils, 
as well as Township Councils, had pending criminal charges against them.3 Often they run for 
office while hiding from the law, or while in prison, and they often win elections this way. If 
they cannot personally run, their wives or daughters run in their place and win. And 
sometimes they flee the country to escape prosecution. This book explores the motivations 
and values of the people who attempt to portray rural politicians like Legislator Yen Ching- 
piao, as ‘public enemy number one’.
Gangsters Non-gangsters
□  City and County councillors
□  Provincial Assembly members
■  National Assembly deputies and 
legislators
Figure 1: Percentage of ‘gangsters’ among elected officials. It is 33.3% of City and County 
councillors, 25% of Provincial Assembly members, and 5% of National Assembly deputies 
and legislators. Source: Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan. 2003.
3 See “ Judicial Yuan sheds light on the darker side o f politicians” . Taipei Times. October 30, 1999. p. 1.
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The literature on Taiwan studies
Recent academic literature relevant to this present thesis has looked at many of the themes I 
wish to address primarily from the discipline of mainstream political science, and also 
anthropology, to a lesser extent. I shall proceed to describe these studies. I will show what 
contributions they have made to the current received wisdom about the issues and problems I 
seek to address. At this point I shall first set the first part of these studies within the broader 
socio-historical context in which social and political research regarding post-war Taiwan, a 
field sometimes known as called Taiwan Studies’, has been generated.
Taiwan studies at the start of the twenty first century has gained a loyal following and 
acceptance as a legitimate area of social science research. However, this was not the case 
for the discipline in the immediate post-war period. Social science research conducted in 
Taiwan for its own sake in the first three decades afterWorld War II was minimal, with much 
of it done by American anthropologists interested in studying Chinese culture. This insistence 
in viewing Taiwan as a laboratory for the elaboration of social science theories pertaining to 
China has led some academics, like Hong and Murray,4 to accuse these anthropologists of 
looking through Taiwan in order to see ‘traditional’ China. These two academics give four 
partial explanations as to why American social scientists have clung to the ‘ideologically’ 
shaky assumption that Taiwan is the most traditional part of China’.
Firstly, American China experts were ‘traumatized’ by the communist triumph on the mainland 
(2005: 57). Secondly, the Maoist state made research inside China impossible (Ibid.). Thirdly, 
it was thought that Taiwan could act as a surrogate for studying rural pre-communist 
revolutionary China, ‘in order to try to understand conditions leading to that revolution, and to 
look for possible ways to prevent other, similar revolutions’ (2005:63). Fourthly, some western 
scholars, in particular those interested in civilizations with long written traditions, were busy 
‘orientalising’ China, intent on studying its glorious past through written texts, which allowed 
them to escape the messy realities of these ‘civilizations’ as they are in the present. Thus in 
the case of Taiwan, scholars, intent on positing a timeless entity such as ‘Chinese society’ 
substituted Japanese and KMT era household registration records for ancient literature and 
court records, in order ‘to escape from complicated contemporary realities’ (2005: 64).
4 Hong, K. & Murray, S. 2005. Looking Through Taiwan: American Anthropologists ’ Collusion with Ethnic Domination. 
Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press.
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Taiwan during this period was used as a ‘case study of a larger Chinese phenomenon’ 
(Cheng & Marble 2004: 5).5 Hence, several ethnographies produced during this period had 
titles such as Gallin’s Hsin Hsing, Taiwan; a Chinese village in change in 1966, W olfs The 
House ofLim: a study of a Chinese farm family in 1968, Pasternak’s Kinship and Community 
in Two Chinese Villages in 1972, and Jacob’s Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural 
Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan in 1980.6
This'apparent obsession with China at the expense of Taiwan needs to be seen within the 
historical framework of priorities on the part of the American academics. They were highly 
influenced in the 1950s by the need to understand the massive decolonization movement of 
newly independent countries. These academics were heavily influenced by modernization 
theories of development, and thus promoted and coordinated research in various countries 
around the world, including the People’s Republic of China, which itself was experiencing not 
only ‘massive social change but also radically heightened ideology on its path to development’ 
(Cheng & Marble 2004:4). The sum effects of the influence of modernization studies and the 
field of China Studies, along with the view that the island was a minor issue, nothing more 
than an appendage to the United States, was to marginalize any interest in studying Taiwan 
for its own sake.
Notwithstanding the validity of the arguments those anthropologists had for studying Taiwan, 
their research is highly relevant for this thesis in that it can shed light on the topic of traditional 
forms of rural leadership in Taiwan. In an early study looking at the effects of land reform in 
post-war Taiwan, dating from this period of optimal productivity within ‘Chinese’ anthropology, 
Gallin described the village landlord as playing ‘a major role in the leadership of his village and 
its immediate vicinity’, as the elected village political leader. But his formal leadership role also 
overlapped with a more informal one:
5 Cheng, T.J. & Marble, A. 2004. “Taiwan Studies and the Social Sciences”. Issues and Studies 40 (3/4): 9-57.
6 Ethnographies featuring the name Taiwan did appear in that period, such as W olfs Women and the Family in Rural 
Taiwan, and Jordan’s Gods Ghosts and Ancestors: the folk Religion o f a Taiwanese village, both published in 1972.
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He might often be an informal leader as well, a person who took an active part in most of the social 
and religious affairs of the village. He usually contributed money and time to help make these affairs 
a success. The efforts of the landlord helped to build up his reputation as a public-spirited citizen. 
Frequently, he assumed the role of mediator in discussions of village and intervillage problems and 
in disputes between his own villagers or even between members of other villages (Gallin 1966:115-
lie).
Pasternak7 described the post of village headman (cunzhang), the township’s official 
community representative, as ‘demanding, but confers only limited prestige and authority’, and 
did not constitute a ‘stepping stone to personal profit or higher political office’. Hence elected 
office at the township level was not attractive to ‘better educated, politically ambitious, or 
wealthier villagers’ (1972: 96-97). Thompson’s article on rural Taiwan, nearly a couple of 
decades after Gallin’s work, observed how land reform dislodged the traditional rural gentry 
from positions of leadership. He mentioned a new type of leader who emerged to fill the 
‘leadership vacuum’ at village level after the 1950s. The new type of leaders, though, ‘eschew 
the opportunity to become district head...Often the real leaders or leader of a village work 
behind the scenes, maybe using a village temple as a basis for operations, and putting 
forward a nominee to act as district head’ (1984: 562).8
Crissman described local and regional organization in Taiwan as being noncorporate- ‘i.e., it is 
not formally organized at all, and to the extent that it is structured in any definable sense, it is 
governed by normative relations that do not involve legal obligations or formal sanctions’ 
(1981: 90).9 Candidates for elected office at township level tended to be members of the 
traditional landed gentry or ‘self-made’ men who accumulated wealth in a ‘rags to riches’ 
fashion. Their wealth, and their ability to use it to control other men, and not, at least primarily, 
because of the offices they may hold’ make them the natural leaders of rural society. 
Crissman felt these rural leaders are comparable to Melanesian ‘big men’ who, absent 
corporate hierarchies, ‘hold sway over others by virtue of the force of their personalities, their 
control of resources, and their ability to dispense favours’:
7 Pasternak, B. 1972. Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
8 Thompson, S. 1984. “Taiwan: Rural Society”. The China Quarterly 99: 553-568.
9 Thus, although it is undeniable that the island possesses a highly corporate local administrative jural (relating to the law) 
structure, which divided up the country into counties (xian) and further subdivided into townships (xiang) and subdivided 
into districts (cun), Crissman is not sure the same applies to administrative structure below township level, which he 
characterizes as having an authority structure (1981: 103).
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To be a success in local Taiwanese factional politics, an aspiring big man must first of all have 
money, and secondly must invest it in politically relevant ways, such as making generous 
contributions to temples and to charities... if leaders are to keep their followers they must provide 
' them with certain services. Big men hold the equivalent of ‘office hours’ when they are freely 
available to their constituents and clients to hear and settle disputes, to give advice, and to respond 
to pleas for help in various manners (such as free medical equipment, getting a son into school or 
into a job, or securing or extending a loan). Big men must above all appear to be generous and to 
be eager to help people with their problems by using their superior connections (Crissman 1981: 
107).10
These early studies about traditional rural leadership in post-war Taiwan indicate that there 
are socio-cultural dimensions to the realities of power in a rural context. In addition, the 
quality of effective leadership- the ability to lead men and to get things done, is embedded in 
wider social and cultural structures that transcend official institutions. More specifically, 
possession of formal leadership positions such as elected office, are often insufficient 
indicators of an individual’s true status, power and influence in the local community. Though in 
any given locality, the most powerful individual may also be the place’s highest elected 
political leader, it is not always the case that the two are one and the same. Often, powerful 
and influential individuals eschew public office, electing instead to work behind the scenes.
More often than not, local political leaders derive their power not from the authority that a 
government post confers. Rather they are powerful in their own right. They seldom ran for 
office, but when they did they secured it by harnessing various forms of informal influence in 
order to mobilize voters and win the popular vote. Their influence stems from their 
independent sources of wealth, their willingness to use their wealth and resources to build up 
a following, their generosity to fellow villagers, their ability to mediate in disputes, and finally 
their use of connections to benefit their followers. This thesis will build on the work of these 
early ethnographies on traditional forms of leadership in rural Taiwan. It explores the nature 
and legitimacy of the power and influence that rural leaders possess in contemporary Taiwan.
10 Crissman, L. 1981. “The Structure of Local and Regional Systems”. In Emily M. Ahem and H ill Gates (eds.) The 
Anthropology o f Taiwanese Society. Pp.89-124. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
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However, interest in the earlier research topics such as the ones undertaken by Gallin, and 
Pasternak, began to wane when China opened up and provided scholars with hitherto 
unavailable opportunities to go and study the mainland. The focus of social science research 
in Taiwan began to take a new direction towards the beginning of the 1980s. This new 
direction was due largely to the island’s spectacular economic growth, which accelerated in 
the early 1980s, stimulating two new foci of research. The first body of research attempted to 
understand how the country transformed itself into a newly industrializing country (NIC), 
joining the ranks of Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. This corpus of research is worth 
noting, in my opinion for two reasons; first, as Taiwan was seen as a ‘catch up’ economy, the 
innate value of its research was thought to be self evident and did not need explaining, 
second, the research on NICs strengthened the idea that governments can ‘lead the market 
and put in place a stable system that implements good policy’ (Cheng & Marble 2 0 0 4 :10).11
The Taiwanese gangster state
At the same time as the nation’s economy underwent a dizzying transformation, it also 
experienced an equally significant process of democratic change. This spurred researchers to 
look at the island’s democratic transition, which they considered to be a unique case. They 
were surprised that the ruling KMT party did not lose power during this political transition and 
this sentiment generated a considerable quantity of academic research on Taiwan since the 
1980s, primarily among political scientists. This second corpus of research endeavoured to 
answer a second, and for our purposes, more significant question; namely, how did the ruling 
KMT party manage to hang on to power while the country was moving from dictatorship to 
democracy? The various hypotheses put forward attributed it to machine politics (Kuo Jeng- 
liang Julian 1995; Wu 1997), local factions (Chen 1996; Rigger 1994, 1999), patron-client 
theory (Wang 1996), and vote buying (Rigger 1994, 1999).
The literature from the 1980s to the mid 1990s that researched this issue concluded that the 
informal institution known as ‘factionalism’ or ‘local factions’, the fundamental organizing 
principle and driving force behind Taiwanese politics, was the key factor, though not the only 
one, in helping the ruling KMT party hang on to power despite wide-ranging democratic 
reforms. Local factions may be defined as local level clientelist networks held together not by 
a shared ideology, but by ties of blood, kinship, marriage and personal relationships, which 
compete for local economic power and resources. Factions can ally themselves with national
11 Cheng, T.J. & Marble, A. 2004. “Taiwan Studies and the Social Sciences”. Issues & Studies 40 ( 3A): 9-57.
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and regional political parties such as the KMT, akin to a patron-client relationship, and use 
their local manpower, organizational structure, and resources to elect their chosen candidates 
to public office in exchange for a ‘share of the spoils’ of local and national resources.
The latter body of research also tried to answer two related questions: ‘why has the informal 
institution of factionalism continued to exist under a democratic system’, and ‘what can be 
done to consolidate the power of formal institutions?’ The literature from this period tried to 
analyze the ‘problem’ of factions through the use of the following mechanisms and analytical 
categories: guanxior relationships (Jacobs 1975), vote buying (Rigger 1994,1999), machine 
politics (Kuo Jeng-liang Julian 1995; Rigger 1994,1999), patron-client relationships (Chen & 
Chu 1992; Wang 1996) and modernization theory (Tu 1984; Bosco 1992; Huang 1994).12
The literature from the mid 1990s to the year 2004 maintained the assumption that democracy 
on the island was incompatible with the continued existence of certain informal institutions. 
However, researchers during this period focused on new forms of informal institutions- 
‘mafias’ and ‘gangs’, and practices such as ‘corruption’, as a way of understanding the 
reasons behind the KMT Party’s continued survival in contemporary Taiwanese politics. Thus, 
traditional ways of talking about politics typical of the earlier phase have been supplemented, 
although not replaced, by new narratives of criminality and corruption. Hitherto unused words 
such as ‘gangster’, ‘mafia’, and ‘corruption’, have complemented, and now coexist with the 
older analytical categories of ‘patron-client’, ‘vote buying’, ‘factions’, etc. Kuo Jeng-liang Julian 
(1995), for example, tries to explain the genesis of ‘gangsters’ and how they came to 
penetrate politics in Taiwan:
12 Another kind of early research viewed democracy in Taiwan as being in a ‘transitional’ phase of development. Thus 
certain transitional features such as factions (Bosco 1992; Huang 1994; Tu 1984) are at present inevitable, but will 
eventually disappear due to the forces of modernization, education, democratization and urbanization.
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The entrance of gangsters into local elections occurred well before... Even so, however, gangsters 
were weak since they were neither organized nor corporatized. They remained primarily individual 
and well connected with local gentry. In many cases, they acted like Robin Hood and served in 
keeping social order during emergency... It was only after 1980 that gangsters changed their social 
and political character. Together with the rise of machine politics and plutocracy, new gangsters 
became more business-oriented and organized...Gangsters were activated to enter politics in the 
wake of November 1984, when the KMT launched a nationwide campaign of ‘liquidating criminals’ 
(yiqing zhuanan). In this campaign, almost all gang leaders were detained for ambiguous “security” 
reasons rather than for their illicit behaviour. However, this political folly led to three unintended 
consequences: (1) All cornered up in jails, gang leaders from different areas were given 
unprecedented opportunities to cooperate or combine with one another, thus producing ev6n bigger 
gangs after they were released. (2) With most gang leaders suddenly removed, the underground 
order collapsed and lower-ranked gangsters entered fierce struggle for leadership, leading to 
bloodier fights beyond control. (3) Most importantly, gang leaders concluded they needed some 
official status to protect themselves in the future. To ‘bleach’ themselves, they struggled to become 
elective officers and obtained wherewithals against the law-enforcing agencies (Kuo Jeng-liang 
Julian 1995: 177-179).13
Chao (1997)14 explains the genesis of Taiwan’s ‘gangsters’ in very similar terms to Kuo Jeng- 
liang Julian (1995). Moreover, Chao supplements the genesis story with a typology which 
illustrates the three-stage developmental process that organized crime underwent: The first 
type is the ‘social type of mafia’ (shehuixing heidao) who predate the KMT’s rule in Taiwan, 
this group is largely made up of uneducated youth who engage in petty crime. The second 
type is the ‘economic type of mafia’ (jingjixing heidao) who arose alongside the country’s 
socioeconomic transformation in the 1960s. This group runs illegal or semi-legal business 
operations such as massage parlours, karaoke bars, etc. The third type is the ‘political type of 
mafia’ (zhengzhixing heidao) who came into existence after the seminal moment of the 1984 
national crackdown on crime, which resulted in many mobsters being sent to jail. Apparently, 
‘gangsters’ realized that the best way to protect themselves from the police was to enter 
politics.
13 Kuo, Jeng-liang Julian. 1995. The Reach of the Party-State: Organizing Local Politics in Taiwan. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Political Science, Yale University.
14 Chao Yung-mao. 1997. Taiwan Difang Zhengzhi de Bianqianyu Tezhi (Change and Characteristics of Taiwan’s Local 
Politics). Taipei: Hanlu.
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Chu Yun-han (1998) is pessimistic regarding Taiwan’s democratic prospects. Democracy, ‘still 
faces a series of difficult challenges that it must overcome if it is to be considered 
consolidated’ (1998: 138), the most pressing of which is money politics and corruption:
Prospects for democratic consolidation in Taiwan are clouded...also by so-called money politics 
and mafia politics and their troubling implications for the legitimacy of the new democracy... During 
the 1980s, as opposition candidates mounted more formidable challenges and the effectiveness of 
vote buying declined, many local factions recruited gangsters and members of secret societies to 
safeguard their electoral strongholds. The local KMT officials did little to stop this trend, which 
seemed to offer a sure way of curbing the electoral prospects of opposition candidates... In recent 
years, the general public has been appalled by frequent stories about acts of extortion and other 
crimes committed by politicians with gangster backgrounds (Chu Yun-han 1998: 140-142).15
The KMT, the entrenched ruling party since the post-war period, won the first direct 
presidential elections ever held in Taiwan in 1996, but subsequently lost to the opposition 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000 and again in 2004. In what seems to be an 
example of permanent dissatisfaction on the part of political scientists since the first 
democratic transfer of power in 2000, Myers, Chao & Kuo (2002) agonize over the state of 
country’s democratic institutions. These scholars seem to have taken the view that Taiwanese 
politics is ‘backward’, ‘defective and ‘unconsolidated’ because, among other reasons, ‘informal 
institutions’ such as patronage, local factions, vote buying, the mafia, etc. have survived and 
even flourished under democracy:
The March 18, 2000, elections showed that elections mattered and that the people of Taiwan had 
generally complied with the election rules... But in Taiwan’s local elections, local factions influenced 
election outcomes and the behaviour of elected politicians... Once elected, local leaders dispensed 
political and economic favours to their constituents... As elections broadened after 1990, the scale 
of vote buying increased... As political corruption increased, so did the incidence of violent crimes 
such as rape, murder, and kidnapping. Criminal elements were able to organize their activities in 
Taiwan’s densely populated cities. The new Mafia-type organizations were called heidao (those 
engaging in illegal and deviant behaviour), and they used their illegal income to bribe politicians, 
thus giving rise to the term heijin, or ‘black gold’ (Myers, Chao & Kuo 2002: 80-81 ).16
15 Chu, Yun-han. 1998. “Taiwan’s Unique Challenges”. In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.) Democracy in East 
Asia. Pp. 133-146. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
16 Myers, R., Chao, L. & Kuo T. 2002. “Consolidating Democracy in the ROC on Taiwan, 1996-2000”. In Bruce J. Dickson 
& Chien-min Chao (eds.) Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External 
Relations. Pp. 73-90. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.
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Chin (2003)17 continues the corruption narrative with his exhaustive study of heijin (black 
gold), a term which had already become commonly used in the popular media. Chin attributes 
‘black gold’ politics to the convergence of gangsters, businessmen and corrupt politicians in 
Taiwan. He believes that whereas this triangular relationship can be found elsewhere, Taiwan 
is unique in that there, the realms of the ‘upper world* and ‘underworld* are so vague as to be 
sometimes indistinguishable. What is really interesting and paradoxical is that although the 
corruption narratives are a very recent phenomenon in the academic literature on Taiwanese 
politics, Chin blames ‘black-gold* politics for causing virtually all of Taiwan’s social and political 
ills. Thus, for example, ‘corruption’ causes vote buying, a practice that has existed long before 
‘corruption’ became fashionable in academic circles:
In Taiwan, ‘black’ {hei) means the underworld, ‘gold’ (jin) means money or business. ‘Black-gold 
politics’ was the penetration into politics of violent underworld figures and greedy business tycoons 
and the inevitable subsequent social ills such as vote buying, political violence, insider trading, bid 
rigging, and official (and unofficial) corruption. This book is an analysis of how ‘black-gold politics’ 
developed into a major problem during the past fifteen years and how it might have ended the KMT 
rule in Taiwan during the 2000 presidential election after the KMT had been the pre-eminent political 
party in Taiwan for more than fifty years (Chin 2003: 5).
Finally, Gobel (2004)18 argues that as a result of democratization, the long established patron- 
client relationships with local factions turned into one of mutual dependence, leading to the 
emergence of heijin (black gold) and to collusion between big business, organized crime and 
politicians. However, while most scholars took the view that ‘black gold’ political corruption has 
undermined democracy, Gobel goes against this aspect of received wisdom about Taiwanese 
politics. He is actually the only one who believes that democratization indirectly contributed to 
the ‘black gold’ phenomenon.
What I have been trying to do here is to show is that academic scholarship has been very 
consistent in its view that Taiwanese politics is dominated by informal institutions and is 
therefore ‘backward’, ‘defective and ‘unconsolidated*. Scholarship has not perceived the 
nation’s democratization to be consolidated, or ‘bedded down’, and the reasons it has given to 
explain this state of affairs has experienced a considerable change from around 1995. Most of 
the literature before then blamed factionalism and local factions and various variations on the 
theme (relationships, patron-clientism, machine politics, etc.).
17 Chin, Ko-lin. 2003. Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
18 GObel, C. 2004. “Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organized Crime in the KMT and DPP Eras”. 
China Perspectives 56: 14-25.
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However, post-1995 research blames ‘black gold’ money politics, the ‘underworld’, the ‘mafia’ 
and ‘gangsters’ as well as the traditional factors. In other words, long established and 
accepted rural practices such as vote buying, locally influential individuals running for elected 
office in the countryside, or refusing to run for office personally, choosing and bankrolling a 
nominal candidate instead and ‘running the show’ behind the scenes, acting like a ‘big man’ or 
patron by distributing money and favours, etc., have now been ‘criminalized’. Traditional forms 
of influence, previously called ‘informal institutions’, have now taken on new connotations of 
‘crime’ and ‘illegality’.
The assumption that democracy equals formal institutions and therefore by extension, that the 
former must be incompatible with any form of informal institutions, is unquestioned. However, 
is that really the case? Formal and informal institutions are not necessarily opposing forces 
and their relationship can be ‘complementary, substitutive, or conflicting’ (Lauth 2000: 25- 
26).19 Furthermore, there is an intimate relationship between democratic consolidation and 
institutions, be they formal or informal. Informal institutions can serve to stabilize and further 
democracy, when for example, informal bargaining structures within the legislature, and 
between representatives of the legislative and executive branches, take place. Informal 
institutions can also serve to undermine the democratic process, when corruption and political 
clientelism occurs (Valenzuela 1992: 62-70).20 It is my belief that the obsession with formal 
institutions, or the lack of them, in the research on Taiwanese politics and government, is 
indicative of a normative and highly idealized approach that seeks to explain, not how politics 
in Taiwan actually functions, but rather how politics in Taiwan should function.
All the research on Taiwanese politics since the mid 1980s appears to share another implicit 
and unquestioned assumption- there is only one possible model of democratic system and 
governance that the country should emulate. That model is what is popularly known as ‘liberal 
democracy’, and carries with it, certain notions of accountability, transparency, checks and 
balances, rule of law, etc. It is precisely these notions which formal institutions are supposed 
to ensure. The various informal institutions at play in Taiwan ‘violate’ these democratic 
principles of accountability and transparency, and therefore must be eradicated. Doh & Chu 
below compare the political systems of Taiwan and South Korea and make an explicit
19 Lauth, H. 2000. “Informal Institutions and Democracy”. Democratization 7(4): 21-50.
20 Valenzuela, J.S. 1992. “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating 
Conditions”. In Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.) Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Pp. 57-104. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press.
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assessment of ‘how well these two regimes perform as electoral democracies and how much 
progress they have made in becoming well-functioning liberal democracies’ (2004: 2):
South Korea (Korea hereafter) and Taiwan are widely recognized as the two most successful third- 
wave democracies in Asia... Nonetheless, little is known about how well their current regimes meet 
other important principles of liberal democracy and uphold its basic values such as freedom, 
equality, and justice...How much progress have third-wave democracies made in their march 
toward liberal democracy? What particular properties or qualities of liberal democracy do they lack 
most...Universal adult suffrage, free and fair elections, multiparty competition, and inter-party 
alternation in power are the most fundamental characteristics of all democracies. The successful 
establishment of these democratic institutions alone, however, does not guarantee the creation of 
liberal democracy. It merely creates electoral democracy, a regime that allows the citizens to take 
part in free and competitive electoral contests... What constitutes liberal democracy? It refers to a 
political system that allows, substantively, for political freedom and equal rights and, procedurally, 
limits the arbitrary use of governmental authorities and powers primarily for the well-being of 
individual citizens. In brief, the fundamental norms of freedom, equality, limited government serve 
as the substantive and procedural marks of liberal democracy (Doh & Chu 2004: 2-7).21
However, democracy is not an unproblematic concept, which can admit no differences, either 
in form, or style of governance. There is no ‘ideal’ form of democratic governance. 
‘Democracy is one of the most contested and controversial concepts in political theory’ and 
remains an ‘ambiguous concept’ (Abrahamsen 2000: 67).22 It is my belief that we should not 
treat formal and informal institutions, along with democracy as a political system as ‘separate 
and apart from the socio-economic structures of society’ (Abrahamsen 2000:75). We should 
try to understand these formal and informal structures of power and influence within an 
appropriate cultural and historical context. Also, we should strive to appreciate what these 
informal structures mean for the people to whom they matter most. This thesis will build on the 
early ethnographic research by Gallin, Pasternak and Crissman that had made substantial 
contributions with regard to traditional forms of rural leadership, and rural institutions, both 
formal and informal.
21 Doh, C.H. & Chu, Y.H. 2004. “The Quality of Democracy in South Korea and Taiwan: Subjective Assessments from the 
Perspectives of Ordinary Citizens”. In Asia Barometer: A Comparative Survey o f Democracy, Governance and 
Development. Working Paper Series: No. 25. Asian Barometer Project Office: National Taiwan University and Academia 
Sinica.
22 Abrahamsen, R. 2000. Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. London: Zed 
Books.
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The Thai gangster state
It is instructive to look at a similar corpus of academic literature on contemporary politics in 
Thailand. Taiwan and Thailand have both had long experience of authoritarian regimes and 
have also managed to implement democratic reforms in the last two decades. In both 
countries, participatory democracy has allowed provincial strongmen to consolidate their local 
power base and to seek a presence in the national political scene. The literature on Thai 
politics uncannily raises very similar issues to the Taiwanese case. Much contemporary 
research on Thai politics has focused on political corruption and patron-clientism as the major 
deficiency of the country’s political system. Therefore cross-cultural comparison with nearby 
Thailand may provide a fresh perspective that can illuminate the current received wisdom on 
Taiwanese politics.
Corruption has existed for decades in Thailand and the literature concerning it is relatively 
extensive. Much of the early literature has tried to use cultural factors as a way of explaining 
the pervasiveness of corruption in the country. Riggs (1966)23 looked at the ways in which the 
Chinese business community used a system of patronage in which each person paid an 
influential patron, often a high-ranking bureaucrat in exchange for protection for his business 
activities. Van Roy (1970)24 attributed corruption to a traditional Thai practice of presenting 
gifts to high officials, who, once appointed to a high position, will treat the office as a private 
domain from which anyway of generating revenue is legitimate. Neher (1977)25 argued for the 
centrality of patron-client relationships in understanding the Thai political system. Within this 
type of relationship both the patron and client receive benefits and thus have a vested interest 
in its continued survival. Clients need a patron to whom they will offer respect, gifts and 
services in return for favours and security. Patrons try to build up their entourage in order to 
maximise the flow of gifts and favours.
Pasuk&Sungsidh (1996)26 mark a new direction in contemporary studies of corruption in that 
country. Whereas past studies endeavoured to understand corruption in terms of patron-client 
relationships and Thai cultural values, Pasuk and Sungsidh explicitly link corruption with the 
country’s democratic institutions, with the view that the two are incompatible. Their 
comprehensive study into the nature and history of corruption in Thailand, as well as possible
23 Riggs, F. 1966. Thailand: The Modernization o f a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press.
24 Van Roy, E. 1970. “On the Theory of Corruption”. Economic Development and Cultural Change 19:1.
25 Neher, C. 1977. “Political Corruption in a Thai Province”. Journal o f Developing Areas 7:4.
26 Pasuk Phongpaichit & Sungsidh Piriyangsaran. 1996. Corruption and Democracy in Thailand. Chiang Mai, Thailand: 
Silkworm Books.
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solutions for it, attributes a large part of the blame to the appearance of provincial 
businessmen popularly known as chaopo (godfather). They sit in positions of authority in local 
administration. They play a key role in parliamentary elections’ (1996: 57). Although these 
individuals have been around for a long time, they started to play significantly different roles in 
the 1970s, securing ‘election to parliament. Some have even risen to ministerial positions and 
one was nominated for premiership’ (1996: 58). Pasuk & Sungsidh describe below how their 
presence in national politics undermines the nation’s political system:
They compete with the ‘old elites’ such as the military and bureaucracy for a share in the ‘corruption 
money’. They manipulate the institutions of parliamentary democracy. They aim to use the resulting 
power to maintain their status 'above the law’ in order to further their business interests, both legal 
and illegal. The emergence of the chaopo to such a position of importance in national politics raises 
several questions. Is this a passing phase of Thailand’s economic and democratic growth? Or is 
this the first stage in the emergence of a structure of political boss-ism or gang-ism on par with the 
Italian Mafia or the political structure of some Latin American countries (1994: 58)?
Trocki,27 in keeping with this new approach that links corruption and democratic politics, 
describes Burma, the Philippines and Thailand as ‘gangster democracies’ in which locally 
powerful individuals have achieved power through the electoral process. These individuals 
would be, by most measures, considered politicians, but are all ‘men of violence. Most of them 
are murderers.. .They have their hands in most forms of large scale crime.. .They are involved 
in drugs, prostitution, gambling and extortion. Political “corruption” is fundamental to their way 
of life’ (1998:10). Laird (2000)28 states that the ‘biggest hurdle impeding Thailand’s political 
development, its sustainable economic development, and its attainment of a genuine quality of 
life, is the patronage system which permeates Thai society and politics’. For Laird, patronage 
is closely linked to corruption and is anti-democratic and ‘distorts the development process’ 
(2000:241).
Thus one can observe a striking similarity in the way research on informal institutions such as 
patron-client relationships and corruption have undergone a significant transformation in both 
Taiwan and Thailand. Whereas up to the mid 1990s, in the case of Taiwan, informal 
institutions such as patron-client relationships, factionalism and vote buying were seen as the 
principal impediments to the country’s democratic consolidation. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, heijin (corruption) and heidao (gangsters) appear and are blamed for democracy’s 
precariousness. Likewise, up to the mid 1990s, in the case of Thailand, patron-client
27 Trocki, C. (ed.) 1998. Gangsters, Democracy and the State in Southeast Asia. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
28 Laird, J. 2000. Money Politics, Globalization, and Crisis: The Case o f Thailand. Singapore: Graham Brash Pte Ltd.
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relationships and Thai culture were viewed as the main factors behind the country’s pervasive 
corruption, from the mid 1990s onwards, provincial politicians known as chaopo (godfathers) 
are now seen as the culprits behind the country’s rampant corruption, and, if unchecked, can 
threaten the country’s fledgling democracy. The way in which democracy is being talked about 
in Taiwan has changed. This thesis will explore the circumstances and conditions surrounding 
it. This thesis will make sense of the fact that ‘gangsters’ are now blamed for the nation’s 
perceived rampant corruption and precarious state of democracy.
Contested legitimacy
Sukatipan (1995)29 argues that much of the perennial political instability that invariably results 
in numerous coups in Thailand can be attributed to contested ideas of political legitimacy 
between competing spheres of power. ‘In contrast to the generally uncontested legitimacy of 
the Thai nation-state (except in southern Thailand), the legitimacy of regimes and 
governments has been the subject of periodic and at times violent contention among strategic 
groups competing for control of state power. Since 1932 Thailand has wavered seemingly 
endlessly between the two opposing poles of military authoritarianism and parliamentary 
democracy’ (1995: 193).
For Weber, legitimacy is 'the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every 
kind of willingness to obey, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige’ (Weber in Alagappa 1995: 11).30 For Alagappa, political legitimacy is ‘the belief by 
the governed in the ruler’s moral right to issue commands and the people’s corresponding 
obligation to obey such commands...legitimacy comprises four key elements: shared norms 
and values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power, proper and effective use of 
power, and consent of the governed’ (Alagappa 1995:11-15), and leaders may claim authority 
based on one or more of these four elements.
Alagappa notes, however, that the second element, conformity with established rules for 
acquiring power, by itself, cannot confer legitimacy (1995: 31). This is especially true for 
developing countries, whose ‘political systems are still weak and contested and embryonic. 
Normative frameworks about how things ought to be- and the incorporation of relations of
29 Sukatipan, S. 1995. “Thailand: The Evolution of Legitimacy”. In Mutthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia. Pp. 193-223. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
30 Alagappa, M. (ed.) 1995. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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power into these frameworks- are still being worked out...the level of institutionalization is low 
and the preconditions for employing the procedural element as the basis of domination are 
absent or present only in rudimentary form’ (Ibid.).
What is crucial for political legitimacy is the first element, shared norms and values, for when 
this happens, ‘the formal provisions governing the acquisition of political power are unlikely to 
be contested except at the margins. A government that acquires power by conforming with 
such provisions will be viewed as legitimate’ (Alagappa 1995: 20). Questions of legitimacy 
often arise, in many developing countries, ‘traditional states in modern garb’ (Ibid.), where 
conformity with the rules does not necessarily translate into a broad-based legitimacy. This is 
because power in such countries ‘derives from official positions as well as intrinsic personal 
qualities, but is exercised in predominantly traditional ways without distinction between private 
and public property’ (Ibid.).
Elected leaders’ legitimacy is often disputed and contested, when norms and values are 
keenly contested. In the case of Thailand, many rural politicians rule on the basis of traditional 
sources of power such as the big man system and patron clientism, and they are quite popular 
in their rural constituencies. However, among the educated urbanites, ‘most of whom belong 
to professional groups and the business community. These groups apply a different set of 
criteria to assess the performance and legitimacy of the elected government. For them, 
efficiency, integrity and honesty are additional elements essential for political legitimacy. 
Corrupt, inefficient, and self-seeking politicians will not be tolerated’ (Sukatipan 1995: 221).
Indeed, this urban-rural divide can account for another surprising element of Thai participatory 
democracy- the fact that support for democracy is higher among rural residents than among 
their urban middle class counterparts. Even the Thai provincial middle classes are less 
enthusiastic about democracy. They feel it will be misused in the hands of rural people, who 
are often blamed for the continued pervasiveness of vote buying- they often sell their votes to 
rural patrons. What the middle classes want is ‘good government, not democracy for its own 
sake’ (McVey 2000: 20).31
31 McVey R. (ed.) 2000. Money and Power in Provincial Thailand. Singapore: Silkworm Books.
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This preoccupation with good government, and a suspicion of democracy, is an attitude the 
Thai middle classes share with the military establishment. McVey (2000:224) asserts that the 
middle classes have also historically been ambivalent towards democracy as they associate it 
with ineffective government and corruption.32 The view held by the middle-class that the 
democratic government at the time was ineffective and corrupt helps to explain why they were 
initially supportive of the 1991 coup that overthrew the parliamentary government. Although 
they, at times supported democracy (in the 1973, 1977 and 1992 uprisings), and at other 
times welcomed rule by military junta (as in the 1976 and 1991 coups), they consistently 
‘support “clean” politics, meaning a politics in which electoral outcomes and policy decisions 
are determined by the merits of competing choices rather than the amount of cash spent on 
buying votes and offering bribes’ (2000: 227). In other words, the Thai middle classes want 
good government, clean politics, a merit-based society and a level playing field. And it is this 
obsession with ‘clean politics’ that explains the middle class distaste for rural politicians who 
buy votes and distribute benefits, resources and government largesse to their supporters.
They also have ‘an image of the democratic ideal based on the political systems of advanced 
capitalist democracies’. This ideal is premised on four conditions: that politicians should win 
votes through a platform of clear policies rather than bribes, candidates should seek political 
office in order to implement their policies instead of personal enrichment, that parties should 
have distinct ideologies, and lastly, politicians should stay in one single party and not be 
political opportunists, switching party affiliations when politically expedient (2000: 230). This 
thesis will explore Taiwanese middle class democratic ideals in general, and attitudes towards 
corruption, electoral politics and rural voters, in particular. This thesis will also explore urban 
middle class feelings of disappointment over the state of democratic politics, particularly the 
big man, patron client variety practised in the Taiwanese countryside.
I will make the argument that, much like the case of Thailand, a lot of the current scholarship 
regarding the notion that informal institutions like ‘gangsters’, and political corruption are 
undermining democracy in contemporary Taiwan, is really about contested and disputed 
notions of political legitimacy between competing power groups. In a nutshell, in Taiwan, 
educated urbanites hold the belief that a sound democracy is not merely about procedural 
issues and institutions like elections and a free press, nor is it only about efficiency and good 
governance, rather, it is also about leaders’ integrity and honesty. They will not tolerate
32 The middle classes can turn against both democratic and authoritarian regimes when these are thought to be ineffective or 
corrupt (McVey 2000: 224).
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corrupt acts and will dispute the legitimacy of those elected politicians, both in urban and rural 
areas, who do not ‘make the grade’ in this respect. Rural people, on the other hand want 
leaders to act like benevolent patrons. The issue that their politicians may or may not be 
deriving private gain from office is not that important to them.
There exists, however, a counterargument against the notion that rural chaopo (godfathers), 
those who rule on the basis of big man and patron client-style politics, are detrimental to 
Thailand’s democratic institutions. It can be argued that one reason for the perception that 
contemporary Thai politics is corrupt is that some of the perquisites of power have shifted 
away from the Bangkok elite to rural strongmen. Hence what was previously a ‘gentlemanly 
flow of benefits among those fit to rule appeared less legitimate in the hands of crass 
outsiders. The new politics also directed attention to the way in which power was wielded in 
the provinces, and focused particularly on strongmen who flourished by manipulation and 
force’ (McVey 2000: 14-15).
A few scholars see these strongmen as playing a useful role in electoral politics. In essence, 
they fill a yawning gap between national and local politics, something national politicians are 
unable to fill. For instance Ockey feels that much of Thailand’s political peculiarities can be 
explained by accounting for the differences in attitudes and aspirations between the nation’s 
urban and rural voters. Urban voters care about ‘abstract’ issues like policies or the public 
good while rural voters care about ‘parochial’ issues, ‘leading to direct benefits such as roads 
or bridges’ (Ockey 2004: 20).33
However, national parties have ‘rarely designed policies to appeal to rural voters, leaving the 
way clear for rural MPs to seek votes as individual patrons’ (Ibid.). Thus chaopo (godfathers) 
fill the void between local interests and national politics by acting as patrons and distributing 
benefits to their constituents (ibid.), something that has led to frustration with parliamentary 
democracy among the middle classes. This thesis will explore whether there also exists a 
similar gap in local and national politics and whether Taiwanese rural politicians fill that gap by 
appealing to rural voters, acting as patrons and distributing benefits.
33 Ockey, J. 2004. Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender, and Political Participation in Thailand. Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press.
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Likewise, the notion that corruption and ‘gangsters’ is undermining democracy in Thailand is 
not universally shared. For instance, if the current relation between ‘gangsters’, crime and 
government is seen in historical perspective, one can appreciate the fact that morally 
ambiguous but powerful rural individuals played an important part in the administrative 
functions of early Thai monarchies. Before the Thai imperial court established a strong and 
effective central bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, ‘early Thai administrators were often 
forced to rely on dubious figures at the periphery to exert control and collect taxes, 
establishing a pattern of collaboration’ (Ockey 1998:40)34 that was to continue under various 
military regimes in the twentieth century.
This collaboration continued under parliamentary governments when national parties, needing 
representatives in every locality right down to the village level during election time, ‘turned to 
the local nakleng' (Ockey 1998:44). Furthermore, ‘gangsters’, gang violence, and corruption 
may actually be viewed as a characteristic of ‘democratic’ political life as ‘the practice of 
democracy calls forth individuals and groups who can mobilize and support and who 
ultimately vote at the local level’. Thus, we can see that powerful rural figures of dubious 
morals have long collaborated with the Thai state, and this pattern of collaboration antedates 
the country’s democratic transition. So-called ‘gangsters’ and corruption are characteristic of 
democratic political life- they are indispensable. Political decentralization ‘has created 
opportunities for individuals from outside the state apparatus to seek political power through 
the electoral process’ (Trocki 1998:12).35 This thesis will apply the theory that ‘gangsters’ and 
corruption are characteristic of democratic political life in general, and political decentralization 
in particular, to the case of contemporary Taiwan.
Notwithstanding the political similarities between the two countries, each has its own 
particularity. The relationship between democracy and ‘corruption’, while obvious for scholars 
of Taiwanese politics, is less clear in the case of Thailand. ‘The relationship is clearly complex’ 
(Pasuk & Sungsidh 1996: 2). Unlike Taiwan, which experienced a gradual but irreversible 
process of democratization beginning in earnest in the 1980s, Thailand has had a succession 
of elected governments, which have been toppled by military coups. Indeed the ‘military junta 
which carried out the 1991 coup just four months after provincial council elections justified 
their seizure of power and dismissal of parliament as a move to counter corruption in order to 
save democracy’ (Ibid.). They argued that ‘Thai democracy was impure because politicians
34 Ockey, J. 1998. “Crime, Society and Politics in Thailand”. In Carl Trocki (ed.) Gangsters, Democracy and the State in 
Southeast Asia. Pp. 39-53. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
35 Trocki, C. (ed.) 1998. Gangsters, Democracy and the State in Southeast Asia. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
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bought votes and were corrupt’ (Arghiros 2001: 170).36 This justification was self-serving as 
the military cannot claim to be untainted by corruption. Nevertheless, Thailand’s military do not 
seem to be enthusiastic supporters of democracy as they feel it is not always congruent with 
good government.
Southeast Asian political culture
In several countries in Southeast Asia, among the urban middle classes and the intelligentsia, 
certain political ideas like the rule of law, political accountability, emphasis on formal 
institutions, etc. have taken root (Mulder 1996: 217).37 However, one must also take into 
account cultural values that are held by wider society, in order to better understand the 
complex ways in which these interact with political structures, and how these influence 
people’s attitudes toward corruption, democracy and elections.
It would be useful to locate contemporary Thai politics within the broader context of the 
political history and traditional political culture of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia comprises a 
vast geographic region that contains myriad diversity of cultures and ethnicities with no 
dominant cultural tradition. Notwithstanding this diversity, ‘there are certainly various social 
and cultural elements which serve to unite large parts of the region and distinguish them from 
China and India' (King & Wilder 2 0 0 3 :14).38
Southeast Asian social organization is generally characterized by the principle of bilateral or 
cognatlc reckoning of kinship, relative gender equality, folk religion based on spirit propitiation 
and ancestor and fertility cults, a focus on the sacred qualities of the human head, etc. 
Nevertheless, the most significant shared cultural element in Southeast Asia, for the purposes 
of this thesis, is the ‘widespread occurrence of the politic-cultural institution of “big men’” (Ibid. 
2003: 14). Hence, given this broader context, one is able to appreciate certain historical 
continuities between the contemporary Thai rural strongman or chaopo (godfather) and an 
older tradition of informal rural leadership known as the phuyai (big man). .
36 Arghiros, D. 2001. Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon 
Press.
37 Mulder, N. 1996. Inside Southeast Asia: religion, everyday life, cultural change. Amsterdam: Pepin Press.
38 King, V. & Wilder, W. 2003. The Modern Anthropology of South-East Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
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Southeast Asian political history has long been characterized by the ‘shifting dynamics of 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies’, wherein successive monarchies and colonial 
administrations had all tried to ‘assert the primacy of central state structures’ in various states 
of the region. However, these imperial courts and colonial regimes have not succeeded in 
imposing continuous, unbroken and effective control over their territories for any length of 
time, only managing at the best of times to implement imperial state structures of a fragile 
nature.
The modern Thai polity, like most states, is a monolithic, centralized bureaucracy. However 
this state of affairs is quite recent. The Kingdom of Thailand underwent a profound 
bureaucratic transformation only in the late nineteenth century. Before that, Bangkok had 
related to its subjects not directly, but through intermediaries- local and regional chiefs, 
powerful and charismatic individuals who were to be found in the peripheral areas of the 
kingdom (Mcvey 2000: 5). Powerful and charismatic leaders developed who were 
independent of the state, but at the same time were co-opted by it for purposes of rule by 
proxy.
Wolters (1999: 11)39 calls these political entrepreneurs who operate on the margins of, and 
sometimes in competition with, other times in collaboration with royal kingdoms or colonial 
states, ‘men of prowess’. These locally influential leaders were skilled negotiators, diplomats, 
public orators and soldiers and religious leaders. Their type of leadership was characterized 
by flexibility, instability and achievement, and the personal qualities of a leader have to be 
demonstrated and continually renewed. Furthermore, political leadership is associated with 
certain cultural features such as patron clientship, personal entourages, factions and cliques, 
marriage alliances, etc.
Thus, these men of prowess- phuyai or big men achieved official recognition by being elected 
as phuyaiban or village head. It was these notables with whom district officials formally dealt 
(Mcvey 2000: 7). Law was distant. It was a matter for the state and not for the common 
people. ‘It was distant, incomprehensible, and generally available only to those who had the 
right connections and price. Local leaders and personal relationships were the providers of 
protection and arbiters of justice, not the law nor her officials’ (Mcvey 2000: 8).
39 Wolters, O.W. 1999. History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
Southeast Asia Program Publications, Studies on Southeast Asia 26.
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A phuyai, in Thai, means ‘big man’- the ‘commander of men who can attract followers whom 
he can dominate, direct their lives and activities, dispense or withhold rewards from them, and 
demand their subservience and loyalty’, and Thais want nothing more than to be one (Potter 
1976: 194).40 Phuyai are not respected because of wealth, prestige, position, or criminal 
influence, the source of their respect comes from their power, their ability to dominate and 
build up an entourage. ‘If one is powerful that is sufficient; the source of that power is 
relatively unimportant’ (Ockey 1998: 41).
In rural Thailand, beneath the phuyai (big man), was the historical nakleng (village 
strongman). He often played the role of protector of the village, and was widely admired and 
respected. He was a local hero, who, although may have raided and stolen from other villages 
and have been involved in criminal offences, strove to protect and defend his own village from 
the predations of naklengs from other villages. He would help resolve the crime by playing the 
role of mediator and sometimes he and his followers would gain protection from officials in 
return for a share of the spoils. He was a Robin Hood-like figure, a social bandit. He would 
ensure the return of stolen goods and maintain order, and may one day aspire to be 
phuyaiban (village leader). ‘Nakleng had a code of bravery, of decisiveness, and of loyalty to 
their own’ (Ockey 1998:42). He wielded considerable power and commanded respect in the 
village through a combination of threats and rewards (Ockey 2004: 82).
It is in this socio-political history of the Southeast Asian region that the local political 
entrepreneur needs to be viewed (Trocki 1998: 7).41 Modern-day equivalents of these pre­
modern Southeast Asian political entrepreneurs, ‘men of prowess’, can be seen in several 
states of contemporary Southeast Asia. Thailand, The Philippines, and Burma, have, in the 
last two decades, seen the emergence of democracy movements, and have managed to 
overthrow authoritarian and military rule, replacing them with elected civilian governments. 
Two of these three countries are now recognizably democratic, with salient features such as 
‘elected legislative bodies and executives, regular elections, political parties, written 
constitutions, and formal guarantees of political and individual human liberties’.
40 Potter, J.M. 1976. Thai Peasant Social Structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
41 Trocki, C. (ed.) 1998. Democracy and the State in Southeast Asia. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
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Yet within this new political framework, local and regional strongmen have survived, even 
thrived, parlaying their wealth, influence and connections to consolidate their regional power 
bases and to seek positions of power and influence on the national scene. They have grasped 
economic and political opportunities that beckoned by participating in electoral politics, acting 
as vehicles for the expression of local interests in national legislatures, further enriching 
themselves and their constituencies through the diversion of national resources and the 
manipulation for their own profit of the privileges of public office (Trocki 1998: 9). Sidel 
discusses below the various realms that ‘godfathers’ have come to occupy and dominate in 
Thai life since the mid 1980s:
These chaopo conducted interrelated activities in three realms: the economy, elections, and the 
state’s coercive apparatus. First the economic activities of chaopo are quite visible within loosely 
defined territorial bailiwicks, where they accumulate proprietary wealth (agricultural land, real 
estate, mills, processing centres, factories; shares in banks and industrial firms), acquire state- 
derived concessions, contracts, and franchises (e.g., logging, mining, public works, transport), and 
operate illegal rackets (e.g., in the drug trade, gambling, smuggling). Second chaopo have achieved 
great prominence and power through their successful service- or provision or- vote brokers {hua 
khanen) in elections, delivering parliamentary constituencies, or regional clusters of constituencies, 
to Bangkok-based patrons, local clients, or themselves on election day, through a combination or 
coercion, vote buying, and electoral fraud...(Sidel 1999: 150).42
A note of caution, however, rural Thai strongmen have existed for a long time, but have 
traditionally been reluctant to take on the responsibilities of public office, and ‘as recently as 
the 1960s the positions of kamman (sub district head) and village head were deeply 
unpopular’ (Arghiros 2001:71) because local office held few rewards. This situation started to 
change in the mid-1970s when development budgets to the sub district council were 
decentralized, and suddenly influential individuals saw ‘predictable and significant economic 
gains’ from the post of kamman or village head (Ibid.). Therefore, entry o f‘gangsters’ into rural 
office was initially due to the availability of new sources of generating wealth, and not due to a 
desire to capture political office per se.
The image of the powerful, but benevolent and heroic nakleng is such, that, many powerful 
individuals in present day Thailand claim to be nakleng, but bristle when referred to as 
chaopo, a literal translation of the English word ‘godfather’, which sometimes has criminal 
connotations. The term connotes not only wealth and power, but also the ability to operate 
above the law (Pasuk & Sungsidh 1996:57). The term has an older meaning, that of a type of
42 Sidel, J. 1999. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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guardian spirit. Even the term chaopo has divided into ‘good’ chaopo and ‘bad’ chaopo, with 
the former resembling the nakleng, and evoking the older meaning of chaopo, that of guardian 
spirit, and the latter, one is involved in disputes and killings. Nowadays the term chaopo has 
been so loosely used by the media that it now strongly connotes those involved in the vice 
trade; smuggling, prostitution, etc (Chartornvong 2000: 56).43
The Thai bureaucrat and the big man are both men of status who command respect. They 
both have power, but the nature of the power that a bureaucrat possesses differs from the big 
man’s. The Thai term ammat means ‘legitimate power’, that being derived from official 
authority. The term itthiphon, on the other hand, means influence, an informal kind of power, 
something that connotes impropriety and illegality; something a charismatic leader traditionally 
outside of the state apparatus possesses. Officials possessed ammat, the power of authority, 
while non-officials, especially nakleng (village strongman) and phuyai (big man) at best had 
itthiphon, which was illegitimate as the proper locus of power rested in the state alone. Indeed, 
very recently in contemporary Thailand, partly as a result of media coverage, the only 
adjective that ever occurs alongside, itthiphon is the term muet, which means ‘malign’ and 
‘dark’ (Mcvey 2000: 5). This suggests that the modern, highly centralized and bureaucratic 
Thai polity seems to disapprove of and discourages rural leaders with alternative sources of 
power and legitimacy to the state. It calls these leaders ‘godfathers’ and insists that their 
‘influence’ is necessarily bad.
Nevertheless, Thai chaopo, like their historical counterparts, play complex, multifaceted roles 
in contemporary Thai society. They are often on the wrong side of the law, yet collaborate with 
the authorities and are fundamental for political parties in capturing of political power in the 
countryside. The urban and provincial middle-classes despise their role in political corruption, 
yet they are popular among rural voters as they appeal to local interests by acting as patrons. 
This thesis will look at the nature of the ‘influence’ that rural politicians called heidao 
(gangsters) wield, and contrast it with the ‘authority’ of government officials. It will also explore 
the complex roles that they play in contemporary Taiwanese electoral politics.
Hanks (1962)44 explored the relationship between cultural values and Thai political structures, 
specifically groups centred round a powerful individual. He saw merit and power to be the two 
fundamental principles behind social order and hierarchy. Thai society is vertically structured 
in a rigid, but also highly fluid hierarchy, in which each man occupies a station. One man’s
43 Chartornvong, S. 2000. “Local Godfathers in Thai Politics”. In Ruth McVey (ed.) Money and Power in Provincial 
Thailand. Pp. 53-73. Singapore: Silkworm Books.
44 Hanks, L. 1962. “Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order”. American Anthropologist (A (6): 1247-1261.
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place in the hierarchy depends on merit (bhun) or virtue, wherein the higher one’s position, the 
more merit he possesses.
Merit is not a fixed virtue, but can be added to or subtracted from, and individuals rise and fall 
within the hierarchy according to the relative amount of merit they possess at a given time. 
Thus people ‘make meritorious deeds’ in order to increase their store of merit and rise to a 
higher station. There is, in addition, another way of ascending the hierarchy, which is for one 
person to tie his fortune with another one, higher up than he. The higher up one is, the more 
resources he can distribute to his ‘inferiors’, and the more one’s status as phuyai (big man) is 
consolidated.
Hence, the appeal of a big man to ordinary people depends on his greater perceived store of 
merit and power. Followers yearn to belong to a phuyai’s (big man) group or entourage. For to 
belong to a big man is to be in a position to benefit from greater resources than if one acted 
alone. Furthermore, power begets power, and power is a sign of goodness and virtue. Thus 
‘power itself is proof of goodness and virtue and attracts followers.. .The reverse is also true. If 
power begins to slide from the leader of a clique, it falls at an accelerating rate, since the initial 
slide is evidence of a decline in virtue which in turn results in less power to reward those 
opportunities those opportunistic followers who quickly leave a sinking leader’ (Rosen 1975: 
142-143).45
In order to further understand how people’s cultural values influence attitudes towards 
democracy, we should also see how Thai culture perceives social life and how it perceives 
wider society. Thai culture views political life as belonging to either one of two spheres; the 
internal world of one’s own family, community and village, and the external world. The inner 
world of family, community and village is one where values of hierarchy, moral inequality, 
moral obligation, shared well-being and mutual dependence predominate. Moral, consensual 
rules of the family and community operate to maintain harmony and stability in this inner 
world.
The external realm is also seen as hierarchical. But more importantly, especially for rural 
people, the external world is anonymous and businesslike, unruly and unlawful, morally 
neutral and beyond the moral, consensual rules that bind residents of the inner world (Mulder 
1996: 221). This unruly, unlawful, anonymous and morally neutral zone that is the world 
beyond the village and community is both threatening and mysterious for rural denizens. They
45 Rosen, G. 1975. Peasant Society in a Changing Economy: Comparative Development in Southeast Asia and India. 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
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know they may not understand it, but want and need someone who can impose their will and 
enforce their order there. Thus for rural people politics is about having a local person, an 
insider, who is powerful. For them ‘politics is about power, about laying claims to the external 
world. Power is an attribute of strong men, of ‘men of prowess’ who can impose their will on 
an unruly, unlawful external world. Such power is morally neutral. Power operates in an area 
that is beyond the moral, consensual rules of the inner world of family and community’ (Mulder 
1996: 221).
Keeping order in society is the task of government, particularly a ‘personalized leader’ a ‘man 
of prowess’ capable of dominating the external world. He enforces desirable order, and what 
is good for him, as a father, should be good for all. It is, therefore, loyalty to him and the 
collectivity he stands for, that is far more important than law as a means of maintaining good 
order (Mulder 1996: 217). And a politician, a ‘man of prowess’ is expected to use ‘his power 
for his own purposes, his benefit and in the interest of those who depend on him’. The 
external world is ‘like the forest, it is there to be exploited, it is a shared resource, not the 
public good’ (Mulder 1996:221). It is ‘nobody’s and everybody’s land, a field of opportunity to 
be appropriated as the need arises...It is a shared resource, but not a common possession’ 
(Mulder 1996:216). Thus once one accepts these basic premises of rural political life, the idea 
of ‘corruption’ will then sit uneasily in the Southeast Asian rural context. This thesis will look at 
rural values and attitudes towards life in general, and towards corruption, politics and 
politicians in particular. It will also investigate how rural strongmen appeal to voters by 
accommodating and catering to voters’ aspirations and expectations of their leaders.
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A history of rural leadership
Taiwan in 1600 was on the fringes of the Chinese empire and was peripheral to Chinese 
consciousness and activity. It was inhabited largely by aboriginal tribes of Malayo-Polynesian 
stock, and was only irregularly visited by Chinese fishermen, pirates and smugglers. Dutch 
and Spanish expeditions had established minor posts and forts on the island, but were unable 
to consolidate their presence, and had largely abandoned the island by the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Throughout its history, it had served as a base and refuge for rebel 
forces who used it as a staging ground for rebellion against China, and also those who sought 
to escape Chinese rule (Wills 1999).46
Taiwan came to be incorporated into the Chinese imperial state in 1684, when the island was 
made a prefecture of the southern Chinese province of Fukien. A military garrison and a civil 
administration were established to administer the island on behalf of Fukien Province. Large- 
scale immigration of Fukienese, mostly males, occurred during the period of Qing imperial rule 
of Taiwan (1684-1895), especially from the eighteenth century onwards. Life on the island 
during this period can best be described as a big frontier or pioneer town. The preponderance 
of unattached males, fond of gambling and brawling, villages composed of Chinese settlers 
who shared the same surname or the same hometown in China, which fostered inter-village 
mistrust and rivalry, combined with many outlaws, bandits, and other criminal elements, all 
contributed to create a situation of chronic unrest and sub-ethnic strife until about 1780 
(Shepherd 1999).47
The presence of strong rural leaders first developed during the early days of Chinese 
immigration and settlement of Taiwan in the early Qing period. The Qing dynasty 
administrative rule over Taiwan has been characterized as largely ‘weak’ and ‘ineffective’, 
thereby precluding any chance of establishing a strong government there. Bureaucrats were 
sent to administer Taiwan until the end of Qing rule in the late nineteenth century. However, 
they could not cope with the amount of responsibilities, given the meagre resources at their 
disposal, and their lack of familiarity with local conditions.
46 Wills, J. 1999. “The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime”. In Murray 
A. Rubinstein (ed.) Taiwan: A New History. Pp. 84-106. London: M.E. Sharpe.
47 Shepherd, J. 1999. “The Island Frontier of the Ch’ing, 1684-1780”. In Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.) Taiwan: A New History. 
Pp. 107-132. London: M.E. Sharpe.
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Qing officials and troops stationed on the island were poorly trained and were assigned to the 
island on three-year intervals. Imperial officials appointed to serve in Taiwan were offered 
such a very low rate of remuneration that ‘officials had to resort to all kinds of corruption to 
make enough money to live’ (Goddard 1966: 99).48 Mandarins and yamen were corrupt and 
local people were provoked by the restrictive regulations the Taiwan officials had to enforce, 
especially during the last two decades of Qing rule (Lamley 1981: 291 ).49 Th e high cost of 
collecting revenue, the difficulty of constraining abuse by tax collectors, and the resistance 
heavy taxation created’ compelled the late imperial state to minimize expenditures, keep taxes 
low, and finally to rely on local elites to provide governmental services (Shepherd 1995: 5).50
Toward the end of the early period of Qing rule when Taiwan was still characterized as a 
‘frontier’ region (1684-1780), local elites became increasingly involved in assisting state 
officials assert control over their communities (Wilkerson 2004:147).61 Prominent locals were 
deputized as assistants (tiexie), to directly administer each village’s day-to-day affairs. At the 
time all able-bodied villagers had to devote a certain number of days each year in compulsory 
service (kugong) to the Qing government, but tiexie were exempt. They did not receive a 
salary for their services but were allowed to collect a fee from the people they helped. They 
were virtually ‘agents’ working on behalf of the state with semi-official status.
Few important things got done in village life without their involvement. These tiexie wielded a 
lot of quanshi (power and influence) and these posts were extremely coveted (hen 
qiangshou), only the most influential and charismatic personalities in each locality were 
appointed to the post. These posts provided an opportunity to make money as there was no 
standard fee for each service, thus the tiexie would maximize their income by varying the fees 
sought depending on the circumstances. The Qing officials who governed in the formal sense 
knew of and often tolerated their lucrative activities as the tiexie combined intimate knowledge 
of local conditions with sufficient charisma and power to be effective leaders (Wang 2004:64- 
65).52
48 Goddard, W.G. 1966. Formosa: A Study in Chinese History. London: Macmillan.
49 Lamley, H. 1981. “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period”. In Emily M. Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.) The Anthropology of 
Taiwanese Society. Pp.282-318. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
50 Shepherd, J. 1995. Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800. SMC Publishing: Taipei.
51 Wilkerson, J. 2004. “Late Imperial Education and Control: Rural Villages in the Penghu Islands”. Taiwan Journal o f 
Anthropology 2 (1): 141-170.
52 Wang Tai-sheng. 2004. Taiwan Falii Shi Gai Lun (An Historical Introduction to Taiwanese Law). [2nd Ed]. Taipei: Yuan 
Zhao Chu Ban Gong Si.
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A new class of landed gentry began to develop in the ‘intermediate’ period of Qing rule (1780- 
18:60), before Taiwan opened its ports to foreign trade. This intermediate period was also 
characterized by greatly expanded immigration to Taiwan from Fukien Province, as well as 
from other parts of China. Life during the early and intermediate period of Qing rule can be 
described as chaotic and lawless, punctuated by 159 incidents of civil disturbances, ranging 
from armed clashes, uprisings to peasant revolts and rebellions (Chen 1999:136). This state 
of affairs was provoked by the widespread corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy, 
conflicts between ethnic clans and villages who came from different regions in China and 
spoke different languages, and the large numbers of single, unemployed young men 
wandering the countryside making a living out of banditry.
Although the rural elite was often not a formal part of the bureaucracy with imperial title, the 
harsh conditions during that era forced local folk to cultivate strong personal ties to them as 
well as turn to each other for the provision of basic needs and services. Villages, usually 
comprising either Hakka or Hoklo ethnic groups, formed shenminghui (religious societies), 
zongci (ancestral halls) and community temples which served as ‘local political centres and 
served as symbols of unity, centres of self-government, and (in times of strife) headquarters 
for local militia’ (Lamley 1981: 295). ‘The involvement of lineages and temples in at least the 
yamen sub-bureaucracy was widespread across large areas of the empire’ (Wilkerson 2004: 
147).
The landlords of the intermediate period in Qing Taiwan used their resources and influence to 
mobilize local citizens militias, partly to help the bureaucracy put down rebellions in their 
areas, partly to mediate and resolve local disputes, partly to defend the village against 
marauding bandits, and also partly to protect their own property rights and living standards . 
from ‘bureaucratic parasitism’. By 1860 these landlords had accumulated enough wealth and 
social status as leaders of their rural communities, assuming ‘the characteristics associated 
with a local strongman in response to the general failure of the Ch’ing bureaucracy to provide 
for local security and protection’ (Chen 1999: 137).53
53 Chen, Chiukun. 1999. “From Landlords to Local Strongmen: The Transformation of Local Elites in Mid-Ch’ing Taiwan, 
1780-1862”. In Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.) Taiwan: A New History. Pp. 133-162. London: M.E. Sharpe.
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The status of the village landlords as community leaders and strongmen survived well into the 
twentieth century, and was greatly reinforced during the Japanese period (1895-1945). The 
Japanese colonial officials ‘preferred to handle village problems through the wealthy landlord 
class rather than by dealing directly with the peasants’, and ‘if the villagers were to get along 
successfully with the Japanese, they had to work through their landlords’. Thus the landlord 
continued as a formal and informal leader during this period, taking an active part in most of 
the village’s social and political affairs, mediating in village and inter-village disputes (Gallin 
1966:114-115).
In 1949 after its loss to the Communists in China’s protracted civil war, the KMT retreated to 
Taiwan. Mindful not to repeat the economic collapse that happened in China, the KMT was 
intent on shoring up the island’s economy. In the agrarian sector, this meant the 
implementation a series of economic reforms- rent reduction, the sale of public land, and a 
Land to Tiller program that redistributed most of the land from the island’s relatively few 
landlords to the tenant farmers. These economic reforms had tremendous results for the 
countryside. Former tenant farmers were able to finally own their own land and their increased 
incentives to work the land led to an increased yield, resulting in greatly increased incomes 
(Wang 1999: 324-325).54
Then KMT leader General Chiang Kai-shek instituted elections at the county, municipal, and 
provincial, although not national levels in the early 1950s to create and maintain a fagade of 
legitimacy for what was essentially an occupying power. The KMT, faced with regular 
elections in the countryside, sought to maintain control over local politics by using two 
methods by which it was able to manipulate local politicians; it granted government-dominated 
economic privileges to cooperative politicians, and it created at least two mutually opposed 
coalitions, now known as ‘factions’, in every area. This ensured that a permanent opposition 
did not surface as it played the factions off against each other, permitting the factions to 
alternate in power at the local level (Wang 1999: 327).
54 Wang, Peter Chen-main. 1999. “A Bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, An Economy Reengineered, 1949-1970”. In 
Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.) Taiwan: A New History. Pp. 320-338. London: M.E. Sharpe.
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It was in the 1950s that the characteristics of contemporary local politics began to take shape. 
The landed class, the traditional rural strongmen were gradually joined, but not completely 
replaced,55 by a small group of new informal leaders who ‘have more time and money than 
their fellows and who may aspire to improve their status’ (Gallin 1966:116). This new class of 
local leaders took advantage of new opportunities of enrichment in agriculture through greater 
access to land, credit, fertilizer, and machinery. These local leaders however, were reluctant 
to occupy political office, as the economic rewards were small, preferring to exert influence 
behind the scenes.
The KMT also laid the foundations for the country’s economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The success of land reform resulted in farmland being divided into small parcels, removing the 
economic incentive in putting more labour and investment into agriculture and thereby making 
investment in labour-intensive, light industrial manufacturing a more attractive investment. The 
government also consciously promoted an export-oriented strategy through the creation of 
export processing zones, soft loans, and foreign exchange liberalization, which made Taiwan 
an attractive site for domestic and foreign owned industries (Wang 1999: 331-333).
New opportunities for enrichment in the countryside came with the central government’s 
decision to invest heavily in the nation’s infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 
1980s, the KMT regime had given up its dream to ‘liberate the mainland’, and vast amounts of 
money were earmarked for thousands of construction projects for roads, bridges, and 
buildings to be built in the countryside. The substantial sums for construction projects went 
into local coffers whose disbursement was largely under the discretion of locally elected 
officials. This constituted a strong financial incentive for well-connected and locally influential 
individuals to run for political office. Locally influential businessmen, entrepreneurs, local 
politicians parlayed their connections at the local level, bribing officials, rigging public tenders, 
setting up construction companies, erecting structures with substandard materials, ensuring 
projects went to favoured friends and business associates, all in order to profit from the 
massively lucrative construction projects (Chin 2003: 144).
55 The traditional landlords were given incentives to shift their investments into industry (Wang 1999: 325).
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In the 1980s the country had a thriving economy and an ever-rising standard of living. A lot of 
capital was going idle, though, as the cost of labour was making low value-added industries 
uneconomic, but at the same time existing capital controls prevented entrepreneurs from 
setting up factories abroad.56 Ambitious individuals from the city and countryside realized 
there existed an opportunity to profit from a vast hitherto untapped market in leisure by 
catering to consumers who were capital rich. These individuals created a vast semi-legal 
leisure and entertainment industry- gambling joints, video arcades, karaoke bars, brothels, 
and even popular religion temples. Entrepreneurs ran underground lotteries and gambling 
places, operated illegal video arcades, managed karaoke bars and brothels, and even took 
over popular religion temples where resident mediums promised to divine the winning lottery 
number in exchange for a fee or donation. These individuals who profited from the new 
industry were often either, well-connected and locally influential businessmen who operated in 
a legal and commercial context that happened to be murky, if not illegal, or were local officials 
with ties to these businessmen.
By the 1980s Taiwan’s economic transformation was largely complete, and in this period the 
country’s political system also underwent a similar change. General Chiang Kai-shek died in 
1975, and was succeeded by his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who ruled until his death in 1988. 
President Chiang presided over a period of political liberalization, lifting Martial Law in 1987 
and allowing the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to form and to openly 
participate in electoral politics. Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 and 
proceeded to liberalize the political process further and contributed to the effective end of one- 
party rule. The country’s first direct presidential elections were held in 1996 and the KMT, led 
by President Lee, won the popular vote. However, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won the 2000 
presidential election and again in 2004, in the first ever democratic transfer of power in 
Taiwan’s history.
56 The barriers to overseas investment were lifted in the 1990s.
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The biography of Yen Ching-piao
This thesis will examine the life of an individual, Legislator Yen Ching-piao, who best 
exemplifies the complexities and contradictions of the heidao phenomenon in Taiwan. This 
man is a rural politician turned national legislator who the press and middle-classes vilify as 
representing all that is wrong with contemporary Taiwanese politics. Yet he, and other rural 
politicians like him, consistently win elections for public office in the countryside, and, at least 
in the case of Yen Ching-piao, broadly enjoy popular support among his constituency. 45 
years old in 2005, Mr. Yen is the eldest of four surviving sons of Mr. Yen senior, Yen Huai, 
who is 72 and presently retired and since 2004, a widower. His mother, Chen-cai, was 68 
when she passed away in 2004. His siblings are Yen Ching-tong, 44, Yen Ching-jin, 42, and 
finally Yen Ching-san, 41. The youngest, Yen Liang-she is deceased, having died over 10 
years ago.
Yen Ching-piao was nicknamed ‘piao the stone pumpkin’ (dongguabiao) by his grandfather 
owing to his short and stout build. Although he never liked it, that label has stuck with him for 
the past forty years. Married at 17, and a grandfather at 36, he came from a very humble 
background and his origins still have an effect on him to this day. ‘When I saw my parents 
struggle, I felt sad for them working so hard to raise four children’ he recalls in an interview. 
He would go to market at five in the morning to buy fish and other provisions even before he 
started school. Studying was a luxury poor people could not afford in those days. He skipped 
much of school in the early days as he had to work to support his parents and eventually 
dropped out of primary school. He learnt to drive a truck at seven and was already an 
important source of income for his family by the time he was thirteen. He took over his father’s 
rice selling business not long after that. His neighbours felt sorry for the boy. His father was a 
kind but strict man, as he thought children needed a firm but loving upbringing.
Not much is known about his adolescent years. However, his adult years are well known and 
• documented. Mr. Yen was a major jiaotou (big man) figure in central Taiwan’s coastal area, 
operating illegal gambling dens. In a bid to expand his gambling operations, he recruited a 
number of violent chronic offenders and also got along well with local government officials. He 
had a reputation as a highly influential heidao in central Taiwan in the early part of the 1980s,
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partly through his ability to lavish his underlings with money and privileges, and his knack for 
entertaining other influential individuals.57
He was caught in Operation Cleansweep (yiqingzhuanan), the crackdown on so-called gang 
activity, and subsequently spent three and a half years in Green Island’s maximum-security 
prison in the wake of the then KMT martial law government’s crackdown on organized crime in 
1986. He was sent to prison at twenty-six. At that time all four Yen brothers were in prison. ‘I’ll 
never forget those days I spent inside. I felt bad for having let my parents down. My friends 
encouraged me to enter politics. All I want is to do good and make it up to my parents. I am 
ashamed of what I did in the past’.58
He promptly stopped leading a ‘life of crime’ and entered local politics. He became a borough 
warden (lizhang) and a member of the KMT’s Black Faction (Heipai) in Taichung upon his 
release. Three years later he became a Taichung county councillor (xianyiyuan) in the 1994 
election. He was the candidate who garnered the most votes, and won all the elections he 
stood in and, by 35, was the youngest ever member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. He 
was preparing to campaign for the council speakership when he was accused of trying to 
bribe fellow councillor Yeh Shih-tou with NT$ 2 million to win his support.
Both Mr. Yen and Mr. Yeh were found guilty and each was sentenced to one year in prison at 
the close of the first trial at the Taichung district court in 1994. Both men appealed the verdict 
at Taiwan High Court’s Taichung Branch, which overturned the district court’s verdict and 
found them both innocent. The Taichung prosecutors however made two appeals to the 
Supreme Court but the high court’s verdict was upheld twice, absolving him. On the third 
retrial, however, the High Court decided to uphold the district court’s original guilty verdict- a 
one-year sentence for each defendant. He appealed for a fourth time.
He is widely believed to have strong, but indirect links with ‘gangsters’ and holds sway among 
local factions and has various business interests spanning cable TV, gravel plants, cement 
factories and restaurants.59 ‘Both my father and grandfather have been a big influence on me. 
My grandfather wanted me to have a lot of friends, both good and bad ones, but my father
57 See “The fiercest man in the Shalu battleground”. China Times Weekly n. 422. March 30, 1986. Pp. 39-43.
58 Extract from an interview with Mr. Yen, conducted by my research assistant Vivian Chen at the Legislative Yuan in July 
2004.
59 See “The history of the man they call ‘stone pumpkin”’. Taipei Times. June 15, 2000. p. 3.
44
wanted me to stay away from bad people and be a good boy’.60 There was an incident 
involving a car-chase and shoot-out between Taichung police and Mr. Yen and some of his 
lieutenants (xiaodi) in 1995. Two journalists who reported the story were subsequently 
attacked by a group of thugs with baseball bats. The local police chief even apologized to Mr. 
Yen after the incident. When a group of reporters mentioned Mr. Yen’s alleged heidao 
background to his office manager, he quickly answered back, saying: ‘Mr. Yen is a member of 
the Black Faction (Heipai) he is not a gangster (heidao)’.61
The following year saw another violent and highly publicized incident at the shareholders’ 
meeting at San Teh Enterprise. Apparently, Mr. Yen, with a group of ‘brothers’, appeared 
alongside another controversial assemblyman called Chen Ming-wen. He was caught on 
camera yelling and participating in a group brawl, and had this to say when asked about his 
poor public image: ‘Chewing betel nuts and cursing are not necessarily bad. As far as I am 
concerned, this behaviour indicates that the person is close to ordinary people. In the local 
political arena, this is the best way to win the constituents’ trust’.62
The next year, Mr. Yen’s brother and fellow assemblyman Yen Ching-jin, another alleged 
heidao, who had earlier escaped to the Philippines in order to avoid arrest by the Taiwanese 
authorities, publicly announced that he would kill Yang Tien-sen, his brother’s political rival. ‘I 
have no idea what my brother is up to. He is crazy and this is really a headache for me 
because I already have my hands full. People say that I might be a target of the Chih-ping 
antigang program, that I am the main operator of the underground professional baseball 
gambling racket in central Taiwan, and that I am the main reason for the crackdown on mob 
involvement in the stock market. People are blaming me for all the bad things. Now, even my 
own brother is creating a problem for me’.63
In 1998 Mr. Yen was nominated county council speaker (xianyizhang) after an easy re- 
election in that year’s contest for the Taichung County Council. He became chairman 
(dongshizhang) of Jenlangong Temple in Dajia, in 1999. The temple had a total savings of 
NT$ 1.2 billion in 1999, and many suspect Mr. Yen and his followers want to get their hands 
on the money. ‘If you wanted to make a lot of money, controlling rich temples is a much easier 
way than, for example, a public corporation where public oversight ensures there are very
60 Extract from the same interview with Mr. Yen done by my research assistant Vivian Chen in July 2004.
61 See “Black terror engulfed the soul of reporters”. Taiwan Weekly n. 97. August 13, 1995. Pp. 12-26.
62 See “Chen Ming-wen and Yen Ching-piao: Two bulls in politics and business”. Scoop Weekly n. 428. October 20,1996. 
Pp. 144-146.
63 See “A powerful force behind the threat from overseas”. China Times Weekly n. 996. March 30, 1997. Pp. 128-130.
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strict accounting and auditing procedures, temple affairs are not subject to strict supervision’ 
says a local Dajia informant. However, Ms. Liu, Mr. Yen’s secretary is quick to deny 
accusations of financial impropriety ‘It’s impossible. As a follower of Mazu, how can it be 
possible for Mr. Yen to seek profit from Mazu followers’ donations?’64
Politicians have been courting Jenlangong Temple for a long time. They sought the temple’s 
favours as it is a famous religious temple, and organizer of one of Taiwan’s most famous 
annual pilgrimages. Presidential candidates routinely stage high-profile visits to the temple in 
an attempt to win the sympathy of the masses. As one of the most powerful county council 
speakers and chairman of one of Taiwan’s richest and largest religious organizations, Mr. 
Yen’s influence could not be underestimated. His support was courted by all four presidential 
candidates, particularly, Lien Chan of the KMT, and James Soong, formerly of the KMT, but 
who broke away to form a new party, the PFP, to contest the 2000 presidential elections.
The annual pilgrimage Jenlangong Temple made to Xingang, Chiayi County in 1999 was 
proof of his mass appeal, as all four presidential candidates showed up to woo him and his 
followers at a time when the campaign for the 2000 race was at its height. Mr. Yen was a 
good friend of James Soong because the latter had visited his constituency several times and 
provided ample funds for local infrastructure projects for his hometown during Soong’s tenure 
as Taiwan Provincial Governor. After declaring that he ‘needs to ask Mazu for magic’, he 
subsequently openly expressed support for the independent candidate barely three days 
before the presidential election in March 2000. ‘Mazu spoke to me and told me to support him’ 
Mr. Yen said. He was expelled from the KMT soon after, in April 2000.
The ensuing events took an unfavourable turn for Mr. Yen, as his chosen candidate eventually 
lost the race, partly as a result of his explicit backing. The DPP published a huge campaign 
advertisement in the daily papers denouncing the ‘underworld’ connections that James Soong 
had with Mr. Yen, and those that Lien Chan had with Lo Fu-chu, another notorious ‘gangster- 
legislator*. The DPP’s advert highlighted their candidate Chen Shui-bian’s ties with Nobel 
laureate and President of Academia Sinica Lee Yuan-Tse, as a contrast. Lee Yuan-tse 
announced his support for Chen Shui-bian at the last moment and, according to him, this 
move was a reaction to Mr. Yen’s support for James Soong. The DPP narrowly won that 
election in mid-March, due, in part, to the divided opposition, and in part due to the public’s 
reaction to both Mr. Yen and Mr. Lee’s interventions. Even though James Soong won handily
64 See “Legislative aides- uncontrolled, unsupervised and on the make”. Taipei Times. August 21,2000. p. 3.
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in Taichung County, Mr. Yen’s stronghold, his associations with controversial figures lost him 
votes elsewhere in the country.
The DPP wasted no time in trying to eliminate ‘black gold’ soon after its 2000 election victory. 
President Chen Shui-bian set up a timetable, starting in August that year. This followed the 
end of the legislative session in late July, and the president wanted to act quickly in order to 
avoid any possible interference from lawmakers. Prosecutors from the Black Gold 
Investigation Centre raided the offices of Jenlangong Temple on August 3,2000, as part of its 
investigation into suspected financial crimes. Over twenty investigators searched all the 
offices of the temple and the homes of its accountants from 7am to noon. The temple’s 
accounting books were seized, and temple officials, including General Affairs Director Wan 
Fan-xiong and Treasurer Zhuang Mei-jing were questioned.
Mr. Yen says he was not personally responsible for the day-to-day operations of the temple, 
but he denied the temple was involved in any illicit activities or dealings. ‘I’ll definitely clarify all 
these matters for the public.’65 This was in response to the statement by then Minister of 
Justice Chen Ding-nan, who said there was no selectivity in the handling of ‘black gold’ 
criminal cases and stressed that the judiciary would use whatever evidence it had to punish 
tigers (da laohu), or organized crime bosses and not only punish houseflies (da cangying), or 
small-time crooks. Mr. Yen subsequently came back to Taiwan on August 9, 2000, six days 
after fleeing abroad following the raid on the temple. ‘I am not a tiger. I am a human being’ he 
said.66
Legislators from James Soong’s PFP party accused the government of ‘handling cases 
selectively’ and singling him out because he supported James Soong’s presidential bid. The 
raid seems to have been aimed at checking the temple’s account books and the rentals it 
collects from vendors, but the fact the raid was carried out by the Black Gold Investigation 
Centre seems to indicate that he himself was the prime target.67 However, ruling DPP 
lawmaker Jiu Tai-san maintains that the new government had decided to cut off criminal 
organizations’ illicit funds at their source and that the Jenlangong Temple case was just the 
beginning of the government’s efforts to fight black gold by such methods. ‘Jenlangong
65 See “Chenlan temple head denies being on the run”. Taipei Times. August 5, 2000. p. 3.
66 See “Chenlan temple’s Yen Ching-piao returns from China”. Taipei Times. August 10, 2000. p. 3.
67 See “Turning ‘black gold’ into fool’s gold”. Taipei Times. August 4, 2000. p. 8.
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Temple’s assets are worth over NT$ 1 billion and almost all leading public figures in Taichung 
County know that members of criminal organizations control this temple’s board,’ he stated 68
The change of administration made Mr. Yen realize that the days he could count on the 
protection of the ruling KMT were over. The bribing and vote buying case originally brought 
against him in 1994 was for trying to win the Taichung County Council speakership. The 
district courts initially found him guilty, but the verdict was reversed by a higher court on 
appeal, and was upheld by the Supreme Court a further two times. However, the third retrial 
decided to uphold the original guilty verdict of the district court and sentenced Mr. Yen to a 
year in prison. Taichung prosecutors asked the district court for permission to detain Yen 
Ching-piao on several criminal charges, including corruption, attempted murder, and banditry.
Photo 1: Yen Ching-piao’s wife Hou Li-chuan and KMT Legislator Tseng Chen-nung outside the detention 
centre where Yen Ching-piao was being held. Source: www.taipeitim es.com /.../2001/04/25/83079
He is alleged to have inflated his ‘public relations’ expenditures in order to take money from 
the council’s budget while he was a county councillor. Prosecutors were tight-lipped about the 
other two charges, but the media have speculated that the attempted murder charge stems 
from a 1996 shooting case when people from Mr. Yen’s office fired shots on a vehicle outside 
it in his township of Shalu. He is suspected of ordering the shooting. The local media also
68 See '‘Police storm Chenlan Temple” . Taipei Times. August 4, 2000. p. 1.
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believe the prosecutors are looking into a 1996 incident in which Mr. Yen allegedly used 
violence to blackmail a stock market-listed company.
‘I feel easy. I did no wrong,’ he said as he was being escorted by police from the Taichung 
County Office of the Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau to the district prosecutors’ 
office.69 Yen Ching-piao went to prison in late 2000 (see Photo 1), appealing the verdict of the 
1994 bribery and vote buying case a fourth time. Prosecutors also investigated a financial 
scandal involving Jenlangong Temple, although he was not personally charged with any 
crime. However Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen, his brother Jen Ming-zong, chairman of Dajia 
Township Council, and Liu Yu-lin, a temple official, were charged with forgery and breach of 
trust and were released on bail of NT$ 1 million, NT$ 200,000 and NT$ 500,000 respectively 
(Ibid.).70
While under detention for the vote buying case, he decided to enter the 2001 legislative 
elections as an independent candidate in Taichung County. His wife actively campaigned for 
him and he mobilized the full resources of Jenlangong Temple and won with 34,000 votes. He 
was released on a NT$ 5 million bail on January 5, 2002, after spending around 300 days 
inside. The same day of his release he was convicted to 11 years and six months in jail for 
corruption, attempted murder, possession of illegal firearms and attempting to pervert the 
course of justice. The verdict was again appealed.71
Mr. Yen’s political rehabilitation slowly got underway after his release. ‘Killer put down your 
knife, and become a Buddha’ was a Chinese proverb used by a high-ranking Dajia official. 
‘Mr. Yen has changed a bit. If he changes his ways, people will recognize that and he will 
keep getting their votes. He was touched by Mazu and has changed. If you are involved in the 
rituals and ceremonies at Jenlangong Temple maybe you will be a better person. If someone 
is near red, he will become red. If he is near black he’ll become black. In the people’s minds, 
to be elected town council representative (zhenmindaibiao) or county councillor (xianyiyuan) 
or even national legislator (liwei) means you achieve a new status and people will have to 
respect that new status. Is that a case of “whitening” {piaobai),’72 the official added.
69 See “Prosecutor ask court to detain Taichung officials”. Taipei Times. February 28,2001. p. 1.
70 On January 4,2002, Jen Ming-zhong, Dajia Town Council Chairman and brother of Jenlangong T emple Vice Chairman 
Jen Ming-kuen, was charged of bribery by giving voters tea sets for presents, and for inappropriate use of public funds. He 
was found guilty by the district court on January 25, 2002.
71 See “Yen Ching-piao found innocent of vote-buying”. Taipei Times. October 18, 2003. p. 2.
72 Excerpts from interviews with informants from Dajia.
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The most evident public manifestation of his political comeback and semi-transformation into a 
respectable politician occurred during the annual Jenlangong pilgrimage to Xingang, in Chiayi 
County, held in April 2003 (see Photo 2). There, at the pilgrimages climax, on April 9, 2003, 
President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu made an unprecedented 
appearance, sharing the stage with Mr. Yen at the prayer ceremony. Chen Shui-bian offered 
his prayers and shook hands with him, triggering speculation that the president sought to court 
support from the controversial lawmaker and temple president for the upcoming 2004 
presidential elections.
Photo 2: Legislator Yen Ching-piao with President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu at the
closing ceremony of the Dajia Mazu pilgrimage at Xingang, Chiayi County, on April 9th, 2003
It is not unusual for presidential candidates to call on Jenlangong Temple, along with other 
major temples, and seek an audience with the temple chairman. Indeed PFP Chairman James 
Soong and KMT Vice-Chairman Wang Jin-pyng showed up at the starting ceremony in Dajia 
only a few days earlier, interacting warmly with the legislator. The event in Xingang was 
unprecedented in that the president had hitherto avoided any contact with Mr. Yen in an effort 
to fulfil his vow to sever ties with ‘black gold’ politics. President Chen had even said that Mr.
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Yen could not be free from trouble even if he ‘prayed for help from Mazu\ when campaigning 
for DPP lawmakers in the legislative elections of 2001.73
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled on October 17,2003, that he was innocent of vote buying, 
finally putting an end to the nine-year old case first brought against him in 1994, having 
appealed five times. ‘It is finally over. Ever since the beginning, the first trial, I have been 
found innocent four times. I cannot remember how many times I have attended hearings at a 
court but finally I don’t have to do that anymore,’ he sighed with relief.74
The 2004 presidential elections were full of speculation. People and the media wondered 
aloud which one Legislator Yen would throw his lot in with this time. ‘Which way will the 
divining blocks go this time around?’ was a question frequently asked in Dajia. Even Chen 
Shui-bian visited Jenlangong Temple during the campaign period. He seemed to ignore his 
own pronouncements on ‘black gold’ by seeking Mr. Yen’s support. Mr. Yen, unsurprisingly, 
declined to declare his support for anyone that year. His mother had died shortly before 
Election Day, so he used the 40-day mourning period to ask for privacy and kept quiet over 
his favoured candidate. The DPP eventually won a narrow and very contested victory, which 
the KMT has, to this moment refused to recognize. Yen Ching-piao campaigned for re-election 
in the December 2004 legislative elections and won again by a comfortable margin.
Thesis outline
Chapter two explores the perception that ‘gangsters’ have taken over folk religion temples in 
rural Taiwan. It describes political infighting and intense factional rivalry that took place among 
the temple committee directors at two folk religion temples in Dajia, Taichung County. I 
describe the life story of the Jen brothers, the big men of Dajia, and how they, with the help of 
Legislator Yen Ching-piao, got to control Jenlangong, arguably Taiwan’s most famous temple. 
I will argue that the power struggles and infighting that occur in many temples in rural Taiwan 
are actually an extension of the factional struggles and infighting that are characteristic of local 
politics in the country. Religious politics and local politics are inseparable in rural Taiwan. 
Locally powerful individuals have a long history of political and temple leadership. The rise to 
prominence of the Jen brothers and Legislator Yen Ching-piao are unexceptional in this 
respect.
73 See “President attends Matsu festival, prays for peace”. Taipei Times. April 10,2003. p. 3.
74 See “Yen Ching-piao found innocent of vote-buying”. Taipei Times. October 18, 2003. p. 2.
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In Chapter three I describe and interpret middle-class values regarding politics and politicians. 
I argue that their ideal kind of politician is a soft-spoken, mild-mannered, highly educated and 
scholarly ‘gentleman’ who does not engage in the ‘hardball tactics’ and the ‘rough and tumble’ 
politics that is typical of many politicians. I will show that the middle-classes have broadly 
western democratic ideals and they are disappointed with political life and democracy in the 
country because a lot of the behaviour of many voters and politicians do not conform to their 
expectations of what democratic political life should be like.
Chapter four examines English and Chinese language newspaper and magazine articles that 
appeared during my fieldwork, as well as two recent films about Taiwanese gangsters. I 
contrast these sources with equivalent sources dating from before 1991 and I will show that 
there has been significant change in the way the press and the culture industry spoke about 
corruption. Before 1991, corruption was not a central issue in the local press, and gangsters 
were depicted in films as ‘flawed heroes’. From the mid 1990s to the time I did fieldwork from 
September 2002 to August 2005, the local press was full of corruption stories and about 
gangsters undermining the country’s political and economic structures. Similarly, the two films 
about gangsters dating from 1997 and 2000 now portray them as clandestinely infiltrating the 
political process and subverting the island’s democratic achievements. I will argue that these 
new narratives of corruption and gangsters as ‘public enemy’ are a way of instilling new 
attitudes and behaviours among the Taiwanese electorate. They are a way of forming new 
notions of what it means to be a ‘citizen’ of a modern, western-leaning, democratic country.
In Chapter five I examine significant episodes in the life history of Legislator Yen Ching-piao, 
and his demonisation as a heidao. I argue that the accusation is simplistic. He is not just a 
‘gangster’. He plays complex and multi-faceted roles in Taiwanese society. I further argue that 
people like him have existed in Taiwan for a long time, and these sorts of individuals are best 
seen as Southeast Asian ‘big men’.
In chapter six I describe and analyze rural residents’ values regarding politics and politicians. 
In brief, I will show that rural folk are not very interested in politicians’ ideologies and political 
philosophies. What they want and expect is a patron and benefactor who will provide them 
with material benefits and who will improve their welfare. Rural politicians attempt to establish 
close emotional and personal ties with their constituents based on ideas of loyalty, shared
52
kinship and blood ties. I will argue that rural politicians like Legislator Yen Ching-piao fill a gap 
between local interests and national politics that inevitably appears with electoral democracy. 
Rural politicians appeal to voters by portraying themselves as avengers, heroes and 
projectors.
Methodology
My fieldwork in Taiwan lasted three years, from September 2002, to August 2005, mostly 
spent in Taichung City, and the towns of Shalu and Dajia, half an hour’s ride by scooter from 
Taichung City. My main sources of data for the thesis come from participant observation, 
chatting informally, hanging out, and finally culminating in formal interviews with two groups of 
informants. The first group were around two-dozen highly educated middle class professionals 
who lived in the cities of Taichung, and Taipei, to a lesser extent, as well as the provincial 
towns of Dajia and Shalu, Taichung County. Most were university lecturers, schoolteachers, 
owners of private cram schools, pharmacists, doctors, etc. The lecturers were colleagues of 
mine at the department of Foreign Languages and Literature, and the department of 
Sociology, Tunghai University, Taichung, where I taught English and Spanish part-time for a 
couple of years. I lived in Dajia for six months prior to that and had made friends with a few 
local primary school teachers there. I also taught English part-time in three cram schools in 
Taichung and Dajia for two years and established an excellent relationship with the owners, 
as well as with several students, who I frequently socialized with outside work. The rest were 
neighbours of mine; one owned a pharmacy, and a few others were restaurant owners.
The other group of informants were several rural residents of Shalu and Dajia. I had several 
contacts in Dajia where I lived for six months. They either had menial jobs in shops, and 
restaurants, or were employees of the famous Jenlangong Temple. I also had a lot of 
acquaintances in Shalu; home town of Legislator Yen Ching-piao. I spent several months 
‘hanging out’ in the legislator’s voters’ surgery, chatting to his brothers and any voters who 
called in. I observed many incidents of voters arriving at the surgery requesting younger 
brother Ching-san’s help on a range of issues. I was careful to talk to a wider range of Shalu 
residents, than those who came to the surgery. I was concerned that my informants at the 
surgery would constitute a self-selecting group of people who were predisposed to the 
legislator. Thus I also made an effort to get my contacts at the cram schools, neighbours, 
colleagues at university, to introduce me to as many Shalu residents as possible, who did not 
have a vested interest in supporting the legislator.
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My research makes use of diverse materials, from historical sources to popular media, 
particularly magazine and newspaper articles and films, which complement other data gained 
through traditional ethnographic fieldwork such as life stories, interviews, poems, proverbs, 
editorial cartoons, campaign flyers, etc. Newspaper stories of corruption form an important 
part of my data. Gupta (1995)75 advocates combining participant observation with the analysis 
of mass media- newspapers, etc. given that traditional face-to-face methods of acquiring 
ethnographic data are insufficient to capture, for example, how the state is discursively 
constituted. In the same vein, how corruption is talked about at national level can only be 
grasped by accessing newspaper and magazine reports and articles. It is my firm belief that 
one cannot fully understand the contemporary heidao phenomenon without a sense of 
familiarity that comes from constant exposure to media stories about political corruption and 
corrupt politicians that has been a hallmark of Taiwanese journalism in recent years. Gupta 
and Ferguson (1997) state that:
Participant observation continues to be a major part of positioned anthropological methodologies, 
but it is ceasing to be fetishized; talking to and living with the members of a community are 
increasingly taking their place alongside reading newspapers, analyzing government documents, 
observing the activities of governing elites, and tracking the internal logic of transnational 
development agencies and corporations. Instead of a royal road to holistic knowledge of “another 
society", ethnography is beginning to become recognizable as a flexible and opportunistic strategy 
for diversifying and making more complex our understandings of various places, people, and 
predicaments through an attentiveness to the different forms of knowledge available from different 
social and political locations (1997: 37).76
However, access to data regarding corruption through traditional participant observation can 
prove to be slightly problematic, analytically and methodologically speaking. Firstly, as an 
analytical category, the phenomenon known as corruption is not without problems. The World 
Bank asserts that corruption is ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’. However, most 
definitions of corruption somehow ‘rest on the separation between the state or its agents and 
the rest of society’, but Haller and Shore (2005: 5)77 insist that this ‘public-private dichotomy is 
often an arbitrary and inherently ambiguous cultural category’. Moreover, the boundaries
75 Gupta, A. 1995. “Blurred Boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state”. 
American Ethnologist 22 (3): 375-402.
76 Gupta, A. & Ferguson, J. (eds.) 1997. Anthropological locations: Boundaries and grounds o f a field science. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
77 Haller, D. & Shore, C. (eds.) 2005. Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto Press.
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between the public and private spheres, as well as public office and private gain, are culturally 
specific to the west and certainly do not conform to people’s expectations in the countryside in 
Taiwan, as well as large pockets of her cities.
Secondly, from a methodological standpoint, how can instances of corruption be meaningfully 
quantified, if by very definition, it occurs only in ‘hidden, occult and unofficial settings, 
clandestinely, and with the knowledge of the immediate exchange partners only’ (Haller & 
Shore 2005:11)? These misgivings aside, I argue that it is nevertheless pertinent to study the 
phenomenon because it was almost universally perceived as being pervasive during the time 
of my fieldwork. Most of my informants were convinced that many sectors of Taiwanese 
society were riddled with corrupt practices. How prevalent is it? What epistemological status 
do we accord it? How do we measure it? These considerations aside, the undeniable fact is 
that it is widely perceived to exist and the mass media were instrumental in shaping people’s 
perceptions. It is perhaps prudent, given all these problems, to study not cases of corruption 
per se, but what stories are being told about them. Haller & Shore state:
Anthropology is perhaps better placed to deal not so much with corruption perse as with allegations 
of corruption and their effects. There are important parallels here with the anthropological study of 
witchcraft. Like witchcraft allegations, accusations of corruption also mirror structural cleavages and 
tensions in society and are often used by politicians to undermine the credibility of opponents in the 
competitive game of political reputation management (Haller & Shore 2005:14).
I also came across three films that I found relevant to my topic of narratives of corruption 
through watching Chinese language films on cable TV. After they were broadcast I quickly 
went to video shops and bought copies. Legislator Yen is a minor media celebrity in Taiwan 
whose face is instantly recognizable and has made regular appearances in magazine and 
newspaper articles, as well as TV news broadcasts. His celebrity and notoriety precede my 
fieldwork by several years so I have made liberal use of the substantial corpus of news and 
magazine articles and stories about him, some dating from as early as 1985, in order to fill in 
the details regarding his life.
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Chapter Two:
Temples and the New Rural Elite
Pilgrimage (jinxiang)
I marked it on my calendar for March, to follow Mazu’s pilgrimage.
I watched March on TV, transformed into a veiy long and colourful caterpillar.
The caterpillar went through the food chain, passing another village, and yet another.
The grandmother from Meizhou says: ‘you’re a school of fish, there are no Taiwan Straits.’
Mazu’s pilgrimage ends, the caterpillar is metamorphosing into a butterfly.
It flew back to the wall, and went back to March on the calendar.
There appear tattoos for titles in March.
They represent temple chairman, government officials and gangster bosses.78 
(poem written by Huang Chun-ming)
The above poem written by the renowned Taiwanese writer of the ‘nativist’ school of literature 
(xiangtuwenxue) Huang Chun-ming is a narrative in the first person about a Mazu 
pilgrimage.79 Huang Chun-ming was born in the countryside and spent his childhood there 
before moving to Taipei to pursue his professional career. His narrative style is characterized 
as that of a ‘sojourner narrator’ wherein the author documents rural life in constant change, 
‘caused by the encroaching urban spread, and the effect that these had on rural lifestyle’ 
(Haddon 1990:14). The changes are often disruptive, and Huang Chun-ming’s literary style 
suggests nostalgia over Taiwan's vanishing rural virtues’ as traditional practices and attitudes 
are continually eroded (Haddon 1990: 15).80
78 m ±W7^,
n - ® . . . .
The English translation of the poem was done with the collaboration of several Taiwanese informants.
791 came across the above poem shortly after attending the annual pilgrimage to Xingang in April 2003 organized by 
Jenlangong, Taiwan’s most famous popular religion temple. Although the writer does not specify the exact identity of the 
Mazu temple he is describing, there is a strong case to be made that the temple in question is Jenlangong in Dajia Town, if  
only because it’s annual pilgrimage is one of the country’s most famous and most televised events, and its chairman is 
‘gangster’ cum-legislator Yen Ching-piao.
80 Haddon, R. 1990. “Taiwan xiangtu wenxue: the sojoumer-narrator”. B. C. Asian Review 3-4: 1-82.
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This chapter will make sense of an apparent paradox present in contemporary Taiwanese 
society, especially in the countryside. This paradox is the perception of ‘gangsters’ being 
involved in popular religion temples. It is a popular perception among many of my rural 
informants, mainly the local schoolteachers and other highly educated professionals in Dajia 
Town* home of the famous Jenlangong Temple (see Photo 3). The existence of the poem by 
renowned Taiwanese writer Huang Chun-ming is consistent with my own findings, which 
reveal a picture of highly educated professionals from the countryside, who, like Huang Chun- 
ming, are convinced that ‘gangsters’ have taken over several village and town temples.
My enquiries have led me to the conclusion that leadership of local and regional popular, or 
folk religion temples in rural Taiwan has relatively little to do with one’s inherent moral 
qualities. Indeed, it has little to do with religion or belief at all. Instead, it is testimony to a 
salient fact-that temples and local politics are inseparable in southern Taiwan. Elected office 
and leadership of a popular religion temple are simultaneous positions that reinforce each 
other. Often, the struggle for control of a temple is an extension of the same factional politics 
that characterizes local politics. Also, many of the actors in these two spheres are one and the 
same.
The stories of the Jen brothers and that of Legislator Yen Ching-piao, this chapter’s main 
characters, suggests two things, first that political and religious leadership often do not inhabit 
separate, mutually exclusive spheres- they are more often than not closely intertwined. What 
this means is that locally powerful individuals will often hold elective posts. Many of these 
prominent rural individuals will also occupy high positions in temples and other religious 
organizations. Those individuals who get to lead a local temple and those who get to occupy 
high-level local office are powerful people. Often they are one and the same. Second, the 
class of powerful rural businessmen and industrialists who used to dominate local politics and 
temples, now has to compete with a new class of powerful political entrepreneur- the self 
made man, or ‘big man’ (Jiaotou) for rural political and religious leadership.
The fact that this new breed of powerful political entrepreneurs who get involved in temple 
affairs in the countryside are now being accused of being ‘gangsters’ is testament to the new 
type of dominant narrative regarding politics and morality that has emerged in Taiwan since 
the 1990s. Indeed, back in 2000 DPP lawmaker Jiu Tai-san remarked that‘almost all leading 
public figures in Taichung County know that members of criminal organizations control this
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temple’s board.’81 In summary, powerful people have had a long history of political leadership 
and of involvement in folk religion temples in rural Taiwan. The life stories of the Jen brothers 
and Legislator Yen Ching-piao demonstrate that in contemporary rural Taiwan, nothing has 
changed in this respect. What has changed is the way these people are being talked about 
and portrayed by the media and by the rural middle classes.
Photo 3: An inside-view of Jenlangong  Temple 
Source: www.iiawen.net/mazumiao0001 .jpg
The notion of ‘gangsters’ and temples is not a totally new phenomenon. Indeed Boretz 
(1996),82 studied the issue of temples, violence and young working class males in rural 
Beinan, Taidong Eastern Taiwan. He focused on groups of young men who, either worked, 
volunteered or performed in many of the temple performance troupes such as the military 
retainers (bajiajiang) in Taiwan. What is interesting is his assertion that many of these youths 
belonged to sworn brotherhoods, and tended to be classified by the general public as 
‘gangsters’ and ‘local hoodlums’ (liumang). These local toughs are more formally referred to 
as ‘braves’ (yong), generally these were:
81 See “ Police storm Chenlan Temple” . Taipei Times. August 4, 2000. p. 1.
82 Boretz, A. 1996. Martial Gods and Magic Swords: The Ritual Production o f Manhood in Taiwanese Popular Religion. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Anthropology, Cornell University.
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...working-class boys and young men who band together in defence of the village when territory 
and honour are at stake. On the other hand, these 'braves’ are also the ‘gangsters’ (liumang) 
who...extort protection money from local businesses, run gambling, prostitution, and smuggling 
rackets, and control local politics, enforcing control through intimidation and violence (Boretz 1996: 
124).
I shall argue, however, that Boretz’ research, although nominally about ‘gangsters’ and 
temples, differs from the phenomena in this chapter in significant ways. Firstly, that the 
‘gangsters’ he encountered during his fieldwork have little in common with the ‘gangsters’ I 
came across. Although Boretz’s youths and the Jen brothers I study are both referred to as 
‘gangsters’, Boretz’s ‘gangsters’ are, when seen in the context of the late 1980s, were really 
youthful rebels, deviants and misfits. The ‘gangsters’ I encountered, are ‘public enemies’. 
Their identities are constructed in the borrowed language, metaphors and tropes inspired by 
contemporary narratives of corruption, public accountability, separation of public and private 
spheres, etc.
It is instructive to refer to the original Chinese terms to get a clearer idea of the connotations 
attached to them. The former are liumang while the latter are heidao. Shaw (1991) originally 
described liumang as a ‘deviant subculture’, a ‘black society’ (heishehui) that eschews 
traditional Confucian values such as hierarchy, family, and authority, preferring instead to find 
freedom by joining gangs, committing petty crimes and relying on friends as equals. Heidao, 
as I mention in chapter four on the other hand, are much more insidious than a deviant 
subculture. Heidao are criminals who pervert and undermine the country’s democratic and 
economic foundation. The negative usage here is not really about being social deviants. 
Rather, it is about being a ‘public enemy’.83
83 To better understand the qualitative difference between these two terms, we must see them as products of the Zeitgeist of 
the times in which they first appear. Boretz did his fieldwork between 1988 and 1991, on the eve of the country’s political 
reform and media liberalization. The idea of ‘corruption’ and various types of ‘informal institutions’ had yet to be made 
‘thinkable as crimes’ and the figure of the ‘gangster-politician’ had yet to be invented. My fieldwork took place at a time 
when some sectors of Taiwanese society had become extremely sensitized to the ideas of corruption and informal 
institutions. The notions of ‘separation of public and private spheres’, and the ‘abuse of public office for private gain’, 
without which corruption cannot be conceptualized as a crime, had long been a staple of public culture before I started 
fieldwork.
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I believe that the literature that is directly relevant to my case studies lies in the research on 
temple politics as a direct extension of factional politics in rural Taiwan. Seaman (1978),84 for 
example, documents stories of behind the scenes and sometimes not so behind the scenes 
power struggles in a Taiwanese spirit-writing temple in a mountain village called Pearl 
Mountain in the same administrative town of Houli, home of the Purple Cloud Temple, beside 
Dajia, one of the two temples that I study in this thesis. He interprets the events of the spirit- 
writing sect as a subset of the larger political struggle that engulfed the town:
The events of the late 1940s and early 1950s created a political situation in Taiwanese rural society 
that sparked intense factional rivalry. As a result of the suppression of secret societies and local 
bullies by the central government and the subsequent land reform, villagers were left without a 
dominant political elite. At the same time, the system of local elections permitted nearly total 
autonomy as far as the selection of local leadership was concerned. Political activists and faction 
leaders sought to use all kinds of social relationships and institutions to mobilize support for 
themselves. In the spirit-writing cult of Pearl Mountain Village, one such faction found the 
organizational potency, which eventually led to its domination of the village (1978:156).
In addition, Feuchtwang and Wang (2001 )85 essentially make the same argument that I am 
making here, namely, that one cannot divorce temple affairs from the broader context of local 
politics in Taiwan and China. They studied the foundations of rural leadership and the 
relationship between religious and political authority in villages in Fujian, China and Taiwan, 
and the authority attained by locally prominent residents who effectively organize activities 
such as temple building and religious festivals. They show two kinds of leadership that 
coexisted at the village level- that exercised by government officials, and that enjoyed by 
prominent individuals who do not occupy official positions, but who nevertheless inspire loyalty 
and respect for their demonstrated ability to get things done. These two forms of leadership 
coexist in the countryside.
Chau’s (2006)86 book on popular religion, as well as local power and the state in China is 
particularly relevant to my argument regarding the symbiotic nature of temple politics and the 
broader arena of local politics. He describes the story of one of the richest non-government 
run popular religion temples called the Black Dragon King (Heilongdawang) in the village of 
Hongliutan, within Longwanggou Valley, in northern Shaanxi Province. The author describes 
temple affairs at Longwanggou Valley as ‘neither completely embedded in village politics nor
84 Seaman, G. 1978. Temple Organization in a Chinese Village. The Orient Cultural Service: Taipei.
85 Feuchtwang, S. & Wang, Ming-ming. 2001. Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders in China. London: Routledge.
86 Chau, A. 2006. Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
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completely dissociated from it’ (2006: 197-198). He uses the phrase ‘temple/village political 
nexus’ to describe the state of affairs by which ‘Old Wang’ occupied the most crucial point in 
the nexus because he was simultaneously temple and village head. Hongliutan village, the 
site of the temple, is home to two opposed factions who vie for leadership of the locality. 
These factions ‘coalesced along lines of personal grudges, multigenerational conflicts 
between households, and perceived political and economic stakes in the power field. 
Gradually village factionalism in Hongliutan solidified and turned into a protracted fight 
between two main blocs: one under Lao Wang and the other under a certain Zhang Xuezhi. 
These factions did not have definite political platforms. The main goal of the fight was to 
prevent the other faction from achieving their goals’ (Ibid.).
In addition to arguing that powerful rural individuals get involved in temples because the 
religious politics and local politics are closely intertwined, I will also argue that these political 
entrepreneurs are motivated, at least partly, by a desire to gain merit as well as public 
acceptance. That is, these men are partly driven by the desire to be perceived as people who 
are not only powerful but also moral and decent. Seaman’s (1978) research on the spirit- 
writing cult in Houli town speculated that village politicians participated in temple affairs, as 
they provided ‘an alternative source of legitimacy for politicians who wish to divorce 
themselves from the prevailing political ideologies of the modern world’ (1978:162). Thus, one 
factional group, Boss Ng’s faction, ‘could avoid to some extent the accusations of selfish 
motives commonly levelled against village politicians’ (1978:161). I will argue that Legislator 
Yen Ching-piao and the Jen brothers got involved in the running of the two Dajia temples 
partly because they also wanted to gain merit. In short they wanted to remake their public 
personas into that of respectable, decent citizens- pillars of the community.
W e can further explore the cultural logic of temples and merit making as a plausible 
explanation regarding heidao involvement of folk religion temples by making a comparison 
with the traditional political culture of Southeast Asia. Hanks (1962) views merit and power in 
Thailand as very closely interrelated, and the Thai cosmos as being arranged in a vertical 
hierarchy that reflects its members’ differential stores of merit and power. Buddhist beliefs 
regarding karma stipulate that a man’s station in life is the consequence of his acts in a past 
life. Thus a man who occupies a high social position will have relatively more merit (bhun) and 
goodness/virtue (kwaamdii) than someone lower down the ‘pecking order’. Thus Thais see 
wealth and power as directly correlated with merit, and that an increase in the former
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translates into a corresponding increase in the latter. This means, simply, that a man who 
becomes wealthy and powerful is also assumed to have become ‘meritorious’ and ‘good’.
A person’s station in the hierarchy is sufficient to afford him the treatment and respect that 
station confers:
A man rises because of merit and is accepted without regard for his humble origin. Indeed, a 
humble origin implies a considerable store of merit and might increase his prestige. What we 
designate as the individual or person is more restricted in Thai than in Western society. A Thai is a 
minister or a farmer only as long as he holds the station. When a farmer, he acts as a farmer, but 
when he receives his insignia of office, he discards his rustic ways...Thus one emphasizes the 
station of the moment...To a greater extent than in the West, the insignia transform the person. To 
a lesser degree do people speak slightingly of the ‘newly arrived’ or seek flaws in the clothing that 
intends to make a gentleman...(Hanks 1962:1252).
Furthermore, Thais regard merit not as a fixed characteristic in the western sense, wherein, 
depending on one’s relative merits, one is either ‘blessed’ or ‘damned’. Rather it is fluid, 
depending on one’s actions in life, ‘there are no fallen angels in the Thai cosmos’. Thus the 
Thais see a person as ‘always gaining or losing merit’ (Hanks 1962:1247). Moreover, Thais 
believe that because karma is cumulative, ‘with the most recent actions weighted 
proportionately heavier’ (Ockey 1998: 41), one’s actions in the latter part of life are more 
important than those one has done in one’s youth. Thus a man, who in his early years has 
committed a lot of ‘bad’ deeds in his quest for wealth and success, can make up for it in later 
life with good deeds. These actions will suffice to make him a ‘meritorious’ individual. A case 
in point is the example of the Thai rural politicians called chaopo (godfather). ‘Leading chaopo 
and corrupt politicians are frequent donors to religion and charity in Thailand; in return, they 
gain merit and legitimacy’ (Ibid.). I will make the case that Taiwanese heidao, like Thai chaopo 
get involved in temple affairs in order to burnish their reputations as ‘meritorious’ characters.
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in the town of Dajia, Taichung County, Taiwan. 
It focuses on the lives of a few ambitious working-class brothers, known as the Jen brothers 
(Jenjia). This chapter is a partial ‘behind the scenes’ account of the life and times of a family of 
so called ‘gangsters’ who, in collaboration with Legislator Yen, managed to secure the top two 
posts at Jenlangong, Taiwan’s foremost popular religion temple dedicated to the goddess 
Mazu, as well as the Purple Cloud Temple, a much lesser known local temple, located in Houli 
Town, beside Dajia Town, Taichung County.
62
I shall now formulate a few questions pertaining to my arguments, which I will answer in the 
course of this chapter:
• What type of person is inclined to lead a temple?
• What methods do these people employ to control a temple?
• What is their motivation for getting involved in folk religion temples?
• What are the dominant narratives regarding ‘gangsters’ running temples?
As previously mentioned in the introduction, political life in rural Taiwan is characterized by 
extreme factional infighting. Most villages and towns are home to two or more rival factions- 
opposing power coalitions whose members are united not by a shared ideology or philosophy, 
but by a desire to accumulate as much political power as possible, and deny it to the other 
coalition. The fact that a faction is dominant in a locality reflects the current balance of power 
relations there.
In addition, the makeup of the current political leadership of some villages in rural Taiwan is 
also a reflection of the country’s changing social and economic structures. Before land reform 
in the 1950s, the landowning class dominated rural politics- many appointed village chiefs 
were the locality’s most powerful landlords. The introduction of local elections, land reform and 
other wide ranging economic reforms since the 1950s by the KMT gave rise to a new, 
powerful class- the industrialists. These individuals, were, however reluctant to occupy 
political office. However, this situation changed in the 1980s, when the KMT decided to pour 
vast amounts of money in rural construction projects whose disbursement fell under the 
discretion of local officials. This prompted many rural businessmen and entrepreneurs to run 
for local office themselves, or alternatively, they threw their support behind friends and 
associates who were interested in the post.
The 1980s also witnessed the rise of a new class of politically powerful rural individuals. 
These people saw, and took advantage of the then burgeoning and highly lucrative market in 
the leisure and entertainment industry- gambling joints, illegal video arcades, karaoke bars, 
brothels, etc. Many of these ‘self-made men’ became immensely wealthy, and several decided 
to run for local office and get involved in running folk religion temples. This chapter explores 
the story of such men. Concretely, it is about the political rise of the Jen brothers.
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These brothers are popularly known as the local jiaotou (big men) of Dajia Town and they 
have achieved success in business and local politics, often through illegal or semi-legal 
means. The Jen brothers achieved success largely by identifying commercial opportunities in 
the leisure and gambling industry that opened up since the 1980s. This was a time in which 
Taiwanese society witnessed rapid economic growth accompanied later by social and political 
liberalization.
These individuals have leveraged their wealth and influence in two ways. Firstly, they have 
entered local politics. Second, they have, with Legislator Yen’s assistance and collaboration, 
also managed to penetrate the management committee of two local popular religion temples. 
The first is the famous Jenlangong Temple dedicated to the goddess Mazu, and the second is 
the recently built and much lesser known Chinese Purple Cloud Temple.
The temple directors87
Photo 4: Yen Ching-piao, centre, with Jen Ming-kuen seated to his right, is holding
a press conference at Jenlangong  Temple
Source: www.taipeitimes.com/.../06/23/storv/0000041113
87 Being a director (dongshi) at Jenlangong was like being the founding family members and public face o f a large, complex, 
highly lucrative but professionally run family business. Like the professionally managed family business, the temple 
employed dozens o f people, from cleaners and receptionists to accountants, who essentially ensure the temple runs itself. 
Like the family members who own sit on the board o f many professionally run family owned firms, most o f the directors, 
with the exception o f the vice-chairman, were quite removed from the day-to-day management o f the temple. Their main 
role seemed to be the public face o f the temple to the outside world, and to other temples. Thus the directors were constantly 
in the reception room, meeting visitors, VIPS, directors from other temples, reporters and journalists, etc.
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Arguably Taiwan’s most famous and prestigious popular religion temple, Dajia Town’s 
Jenlangong whose main deity is the goddess Mazu, is also a major pilgrimage site. An 
impressive and highly ornate temple that is located downtown, just minutes from the train 
station, it organizes the annual eight-day pilgrimage to Fengtiangong Temple in Xingang 
Town, Chiayi County, south Taiwan. The temple’s in-house brochures claim that it was first 
established in the early eighteenth century. However, regional gazetteers from Danshui and 
Hsinchu provide contradictory accounts of the temple’s founding (Rubinstein 2 0 0 3 :190).88
Founded by Wu Feng-kai in 1984, the Chinese Purple Cloud Temple is a massive complex 
built on three levels on a terraced hilltop in Waipu village, just outside Dajia Town. The 
imposing temple structure is readily visible as it quite near the main road and railroad tracks 
that lead to the Dajia train station. Originally established to commemorate the birthday of the 
Daoist god Taishanglaojun, it is now a popular religion temple, which houses several Daoist 
gods such as Jigong, Jiutianxuannu and Lifudawang, as well as the Buddhist goddess 
Guanyin. The temple also houses a charity organization dedicated to the god Jigong and 
raises funds for causes deemed worthy by the temple committee.
Jenlangong temple’s busiest months89 run from around February, the start of Lunar New Year 
celebrations, to around April, which is around the time that the temple organizes, in 
cooperation with the Taichung County Government, the month long Mazu International 
Culture Festival {Mazu guoji wenhuajie)90 which culminates in the televised eight-day 
pilgrimage to Xingang, Chiayi County in the south.
88 Rubinstein, M. 2003. “Medium/Message in Taiwan’s Mazu-Cult Centres: Using ‘Time, Space, and Word’ to Foster 
Island-Wide Spiritual Consciousness and Local Regional, and National Forms of Institutional Identity”. In Paul R. Katz & 
Murray A. Rubinstein (eds.) Religion and the Formation o f Taiwanese Identities. Pp. 181-218. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
89 That four-month period is one of non-stop, intense activity for Jenlanggong. The temple, apart from being a well-visited 
tourist attraction that draws visitors from all over the country, is also an important destination for groups of pilgrims on 
journeys organized by hundreds of temples around the island. The organized pilgrimages typically travel by coach and stop 
by the temple for an hour or so, before the pilgrims get back on the coaches and continue their journey heading south and 
visiting more temples along the way.
901 got to appreciate the extent to which Jenlangong Temple was a focus of media interest in the country through my 
observation of the pilgrimage. Media crew were often present to broadcast special event and occasions during the temple’s 
busiest season, which started from late January, around the time of my arrival, and May, the end of the annual pilgrimage to 
Xingang.
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Jenilangong Vice-Chairman Mr. Jen Ming-kuen was present at the temple during most of the 
days during the temple’s busy period. He and the other temple directors (dongshi) received 
visitors and paid visits to other temples, organized and supervised temple events, etc. 
Arguably, (see Photo 4) even more so than Legislator Yen, Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen 
was the spokesman for the temple. Jenlangong Temple was a beehive of activity during those 
four months and is a focus of media interest. Media crew from various national and cable TV  
stations were on site, broadcasting live the temple’s most memorable and significant events.
As Legislator Yen was either in Shalu or in Taipei most of the time, Vice-Chairman Jen Ming- 
kuen was the temple spokesman. He was interviewed on national and on cable TV newscasts 
several times during my fieldwork, and, according to journalists and anchormen I spoke to, he 
had been playing the role of Jenlangong spokesman for some years now. Speaking in 
Taiwanese, he smiled into the camera on the occasion of the annual pilgrimage in April 2004 
and said ‘Along with being the Goddess of the Sea, Mazu is also the Goddess of virtue and 
righteousness. Although Taiwan’s people may worship many different gods and follow many 
different paths, Mazu unites them and is revered by all’. On TV he always seemed keen to 
project the image of a smiling, benevolent and tireless devotee working hard in the service of 
the goddess Mazu.
I was often present when the directors entertained visitors at the temple. Sometimes, when I 
wasn’t in the temple I would be summoned from my room, or they would call me on my cell 
phone and ask me to come to the temple in order to be introduced to visitors. I understood this 
was to be part of the ‘duties’ the directors, especially the vice-chairman, expected me to 
perform in exchange for their hospitality. The most important one was to be part of the 
temple’s unrelenting efforts to court the media. The other was to give the directors ‘face’ 
(mianzi). I suspect they wanted me to burnish and enhance their credentials as respectable, 
model citizens, pillars of the community, and thus deserving of their current status as directors 
of Taiwan’s most famous temple. The directors seemed to be hinting to visitors every time I 
made an ‘appearance’, that since a foreign scholar from a prestigious British university is over 
here studying their temple, they, by extension, must also be decent, respectable people.91
91 After a few months interacting with the management, I suspected that the main reason the vice-chairman agreed to host 
me at the temple was in order to enhance its fame and prestige in Taiwanese society, and by extension, his own personal 
status as temple vice-chairman. The temple directors were delighted that a foreigner from a prestigious western university 
was studying their temple and exploited every opportunity to show me off to visitors and the media, as they did with every 
other foreigner, scholar or tourist who happened to be present at the time. During the height of the pilgrimage season I was 
often summoned from my room, asked to report to the temple reception room, in order to be interviewed by reporters and 
cameramen. During the 2003 season stories and articles about me appeared in regional papers and I even appeared on cable 
TV a few times, being filmed walking around the temple and taking notes and discussing the significance of Dajia Mazu.
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It was interesting to watch the directors as they played host at the temple, and when they 
were guests during courtesy visits to other temples. Many of them were no more than low 
ranking local officials in their hometowns. None of them seemed particularly well educated, 
and with a few exceptions, none were particularly rich, or had a successful business they 
could be proud of. The one thing, the one commodity they could bank on that could give them 
‘face’ (mianzi) and prestige vis-a-vis the outside world was their connection with the temple. 
During those moments of socializing at the temple, the directors would welcome guests, offer 
them cigarettes, serve them tea, and most importantly, introduce themselves by exchanging 
business cards with visitors. The business cards were a vital part of the ceremony of hosting 
at the many temples where I ‘tagged along’ with the Jenlangong directors on their courtesy 
calls. On these cards would be insignia and the full name of the temple as well as the bearer’s 
name and his position- temple director, executive secretary, supervisor, etc. It indicated that 
the bearer was someone important because he was connected with Jenlangong.
Over the next few months I observed and learned about the minutiae of temple rituals and 
interacted with employees and devotees alike. At the same time, nevertheless, as the months 
passed, I could not help noticing a few things about the temple that did not feel quite right, 
from my point of view at least. The first was to do with the two-dozen odd temple management 
committee, composed of the chairman, vice-chairman, directors, supervisors, etc. When I 
interacted with them they sometimes spoke a heavily accented Mandarin, and spoke in 
Taiwanese most of the time. The fact that they spoke Taiwanese nearly all the time is not 
surprising, as hearing Mandarin becomes less frequent the further away from Taipei one 
goes.
Thus my suspicions did not arise from the choice of language they spoke, rather, it was more 
to do with their behaviour and what they talked about and didn’t talk about. In the time that I 
spent in their presence I never heard them talk about issues of belief, faith, morality, or self- 
improvement, for that matter. They hardly ever discussed temple rituals and symbolism 
among themselves, and when I pressed them to explain certain things to do with the temple, 
they struggled to make sense beyond the basics. My initial surprise notwithstanding, this lack 
of concern with doctrine, symbolism, morality or self-improvement is actually quite
There seemed to be a tacit understanding wherein the temple would provide me with food and lodging and access to the 
temple in exchange for my agreeing to be part of Jenlangong’s publicity machine.
67
unremarkable in the context of Chinese popular religion. Ordinary believers, share the same 
lack of interest in these matters as the temple committee members.92
There was another aspect about the temple directors that didn’t seem quite right. By this I 
mean that they didn’t seem to be among Dajia Town’s traditional elite- they weren’t ‘old 
money’ families. Before setting foot in Dajia Town, I had the expectation that the people who 
got to manage a temple as famous and prestigious as Jenlangong had to belong to Dajia 
Town’s landed gentry, or at least were local captains of industry.93 An informant confirmed my 
suspicions by stating that the organizational structure that is the current temple board is a 
recent phenomenon, and that ‘back in early times the head of the temple used to be the Head 
of the Censer (luzhu), a mostly ceremonial post which rotated among Dajia's most respected 
businessmen’.
Thus, I discovered that although a few of them were successful businessmen, mostly in 
property development and construction, most of the two dozen-odd temple directors were low- 
ranking local officials. What I found odd was that the vice-chairman, a native of Dajia, had 
never held public office, and that the chairman, Legislator Yen, is not a even a native son of 
Dajia, but someone from nearby Shalu Town. Who is Jen Ming-kuen and how did he get to 
manage one of Taiwan’s most famous and lucrative temples? Was he a prominent local 
industrialist or businessman? How did Legislator Yen become involved in the temple? What 
can their involvement in a temple of folk religion tell us about significant aspects of 
contemporary rural society in Taiwan?94
92 For example, I once asked a temple director at Jenlangong ‘why does the temple have five doors?’, and ‘who are the 
characters that are painted on the doors?’ He paused for a while, and sheepishly told me to ask the tour guide group, an 
informal association of Dajia natives, composed mainly of teachers and librarians, who volunteer to give guided tours of the 
temple. I tried asking several temple directors similar questions and I received similar responses. I worked out from these 
instances, that the management committee at Jenlangong were not ritual experts, nor do they have any specialist knowledge 
or training in Buddhist or Taoist rites or doctrine. In fact, their knowledge about popular religious history, architecture, or 
symbolism was not much better than that of the average layman.
Taiwan’s industrialization started out in the 1960s with light industry- clothes, shoes, bicycles, toys, fans, etc. and 
Taichung County is the nucleus of light manufacturing in Taiwan, so I was expecting many of the temple directors to at least 
have been involved in light industry or have made their fortunes that way.
94 The focus of my initial interest, studying Chinese popular religion at Jenlangong, gradually broadened to include another, 
more unpredictable and potentially tricky one. I had decided to find out as much as possible about the temple board, 
especially the two men who occupy the top positions, and who wield the most power and influence in it. At the same time, I 
also knew the directors would never voluntarily reveal anything of real substance to me. All of them were personable and 
affable men who I could chat to, but I knew they would never reveal anything that would make them out to be anything 
other than respectable, honest, hardworking devotees of the goddess Mazu. This, at least is the impression that they wanted 
to give me, to the residents of Dajia and to the media. I tried several times over the course of fieldwork, to gain their 
confidence, to get several of them to let their guard down, to stop ‘performing’, and to tell me what was really going on 
behind the scenes. However, my attempts were unsuccessful. I was meant to be researching the temple, its history, its art and 
architecture, and write articles and books about it afterwards. That was the purpose for which they agreed to host me in the 
first place. They didn’t want me to investigate the temple’s ‘dark side’, or their own unsavoury pasts.
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I realized early on that my fieldwork regarding this issue was not going to be straightforward. It 
would be tortuous and fraught with difficulties. I knew I couldn’t conduct this other line of 
investigation in a straightforward fashion. I had to pursue these questions without alerting 
them to the fact that I was aware of these rumours. I simply couldn’t tell the vice-chairman, or 
anyone else at the temple, ‘I heard you’re a gangster’. I knew I couldn’t ask ‘there are rumours 
that you are stealing money from the temple, what are your views on this?’ Also, I knew I 
could not approach many people who were in a position to shed light on the issue but who 
were too closely identified with the main protagonists, out of fear that the chairman and vice- 
chairman would find out. To make matter worse, many people who had been connected with 
the temple in the past, either as employees or as directors, were not willing to talk to me. I 
tried to get a close friend of the immediate past chairman of Jenlangong, industrialist Wang 
Jin-lu, who was abroad at the time, to give me some details, or at least introduce me to people 
who could, to no avail. Many promising informants stayed silent and refused to talk to me 
about the matter.
The bulk of information I have about the life history of the Jen brothers, the alleged jiaotou (big 
men) of Dajia, originates from a few extremely valuable informants. The next section is my 
attempt to weave a seamless narrative out of my own conversations with Jen Ming-Zong, 
along with a series of discrete conversations that Jen Ming-hui, the third brother, had with my 
confidential sources before the former started serving a brief prison sentence. My attempt at a 
seamless narrative of the lives of the Jen brothers is largely the result of long conversations 
with these informants wherein they recalled their conversations with Jen Ming-hui, which I 
wrote down. None of their conversations with Jen Ming-hui were tape-recorded and a period 
of several months separate their meetings with Jen Ming-hui and those they had with me. 
What follows thus, is a partial account from a few sources whose identities must stay 
confidential. I have not been able to independently corroborate the veracity of the great bulk of 
my informants’ stories, either with Legislator Yen, Vice-Chairman Jen (see Photo 5) and his 
brothers, or with other informants. In some cases I have been able to get hold of newspaper 
and magazine articles that corroborate some aspects of my informants’ accounts of the 
brothers, and I will cite them when these are relevant. However, the great bulk of it belongs 
literally to the realm of ‘hearsay’ and ‘rumour’.95 Thus, what follows should not be taken as a 
factual, verifiable description of reality.
95 O f the four Jen brothers I have only personally met Vice-chairman Jen Ming-kuen and Jen Ming-zong, an elected town 
representative. I have asked the vice-chairman virtually nothing about his past as I know this would have made him
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Th e big m en o f Dajia
The ‘Jen family’ or ‘Jen brothers’ (Jenjia) are four siblings, all owners of various karaoke bars, 
brothels, motels, video game and gambling parlours and other ‘vice’ businesses. Not 
everyone in Dajia, a town of around seventy thousand people, has heard of them or knows 
who they are or what they do, but my sources say they are the local big men (jiaotou) and 
thus are to be respected. They should never be openly challenged or criticized. The four older 
siblings constitute the quintessence of the ‘self-made man’ from the countryside. Ming-zong, 
Ming-fu, Ming-hui, and Ming-kuen, have lived lives that have followed broadly similar paths. 
Having grown up in the same paternal household, and having had nearly identical childhood 
experiences, the four brothers have lived nearly all their lives in or near their hometown.
Photo 5: Jen Ming-kuen holding a Mazu statuette 
Source: Times Weekly. 2005.6.23. p. 38.
uncomfortable. I once asked his wife what he did for a living and she replied that he owned a pastry factory in Dajia. I soon 
found out this was a lie so I never bothered to ask them again. 1 spoke to eldest brother Jen Ming-zong a few times in his 
office at the Dajia Town Hall before he was forced to give up his official post in order to serve a prison sentence for bribery 
and corruption.
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What they have in common are their early adulthoods spent doing various unskilled odd jobs, 
and then getting involved in the vice business, spending time in jail and having been charged 
with various criminal offences, running for and holding various political posts, and lastly getting 
involved in the management of two of Dajia’s popular religion temples. Although not all of 
them have done the aforementioned activities in the exact linear sequence describe above, 
observers will detect common elements in the brothers’ life histories; a burning sense of 
ambition to rise above their station in life, and a will to succeed.
The patriarch, Mr. Jen Senior, a farmer, ran a rice store when they were young. He was also, 
depending on who you spoke to, an arms and opium smuggler who plied his fishing boat in 
the Taiwan Strait. Ming-zong the eldest brother, recalls that they were prosperous in the old 
days. He says his father ran a small business, processing taro into the ingredient used in the 
cakes and pastries Dajia is famous for. My informant tells a different story. His conversations 
with Ming-hui depict a difficult life for the Jen household, so difficult that the father had to do 
illegal things to feed a growing family. Mr. Jen senior would allegedly encourage his sons to 
follow his footsteps in the smuggling trade that brought contraband goods and illegal 
immigrants into Taiwan from the mainland, an activity typical of some fishermen on this side of 
the strait. ‘You need to do whatever it takes to make money and become rich’, the father is 
reported to have taught them early on.
Ming-zong is the eldest child of the Jen family. He is described as being the most normal of 
the lot- meaning he is not nearly as bad as the others. He had been in jail for smuggling, and 
reportedly, his father had paid a lot to get him out. He decided to run for elected deputy 
(zhenmindaibiao) in Dajia after his predecessor at the post, and younger brother, Ming-fu had 
vacated his seat at the town hall. When I met Ming-zong in 2004, he was the Dajia Township 
Council Representative Head (Dajia zhendaihui zhuxi). He ran unsuccessfully for the post of 
mayor of Dajia Town in 2001. However, he was charged and found guilty of bribing voters in 
the run up to the mayoral election with cash, tea sets (paochazhu) and luggage (dengjixiang) 
and for forging documents (weizhaociliao) and claiming expenses (fubaozhifudefeiyong) for 
private gain, which he is fighting.96 I discovered, towards the end of my fieldwork in the 
summer of 2005, that his appeal had finally run out and he had gone to prison. However, I did 
manage to speak to him a few times during my stay in Dajia.
96 See “Dajia Township Council Head Candidate Jen Ming-zong is accused”. China Times. January 24,2002.
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I found him to be quite affable and approachable during the few times I chatted to him. What I 
found intriguing was that Ming-zong, like his brother Ming-fu, who was his predecessor at the 
post, held the elected post of Township Council Representative. I found it difficult to reconcile 
the fact that he was a town official with the fact that so many of my informants remarked that 
the whole Jen family were heidao/jiaotou. So at one point I worked up the courage to ask him 
point blank, at* his office on the fifth floor of Dajia’s town hall, ‘don’t get angry, but I heard 
you’re a gangster’. He denied it instantly, ‘I don’t have any “brothers” (xiaodi) surrounding me, 
so I can’t be a gangster’. He remarked that the notion of ‘gangster’ was an invention of the 
media in order to discredit people like him, hailing from the country, from humble backgrounds 
and little education, but who nevertheless achieved success later in life. He was simply, ‘a 
servant of the people of Dajia, who elected him’, he said.
One informant tells me that the brothers were very young when their mother died. And after a 
few years, his father remarried, this time to his sister-in-law, the children’s young aunt. 
Apparently it was the maternal grandmother’s idea, as she thought Mr. Jen Senior was 
wealthy, and besides, the deceased wife had left behind four children. ‘Who better to take 
care of them than their own aunt’, Ming-hui recalls the old woman telling the father. Their 
father’s decision to marry their aunt had so angered the brothers Ming-hui, the third and Ming- 
kuen, the fourth son, that they also decided to get married the same year as the father’s 
wedding, so as to get out of their father’s house as soon as possible. None of the brothers had 
finished junior high, and so life had been difficult in those early years, especially since they left 
the paternal household to be independent. They had received very little byway of inheritance 
from their own father.
Ming-hui was, according to another informant, his father’s least favoured son, and had 
received the smallest share of inheritance from the father’s meagre estate. Ming-hui said he 
kept his resentment to himself, as he knew it was partly out of spite for the two brothers’ 
explicit disapproval of the father’s choice of a second wife. Ming-kuen, allegedly had it 
especially tough, and he spent the initial years carrying bricks and doing odd jobs working on 
construction sites. Like his brothers, Ming-kuen spent a few months in jail for smuggling. He is 
alleged to have made a lot of money from kickbacks and billing millions in non-existent 
services to the temple, but so far nothing has been proven and no convictions made.
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Ming-hui and Ming-kuen, who was to become vice-chairman of Jenlangong Temple, were very 
close. They bonded at a very young age. They used to skip school and get into fights with 
other gangs of youths. They are not known to have any religious or spiritual inclination. Unlike 
many male working class youths, they did not join nor participate, in any Military Retainer 
(bajiajiang) troupes, nor procession (zhentou) troupes. Ming-hui described himself as a self- 
made man of the masses. One of my sources told me Ming-hui described himself as gentle, 
humorous, and generous to a fault, ordering and paying for a sumptuous meal for others while 
he himself only ordered coffee. He rose from obscurity and poverty to be what he is today, a 
member of Dajia’s most powerful and wealthy jiaotou families.
‘If you want something done, or you need someone big to back you up in a dispute, Ming-hui 
can help you’ (diya suyao bangmang Minhui e kadi bangmang), that is what Ming-hui says 
people say of him. However, some informants beg to differ. The brothers are all criminals, 
each one has spent time inside for the same offences, and even the second generation is 
bad’. With these words one informant was making a veiled reference to the fact that one of 
Ming-hui’s son’s also spent two years in jail for drug dealing. They’re just like their father, 
greedy and unscrupulous’.
Ming-hui was aware of his family’s reputation, but he disavowed any notion that they ruled 
through fear. Indeed, according to him many common folk saw in him a kind benefactor. This 
was a social role slightly at odds with the image of ‘gangsters’ as ruthless and savage, 
conveyed in many popular films belonging to the genre. He says he visited city hall once a 
week to help people. He said he had even donated coffins to the needy in Dajia.
Ming-hui did not complain much during those early years when he and his wife did various 
manual jobs in order to survive. His wife did various things to get by, peel asparagus, and do 
piecework at home to sell to Dajia’s various cottage industries. ‘Once’, Ming-hui told my 
confidant, ‘I went to a fortune-teller and she said my destiny was to be a bar owner and get 
rich. That fortune telling session changed my life as it became clear to me how I was to live 
life from now on.’ Thus it seemed that, although the Jen brothers were born in, and spent their 
childhood and early adulthood at the bottom rungs of society, their ambition to succeed 
ensured they moved up fairly quickly.
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His first foray in business was in the leisure industry. Ming-hui’s venture in the ‘underground’ 
economy started when he opened a video game shop. Taiwanese society had been 
experiencing rapid economic growth in the 1980s and as a result, consumers had a lot of 
disposable income. However, that was the martial law period, and at the time the leisure and 
entertainment industry was relatively undeveloped and many activities were technically illegal, 
or had an ambiguous legal status. Ming-hui, like his brothers saw the business opportunity 
beckoning to them and they made a lot of money, initially in the video arcade business in the 
1980’s. It was not easy then, as they had frequent brushes with the law as well as other 
competing ‘criminal’ elements. Of the two, Ming-hui had no doubts that the former constituted 
much more of a nuisance than the latter. The nature of the former disturbance had little to do 
with upholding the law though.
There was one time’, he informed one of my sources, ‘a government inspector came to my 
arcade and threatened to issue a massive fine unless I agreed to give him a big cut of my 
profits. I had no choice but to pay him off, or he would have shut me down. The inspector 
even hired an accountant to keep tabs on my operations, noting down the daily takings and 
the expenses, so that he knew exactly how much money was made and how much his share 
was. W e got into the illegal activities like karaoke bars, brothels, massage parlours, video 
game arcades and the like because we are not highly educated and it’s a quick way of making 
money. W e often had to live by our wits in order to outsmart the police. The police were so 
corrupt in those days, whenever they confiscated illegal video games in Kaohsiung, they 
would somehow end up in Taichung, some in my establishments. I remember the police once 
asking us to dismantle all our “one-armed bandit” slot machines and return them to the 
warehouse in Kaohsiung. W e were tipped off that there was going to be an inspection, so the 
impounded goods had to be there. W e fooled them by making a lot of cardboard likenesses of 
our video games, taking them to Kaohsiung and we took photos to show to the police as 
evidence we got rid of them after that it was business as usual.’
Gradually, he expanded the range of business activities he was involved in. Along the way he 
also ran various karaoke bars and massage parlours, which also secretly operated as 
brothels. He also engaged in gun and drug smuggling, running boats that transported the 
goods to Taiwan from the mainland, and he had served a jail sentence for these offences. He 
once went to Vietnam to procure young elementary and high school girls for his businesses. 
The girls were pretty and cheap, and in Vietnam, everyone, even police can be bought. 
Informants said the girls ended up working in Dajia but eventually wound up in jail. Ming-hui
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has nearly always got away with his illegal activities and has mostly avoided prison in his 
myriad brushes with the law. ‘I shot a guy in the stomach once, but I didn’t go to prison 
because I paid a “little brother”, one of my lieutenants, to take the rap for me.’
His luck finally ran out in 2003 when Ming-hui was finally found guilty of illegally smuggling 
mainland women to work as prostitutes in his massage parlours in a notorious case ten years 
earlier. The criminal case dragged on for ten years as his lawyers lodged many appeals, and it 
went all the way to the Supreme Court, until he finally received the summons to start serving a 
ten-month prison sentence in October 2003. He was determined to be as low-key and attract 
as little attention as possible, on the day he reported to prison.
‘When I get out I’m going to run for the office of Taichung County Counsellor, that way I’ll be 
safe from the police’ (dangua chutga guabelai daidiong yihue ane guade anzhuan a). I also 
need votes when I run for office next year, so being part of the Purple Cloud Temple helps as I 
get even more exposure to the common folk. I hope James Soong wins the 2004 elections 
and becomes president of Taiwan next year, that way I’ll get pardoned and get out early’, 
Ming-hui mused.
Ming-fu is the second eldest brother, easily the most violence-prone and troublesome of the 
lot. He sold drugs and stole containers loaded on trucks and resold them later. These 
containers were on their way to Kaohsiung Port to be exported abroad as part of Taiwan’s 
economic miracle. He is rumoured to have killed two people. He has been less fortunate than 
Ming-hui in that he has been jailed several times. Persuaded by Yen Ching-piao, he gradually 
decided to enter politics, becoming an elected people’s representative (mindai) in Dajia, and 
he was Ming-zong’s immediate predecessor in the post. He held the post for years, until he 
was forced to flee to Mainland China when he was charged with attempted murder of a county 
counsellor and was certain he was going to be arrested unless he fled first.
The reason he shot a counsellor and had to escape are to do with the last temple committee 
elections at Jenlangong Temple and the newly established Byzantine voting system designed 
in 1999 to install outsider Yen Ching-piao, then Taichung County Assembly Speaker, as 
temple chairman. Ming-fu had a feud with then sitting President Wang Jin-lu, who he wanted. 
to unseat. The Jen brothers, who engineered Yen Ching-piao’s takeover, reportedly spent 
over NT$ 50,000,000 in bribes to all the borough wardens (lizhang), who had voting rights and 
thus were in a position to elect the chairman of the temple committee.
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He reportedly fled to China by boat and does not intend to come back for 25 years until the 
legal time limit of the charges against him expires. Apparently remarried and with a young 
family, he is also, ironically, in a Chinese jail, not for having killed a Chinese policeman over a 
disagreement regarding bribes, which he did, but for being found guilty of hoarding certain 
food staples, buying them cheaply and later on selling them at a vast profit. It seems he was 
caught up in China’s most recent anti-corruption drive.
‘My father didn’t want us to get involved in the temple’, Ming-hui reflected back on the 
‘counsellor shooting’ episode. He then described an incident wherein his father angrily entered 
his house one evening, when they were busy manipulating the temple elections. His father 
banged his cane on the dining table and shouted ‘if we are rich people will suspect we took 
money from Mazu, and if we lose our money and become poor, they’ll see it as the goddess 
punishing us for stealing her money, either way, we lose’ (lanna si uzhilang de e kong Ian si 
uy mazo hia taute, lanna pembo jilan de ekong hesi Ian taute mazo j i  e boying’m kuan an 
tzua Ian long su), Ming-hui recounted to one informant.
I argue that the ‘gangster’ phenomenon of Dajia’s two temples may be interpreted as a local 
success story. That story is one of four brothers of humble origin who were nevertheless very 
ambitious and who wanted to improve their status in life by any means available to them. They 
were fortunate enough to have reached adulthood in the 1980s, a time of rising prosperity and 
disposable real incomes as well as one of increasing political liberalization. They tried their 
hands in different criminal pursuits- smuggling, peddling manufactured goods for export 
markets that they had stolen while these were sitting in container boxes at Taichung port, 
motels, karaoke bars, arcades with coin-operated machines, etc. These brothers lived near a 
seaport through which many of the country’s light manufactured products passed on their way 
to the developed markets in the West. They made money from stealing these container vans 
at the port and selling the goods onwards. They also spotted a gap in the emerging leisure 
and entertainment market between consumers’ increased wealth and willingness to spend 
their disposable incomes on leisure and entertainment, and the then underdeveloped and still 
illegal businesses that catered for these consumers.
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These brothers saw an opportunity to ‘make a killing’ in smuggling and theft, illegal motel, 
karaoke bar, and gambling arcade businesses and understood the risks involved should they 
be caught. Indeed, all of them have been convicted of many of these crimes and have spent 
various periods ‘inside’. They were highly motivated and ambitious and were willing to pay the 
price for success. They had little education and social capital and thus knew that their 
opportunities for advancement, like for many other uneducated working class men, lay in a life 
of crime. Thus illegal and semi-legal pursuits have ensured the means for upward social 
mobility for these ambitious, but underprivileged and undereducated young brothers. I suspect 
that they yearned to be jiaotou -  ‘big men’, and to be a ‘big man’ you need to have money. 
Aspiringy/aofot/ had a route out of poverty in the 1980s through smuggling and theft, and also 
through catering to the needs of the new consuming middle class, running illegal gambling 
dens, brothels, and underground video arcades. These were illegal, but all highly lucrative 
activities.
‘Gangsters’ and temples
Jenlangong
Temples are loci of prestige and status, apart from being the locus of symbolic power. 
Membership of a famous temple brings considerable kudos to ambitious individuals in the 
countryside. Also, temples in Taiwan, especially the more popular ones, generate vast 
amounts of income from donations and fees for various services. It is rumoured, but so far not 
proven, that many individuals do their best to gain control of these temples, motivated by a 
desire to gain access to the vast sums it holds. In addition, there are other reasons why they 
would want to get involved. Below is a quote from an informant:
Dajia Town’s Jenlangong Temple, like Xingang Town’s Fengtiengong Temple and Beigang Town’s 
Chaotiengong Temple, are rich and famous and attract a lot of interested parties. There will often 
be opposing factions vying for leadership in the temples and often the disputes are long and drawn 
out. No one single faction is strong enough to gain power and see off potential challengers. 
Nevertheless, they are in a position to prevent other groups from doing the same thing. So very 
often you have a stalemate between two equally matched factions.
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The above quote implies that the activities and manoeuvrings behind the scenes of the 
management committee of Jenlangong Temple, like several prestigious temples in southern 
Taiwan, needs to be viewed as a logical extension of rural factional politics,97 which is 
characterized by a struggle between two powerful groups over political power and access to 
money and resources.
The directors were not keen to discuss with me the details of temple management. 
Nevertheless, I gathered that Jenlangong became a management committee (weiyuanhui), 
which did away with the post of Head of the Censer, and in 1988 it became a Consortium of 
Judicial Persons (caituanfaren) which would be composed of around two dozen officials who 
would be in charge of running it. Jenlangong's 'footprint', the area whose residents considered 
themselves to be under the goddess Mazu's care and protection comprised the neighbouring 
towns of Dajia, Waipu, Houli, and Da' an. Under the new regulations, these four townships’ 
elected officials, ranging from, lizhang (district head), mindaibiao (people's representative), 
xianzhang (village mayor), and zhenzhang (town mayor), around sixty all in all, would decide 
the composition of the twenty-odd temple committee members (dongshi) among themselves, 
and these members would vote among themselves and choose the temple chairman and vice 
chairman. A committee member would normally need to be a resident of one of the four towns 
and hold locally elected office.
‘Now’ my informant tells me, ‘all the elected officials in Dajia are either Red or Black, but 
regardless of which side they're on, they all want to be part of Jenlangong. They all want a 
piece of the action.’ The ‘action’ he was talking about was the 'grease money' each vote- 
wielding elected official would get in return for voting for aspiring presidential candidates. 
Apparently, the chairmanship of the temple was such a valued commodity that committee 
directors were willing to buy the votes of many of the sixty local officials who had voting rights 
in the temple. Informants often quote the sum NT$ 1,200,000 (US$ 36,000) as the going rate 
for each vote.
97 Factions (paixi) have long existed in Taiwan, but their modem form took shape after the KM T took over the island in the 
early 1950s. The Nationalists had complete control over all the central government, but found that it needed 'vassals' to 
control the countryside outside the main cities of Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung. That is why they cultivated factions in 
most localities in outlying areas- to help them keep control and to deliver the votes at local elections. The KMT had created 
two factions in Taichung County, the Red ([Hongpai) and Black (Heipai), and made sure that they were antagonistic to each 
other. This ensured that any alternative to the KMT would stay divided and never constitute a threat to the ruling power. 
‘Normally’, says an informant, ‘faction members are dormant, so you wouldn't know which one someone belonged to unless 
you were a local person. But things change right before election time, and that's when everyone activates their followers to 
deliver the votes.’
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The informant went on to say, ‘in Jenlangong Temple, before Legislator Yen assumed the 
chairmanship in 1999, his predecessor as chairman was Wang Jin-lu, prominent local 
industrialist, who served for three terms, and before him was Zeng Fu-hui, another wealthy 
businessman and unelected head under the old system, who served two terms. It is not 
known precisely how Jen Ming-kuen got to occupy a directorship at the temple. Nevertheless, 
Jen Ming-kuen became a director (dongshl) under Wang Jin-lu and had initially held that post 
and was not yet vice-chairman. Both men belonged to opposing factions, and the former 
wanted to unseat the latter in order to become chairman. Yan Rong-can and Huang De-chi 
were two fellow directors who were both experiencing financial difficulties and wanted to profit 
from the temple. However, Wang Jin-lu was not cooperative enough, and so they wanted to 
replace him with a chairman who was more accommodating. The details are not clear and it is 
not known exactly which candidate for chairman that each director cast his vote for. 
Nevertheless Wang Jin-lu narrowly won re-election as chairman for a third term as the first 
attempt to unseat him failed.’
However, the seeds of his downfall had already been sown. Jen Ming-kuen and his two 
brothers Jen Ming-zong and Jen Ming-fu had begun to penetrate the temple. He had become 
the first 'gangster' director (dongshi). The other committee members allegedly knew about his 
background, but they wanted to believe he was sincere and gave him the benefit of the doubt. 
After all, as local people like to say, 'anyone who wants to serve Mazu is welcome, whoever 
he is.'
My informant described at least two dubious incidents in which large sums of money possibly 
changed hands or were misappropriated for private gain. He said that when the Mazu Culture 
Building (wenhuadalou), a massive museum, exhibition and conference centre, was finished 
in Dajia under the auspices of Jenlangong in 2000, Jen Ming-kuen took charge of the 
tendering process for the paintwork, but after he had awarded the project, he presented then 
Chairman Wang Jin-lu with a bill which was NT$ 8,000,000, more than the chairman thought 
was reasonable for a project of that size and scope. The other incident allegedly involved Jen 
Ming-kuen telling the chairman that he could win re-election and hold on to his post if he paid 
him NT$ 30,000,000, as his brother, Ming-fu who was living in China at the time, needed it. 
The chairman allegedly replied, ‘whether I run for chairman again or not, you won’t get the 
money’.
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Jen Ming-kuen was determined to defeat Wang Jin-lu and so he twice asked that a meeting 
be convened so that the board could vote and install a temporary leader (linshizhuxi). 
However, his request was denied. He decided to convene an emergency meeting, which was 
illegal according to the committee’s own rules, but he convinced Yen Ching-piao to intervene. 
At the time Yen Ching-piao still hadn’t won the legislative seat, and was still Taichung County 
Assembly Speaker (xianyizhang). ‘Chairman Yen Ching-piao became chairman because the 
rules weren't well thought out’, my informant continues. Th e  residency rules stated that the 
temple chairman had to be a resident of Dajia, but did not state a minimum period of 
residence. So once Yen Ching-piao changed his residency (hukou) to Dajia he was able to 
run’.
Yen Ching-piao also forced the Taichung county governor (xianzhang) to rewrite the rules on 
how to become temple president. Normally when the Jenlangong committee held meetings, 
these should be attended only by committee members/directors (dongshi) along with an 
official observer appointed by the county governor. Yen Ching-piao pressured the governor 
into not sending the observer to the meeting. Thus, that way the rules were flouted and non­
members got to attend. Apparently, the voting body of around sixty people who had the right 
to choose the temple committee had mysteriously increased to around a hundred at the 
time of Yen Ching-piao’s election. Somehow he had managed to stuff the committee with 
his 'minions', all heads of the pilgrimage's various performing troupes like the heads of the 
Scholar Troupe (shentongtuan), Santai Troupe (Taizizuan)t etc., into the Believers' 
Representatives Association (Xintudaibiaohui) and given them voting rights, presumably to 
consolidate his position and to fend off likely challenges.
During that emergency meeting, directors Yan Rong-can and Huang De-chi decided to 
abandon the incumbent president and sided with Jen Ming-kuen. The betrayal of Wang-Jin-lu 
by Huang De-chi was especially bitter, as they were sworn brothers (jiebai xiongdi). My 
informant continues, ‘the committee was evenly split between Black and Red. Jen Ming-kuen, 
who was black and already a senior committee member in Wang Jin-lu's era, wanted to be 
chairman. As the two sides were evenly matched and there was a stalemate Jen Ming-kuen 
and his supporters decided to bring in Yen Ching-piao to unseat Wang Jin-lu and replace him 
as chairman. The outcome of the emergency voting session of a hundred people convened by 
Jen Ming-kuen was unequivocal- Yen Ching-piao suddenly emerged as the new chairman of 
Jenlangong in 1999. He was able to break the stalemate as he was the one personality with 
sufficient power and clout (shili) who everyone could agree on.’
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Purple Cloud Temple
I have visited the temple only a few times, and have not done fieldwork there, as my focus 
was on Jenlangong, so I rely exclusively on my sources, which had strong connections with it, 
to supply me with the data. Apparently, the Purple Cloud Temple is a complicated and 
unwieldy organization, which has a directors committee (weiyuanhui) as well as a much bigger 
association of believers’ representatives (.xintudaibiaohui) who frequently argue with and 
among each other. Apparently, businessman and current Temple Committee Chairman of the 
Board Huang Zhen-xiong presided over a deeply divided organization.
The temple had been built some thirty years earlier and the committee and other members 
had succeeded in raising a lot of money for its recent facelift, a fundraising effort that has 
lasted over 10 years now and has raised over NT$ 300,000,000 so far. The few times I was at 
the temple grounds I saw several coach loads of pilgrims who, similar to what happens at 
Jenlangong, stop off at the temple and pay a brief visit, spending money on donations, 
souvenirs and certain fees for services typical of most Chinese temples. The temple’s 
activities, of which a major part is making money from donations from pilgrim groups and other 
visitors, has proved enormously lucrative. This is evident in the ‘theme park’ like structure, 
which comprises several large buildings and occupies three levels on the hill terrace. This 
commercial success had also created a division and has led to infighting among the board 
members, mainly businessmen, who now formed two distinct factions.
Former Temple President Yan Pei-yun, leader of one faction, had been accused of stealing 
NT$20,000,000 from the temple, as well as benefiting from all sorts of kickbacks and 
commissions, so he was deposed in a power struggle, losing to Huang Zhen-xiong. Hence 
Yan Pei-yun’s faction, composed among others, of Huang De-chi (also Jenlangong temple 
director), and Ji Jin-lian, called in some ‘gangsters’ in order to intimidate the other group, 
Huang Zhen-xiong’s faction, composed mainly of Director Zhou and Zhang Hua. Details are 
not very clear at this point, but it appeared that Director Zhou summoned his son, a known 
gang member, to show up, gun visible, at a temple meeting to intimidate the other group. Now 
Huang Zhen-xiong was unsure where Director Zhou’s loyalty lay, and suspected that he may 
have switched factions.
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Huang Zhen-xiong responded by soliciting the help of his good friend, Yen Ching-piao, so 
then the latter sent Jen Ming-hui to ‘cancel out’ the other group of heidao. It was a variation on 
a theme, of the practice of using heidao to mediate between opposing groups in Taiwanese 
society. In this case, a heidao had intervened on behalf of one of the parties, thus tipping the 
balance of power, forcing the weaker group to call in rival heidao to level the playing field. In 
the month of July of 2003, shortly before starting his jail sentence Jen Ming-hui was called on 
to act as ‘supervisor* (zongganshi) at the Purple Cloud Temple on the hillside of Waipu, just 
outside Dajia. ‘I’m not a believer and I’m not religious. The reason I’m in the temple is that my 
“brother” Yen Ching-piao asked me to do it as a personal favour*, he told my informant.
Ming-hui told him, ‘I was summoned to the temple in July and have worked hard the three 
months that I was there, till I entered prison in October 2003. There were times at meetings 
involving both factions, when discussions became so acrimonious, that I nearly came to blows 
with the other group’s heidao members. I pushed and grabbed some of them by their shirts, 
screaming, and I’ve even had to call my armed bodyguard to come and help me. I prefer to be 
doing charitable works for local folks but Yen Ching-piao called because heidao had become 
involved in the temple, and the best way to counter the black is to be black yourself (yuhei 
zhihei), but when you’re with respectable folks you act accordingly (yubai zhibai)’ Ming-hui 
added.
The above data on political rivalry and infighting at Jenlangong and the Purple Cloud Temple 
is not unprecedented in the history of Taiwanese temple affairs. Seaman’s (1978) book about 
the power struggles in a Taiwanese spirit-writing temple in the same town as the Purple Cloud 
Temple had portrayed a situation of intense factional rivalry and infighting between opposed 
power groupings. As with Seaman’s findings, my data show that temple committee members 
in both temples I studied are also members of the town’s two rival political factions- Red and 
Black. The fact that Yen Ching-piao and Jen Ming-kuen succeeded in becoming chairman and 
vice-chairman, respectively, of Jenlangong, as well as the fact that Ming-hui was able to play 
a decisive role in temple politics at the Purple Cloud Temple suggests two powerful 
interpretations- one, that temple politics is an extension of the wider phenomenon of intense 
factional politics that pervades rural Taiwan, and two, that a new class of self made men, or 
jiaotou (big man), have arrived in the rural scene and are ready to compete with the 
businessmen and industrialists for both political and sacred leadership, in rural Taiwan.
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Chau’s (2006) notion of the ‘temple/village political nexus’ and of the factionalism in 
Hongliutan Village, also applies to the situation I witnessed at Jenlangong Temple in Dajia 
Town. The Jenlangong temple committee, like local politics in Dajia Town, is likewise home to 
two opposed factions who vie for leadership. The fact that Yen Ching-piao and Jen Ming- 
kuen, who belong to the Black Faction, occupy the top positions at the temple is indicative of 
the current balance of power in Dajia. Past temple chairman and industrialist Wang Jin-lu, who 
belonged to the Red Faction, was deposed in a showdown between Red and Black. In short 
one can say that these two men occupy the top positions in Jenlangong temple because the 
Black Faction is currently the stronger of the two. In southern Taiwan it’s not possible to 
separate temple affairs from local politics.
One can readily detect some similarities between the ‘gangsters’ in my fieldwork in Dajia and 
those that Boretz (1996) encountered in Beinan a decade earlier, in particular, mainstream 
society’s disapproval of them, and their involvement in crime, especially the ‘vice’ business. 
However, I argue that Boretz’s ‘gangsters’ are somewhat different to the ones I encountered 
on account of the following: first, to my knowledge, none of the Jen brothers nor Yen Ching- 
piao, were ever involved in temple performance troupes in their youth. Second, Boretz does 
not clarify whether any the youthful subjects studied ever became wealthy as a result of their 
illegal pursuits, or whether any of them ever participated in elected political office. Last, we 
cannot know whether any of these youths eventually achieved the status and prestige in the 
community sufficient to manage a prestigious temple.
True, Boretz mentions the story of ‘Wang’, a local landowner. ‘Wang’ was the ‘richest and 
most powerful patriarch in the cluster of villages north of Fugang. He was at one time one of 
the largest landowners in Shanyuan village, north of Taidong, and had close personal and 
business connections- on both “black and white paths”- in Taidong’ (Boretz 1996: 140). 
‘Wang’ was a prominent member of the local village steering committee, who also sponsored 
a temple performance troupe, the Song Jiang Battalion. Comparisons between W ang’ and the 
Jen brothers are inevitable. In both cases, these locally prominent people have managed to 
gain control over the local temples. However, I shall argue that these similarities conceal an 
important difference- ‘Wang’ represents the old rural landowning elite. The Jen brothers 
represent a new breed of elite that came into prominence relatively recently. W e must 
interpret the life histories of the Jen brothers- Dajia’s big men known locally as Dajia’s 
‘gangsters’, within the broader context of the island’s economic and social transformation, 
particularly since the 1980s, as well within the peculiarities of rural factional politics in Taiwan.
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Temples, ‘face’, and merit
I often asked ordinary folk what they thought about Legislator Yen and the temple committee 
and most would refuse to condemn or issue strongly critical opinions of the man. Their replies 
would range from ‘I heard Legislator Yen was a gangster, but I met him once at the temple 
and he was very humble, and seemed quite modest, so I’m not too sure’, to ‘I think he used to 
do bad things in the past, but he has changed a lot since he became temple chairman and 
later legislator.’ The above quotes seem to indicate that very few of Dajia and Shalu’s working 
classes and even small business owners seemed to mind or care very much who ran the 
temple.
Opinions towards the Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen are somewhat harder to gauge, partly 
because, apart from his official position at the temple, not much is known about his personal 
life, or what he does for a living. Most Dajia residents only know of him through his connection 
with the temple, and so they assume that he must be a successful local businessman. Some 
are vaguely familiar with his reputation as a ‘gangster* but are not sure exactly what type of 
‘gangster’ he is. Very few actually know of his family’s criminal past and their involvement in 
Dajia’s entertainment and leisure industry. It is instructive that during my fieldwork, perhaps 
only three local informants (all schoolteachers) were actually capable of pointing out which 
motels and karaoke bars (which apparently also functioned as brothels) he and his brothers 
actually owned. Still less is known about the rest of the temple committee members, perhaps, 
apart from the fact that most of them hold low-ranking local office.
Nonetheless, the attitude most people have toward him and the other directors is that of being 
outwardly deferential and respectful. People who recognize him from television and magazine 
coverage as temple director will greet him with courtesy at the temple grounds and he, pretty 
much like a benevolent uncle, will smile and greet them back. The few, who know of his ‘dark’ 
past, such as the local schoolteachers and volunteer temple tourist guides, will still be 
outwardly courteous and give him ‘face’ (mianzi). These schoolteachers and volunteer temple 
guides are the same ones who were scathing about him in private. However, I have never 
heard anyone, openly and publicly criticize his involvement with the temple. When I prod those 
few people other than the schoolteachers and other highly educated professionals who do 
know about his past what they think of his involvement in the temple, they would reply 
‘perhaps he’s trying to make amends for his past mistakes’, or ‘he can’t be doing anything
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wrong or improper as long as he’s involved with the temple’, and finally ‘even heidao can 
serve Mazu’. What can account for rural folk’s pragmatism regarding supposedly ‘insalubrious’ 
elements in local temples?
Perhaps this reluctance to condemn heidao involvement in temples has to do with historical 
factors. In particular, it may have something to do with Taiwan’s origin as a lawless frontier 
town in the Qing period, and the importance of temples in the early days as a provider of basic 
services, especially, the protection and defence of the village from marauding thieves and 
hostile people from other villages. Informants said that in the early days, in the absence of a 
strong central government, village temples were the sole organization that was capable of 
absorbing and agglutinating all elements of rural society. ‘Farmers, traders, even local toughs, 
anybody who was in a position to make a contribution to temple affairs was welcome. They 
didn’t prohibit anyone from participating because of their background.’ Certainly, these 
opinions from an informant about the history of temple participation being all embracing and 
non-discriminatory are consistent with my findings about the pragmatic stance people have 
about recent heidao involvement in temples.
Belief and doctrine are ambiguous concepts for practitioners of Chinese popular religion and 
this is confirmed when one talks to them about their religious behaviour. Pingan (peace and 
security) is what most people say they are looking for when they come to worship at the 
temple. Ritual worship and religious activity at the temple can be described as one of 
periodical visits to Jenlangong, going to the temple-run kiosks, buying ‘paper money’ for the 
deity and burning it in the special incinerator, buying incense sticks and ‘worshipping’ (bai-bai) 
the various gods within the grounds, bringing ‘offerings’ of food and laying them atop the 
tables for the duration of their visit and taking them home afterwards. I take the view that a lot 
of what happens in Jenlangong, as in other popular religion temples, is an activity 
characterized by exchange. Worshippers come in to ‘pray’ and burn incense, make offerings 
of food, and make donations, in exchange for pingan (peace and security).
DeBernardi (2006: 95),98 to give an example, discusses the fundamental importance of 
respect and correct ritual in religious and community settings, whether one is dealing with a 
deity, or with elder family relations and others of high social rank, if one desires an efficacious 
response. Thus what matters is the provision of a service and the pleasing of and respect of a
98 DeBernardi, J. 2006. The Way That Lives in the Heart: Chinese Popular Religion and Spirit Mediums in Penang, 
Malaysia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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god by the temple as the god’s lodging, and by the offerings ‘exchanged’ in reciprocity for the 
god’s beneficence."
Why have Jen Ming-kuen and later, Legislator Yen gotten involved in Jenlangong? Perhaps 
part of the answer lies in the long tradition of strong rural political leadership by prominent and 
powerful individuals in Taiwanese history I had talked about in the introductory chapter. 
Throughout periods in Taiwanese history when state power was weak or ineffectual they often 
took on roles such as educators of local folk and defenders of the town from outside attack, 
and dispensed medical, cultural and military services, competencies now thought to belong to 
the state (Chen 1999).
In the introductory chapter I also discussed how in the post-war era, village chiefs and 
headmen’s formal leadership roles overlapped with a more informal one. They would take 
active, leadership roles in community and especially temple affairs (Gallin 1966; Crissman 
1981; Thompson 1984). As in Qing era Taiwan, prominent individuals were traditionally 
involved through the temple in the provision of these services, partly as a way to act as local 
benefactors, and partly in a bid to increase their prestige (Lamley 1981; Wilkerson 2004). In 
the absence of a strong central government, temples became the de facto locus of local 
village organization. The phenomenon of temples as a locus of prestige and power continued 
in the 1960s and 1970s. This was an era marked by strong central government, and coincided 
with the period in which a lot of ethnographic fieldwork that resulted in many influential 
ethnographies in Chinese anthropology.
The salient point here is that temples have always been important indicators of local prestige 
and power. Temples have always been a place where prominent people have jostled behind 
the scenes in order to occupy roles that can either confer prestige or reflect the fact that the 
temple official is ‘influential’. Without doubt, Yen Ching-piao’s position as chairman of the 
temple has enhanced his status and influence nationally. But, more importantly, this fact 
reflects what is common knowledge; that Legislator Yen becoming temple chairman in 1999 is 
evidence of his considerable power, as well as his status as ‘first among equals’ among the 
‘big men’ in Dajia and Shalu. Thus he plays multifaceted roles in that he is a prominent local
99 In Chinese religion, some argue, it is not important what you think or feel inside or what kind of person you are, what 
matters is that you perform the rituals correctly. This does not mean, however, that questions of morality are not important in 
Chinese popular religion. Chinese are very interested in correct practice (orthopraxy) rather than correct belief (orthodoxy). 
What matters is that one performs the ritual correctly in order to ensure that the ancestors do not go hungry. Thus seen this 
way correct ritual observance is an extremely moral act.
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politician with nationwide name recognition, and is also head of the country’s most prestigious 
temples.
The story of the Jen brothers, like that of the four rural leaders studied by Feuchtwang and 
Wang (2001), involves issues of rural leadership and kinds of authority, especially that which 
is associated with the successful running and management of a local temple. More to the 
point, their story likewise suggests that by demonstrating the ability to organize activities, 
mobilize people, and get things done, particularly with regard to communal endeavours like 
managing a local temple, one can have alternative sources of authority to public office. These 
two authors argue that having served in public office and shown in that role the capacity to be 
loyal to the locality and get things done for it was a pre-requisite for their leadership in the 
other authority of temple building and management. The saga of the Jen brothers is 
somewhat similar in that it shows that, at least in rural Taiwan, official posts in government 
and having a formal leadership post in temple management, are not incompatible. Indeed, the 
Jen brothers’ story indicates that they are complementary-that is, many locally powerful 
people will want to occupy public office as well as enjoy positions, such as temple director.
Feuchtwang and Wang’s recent research on the two locally powerful Chinese men, seems to 
suggest that, at least in China, due to the particular contingency of the country’s communist 
past, the authority conferred by official positions and that conferred by alternative methods 
such as leadership in a local temple, are mutually distinct realms that rarely ever mingle. The 
story of the Jen brothers illustrates on the one hand the ease by which locally prominent 
individuals in rural Taiwan are able to leverage their wealth and influence into occupying 
public office, in the cases of Jen Ming-zong and Jen Ming-fu, and getting involved in running a 
temple, in the cases of Jen Ming-kuen and Jen Ming-hui. On the other hand, their story also 
indicates that the two kinds of authority are sometimes inseparable and intertwined.
Indeed, the Jen brothers’ experiences may be more akin to that of Chau’s (2006) case study 
on ‘Old Wang’. ‘Old Wang’ (laowang), is one of the village’s richest and most influential 
members, and runs a wholesale business. ‘Old Wang’ did not occupy public office, nor was he 
a scholar, thus he could not avail himself of two traditional sources of public ‘face’ in Chinese 
society. He was a rich businessman who yearned for respect, and so he got involved with the 
Black Dragon King Temple because he wanted to gain ‘face’, or public recognition as a 
powerful individual.
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‘Old! Wang’ originally was classified as a lower-middle peasant household (xiazhongnong) 
during the Maoist era and he eventually trained as a primary schoolteacher. He did various 
jobs during the Cultural Revolution and went into business in the early 1980s, when China 
began to institute market reforms. He decided, along with other elderly villagers, to revive the 
famous Black Dragon King Temple in 1981, which had been razed completely during the 
Cultural Revolution. He was elected leader of the reconstruction of the temple because of his 
organizational and technical experience, which he put to good use by organizing and 
contracting out different phases of the work. Using his expertise as an artisan, he designed 
the new temple buildings, and even put in RMB 100,000 of his own money to finance the 
project. The new temple was completed in 1984 and ‘Old Wang’ was elected chair 
{dahuizhang) of the temple association.
Because he is the prosperous and prominent leader of the Longwanggou Valley local elite, 
and especially because he is the head of a famous popular religion temple, ‘Old Wang’ has 
been able to accumulate eight formal titles, such as chair (dahuizhang) of the temple, chief 
(suozhang) of the Longwanggou Cultural Treasure Management Office, chief (yuanzhang) of 
the Longwanggou Hilly Land Arboretum, village head (cunzhang), he was selected as one of 
the few Chinese members of Inter-Asia, a Japanese NGO, etc. These titles appear 
prominently on name cards. Because he is leader of Longwanggou, he has attended various 
conferences in China and was even invited to go to Japan, to attend a conference as well as a 
study tour in 1996. He was able to welcome Chau, then a doctoral student of anthropology 
from Stanford, to do research at the temple, and even allowed him to use Longwanggou as a 
base camp for his research in Shaanxi.
I will argue that Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen got involved in running Jenlangong Temple
because he yearned for a measure of public recognition commensurate with his power and
wealth. Because ‘Old Wang’s’ numerous titles, just like Jen Ming-kuen’s sole title as temple
vice-chairman, are outside the government bureaucracy, they are not government officials,
and receive no salary for any of them. However, ‘these titles imply positions, which in turn
imply power’ (Chau 2006:185). All of his eight positions hinge on the fact that he is the temple
boss, and all these titles mean one thing- he is the boss in Longwanggou. Similarly, Jen Ming-
kuen’s position as temple vice-chairman signifies he is the boss, or to put it another way, he is
the jiaotou (big man) of Dajia.
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Being boss of a famous temple gave these two men social ‘face’ (mianzi) with which they can 
present themselves to the outside world. It is as temple bosses that these two men receive 
visitors to their hometowns. It is as temple boss that Jen Ming-kuen appears on cable TV to 
give interviews during the pilgrimage season. It is as temple boss, especially a famous one, 
which allowed ‘Old Wang’ to act as host to Dr. Chau, a foreign scholar from a prestigious 
American university, just as Jen Ming-kuen had done with me.
These two men differ, in that ‘Old Wang’ is very candid about why he spends so much time 
and energy at the temple. When interviewed by Chau, he replied, ‘because I want to leave a 
name. You see, one comes to live in this world only once, so one has to leave a name. It 
doesn’t matter whether it’s a good name or bad name; one has to leave a name’ (Ibid.). ‘Old 
W ang’ wants to be remembered as the architect of the revival of the temple. He wants fame 
and influence. Jen Ming-kuen, on the other hand, has never shifted on his declared motive for 
spending time at the temple. ‘I work for the goddess Mazu and my intention is to get the whole 
world to know her5, is what I repeatedly heard him say in public and in private.
I shall now return to the idea of merit in the traditional political culture of Southeast Asia as a 
motive for ‘gangster1 involvement in Taiwanese temples. Thais see a person as ‘always 
gaining or losing merit’ (Hanks 1962: 1247). Moreover, they believe that because karma is 
cumulative, ‘with the most recent actions weighted proportionately heavier* (Ockey 1998:41), 
one’s actions in the latter part of life are more important than those one has done in one’s 
youth. For both Yen Ching-piao and Jen Ming-Kuen, as with the Thai chaopo, their connection 
with the temple as directors reflects the fact that they are powerful individuals. It may also, if 
we follow the Thai logic of merit and power, mean that they are ‘good’ people since ‘power 
itself is proof of goodness and virtue and attracts followers’ (Rosen 1975: 142).100 Temple 
Chairman Yen Ching-piao and Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen, to varying degrees, rely on 
Jenlangong in order to gain public acceptance as individuals who are both powerful and 
meritorious. Yen Ching-piao briefly ‘lived a life of crime’ in his youth, but since then he has had 
an illustrious political career, which has culminated in his directorship Jenlangong and shortly 
after, his elevation to national legislator. Thai logic of merit and power would dictate that he is, 
by definition, a ‘good man’.
100 Rosen, G. 1975. Peasant Society in a Changing Economy: Comparative Development in Southeast Asia and India. 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
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To be fair, his claims to legitimacy are very much contested and negotiated. Highly educated 
urban and rural residents are still suspicious and distrustful of him despite his recent 
achievements. However, among the rural folk his legitimacy derives from various sources. To 
a large extent he bases his legitimacy on his status as two-term legislator for Shalu and on his 
well-deserved reputation as a ‘tireless servant of his constituents’. Also he has recently 
cultivated a reputation as a benefactor for various causes- earthquake and typhoon victims, 
blood donation, etc. These factors alone should suffice to make him a ‘meritorious’ individual 
in the Thai worldview. Indeed, in chapter six I talk about how Legislator Yen’s constituents in 
Shalu view him. Many of those who support and vote for the two-term legislator, see him as a 
good man who works to defend local interests. The fact that he is also head of the island’s 
foremost temple buttresses his standing as a powerful and virtuous individual in the eyes of 
rural folk.
Jen Ming-kuen, on the other hand, relies almost entirely on his post as Jenlangong vice- 
chairman to claim respectability as well as acceptance. He is not a learned man. I even 
suspect he may be functionally illiterate as I have never seen him reading anything and I 
noticed temple employees used to scan the daily papers and give him a summary of any 
article that made mention of the temple. His only position of social worth is as temple vice- 
chairman. He receives visitors in Dajia as temple vice-chairman. He gives interviews on cable 
TV as temple vice-chairman. He has the potential, should he so desire in future, to make 
political connections and alliances with people outside Dajia as temple vice chairman. Thai 
cosmology and beliefs would predict that his current high status as Jenlangong vice-chairman 
should confer a commensurate amount of merit and virtue. It could certainly account for why 
ordinary folk are outwardly respectful and why they give him ‘face’ (mianzi). Perhaps they 
focus on the office, not on the person, and they assume that he can’t be all that bad because 
he is connected with the goddess Mazu. It may be another way of saying that he must be 
virtuous because in Southeast Asian traditional political culture, power begets virtue.
I have been arguing in this section that prominent rural individuals get involved in folk religion 
temples as a way of gaining merit and legitimacy. I will now make the case that one may 
analyze certain aspects of local politics in Taiwan by taking folk religion as an ideal or model. 
Ahern (1981) and Feuchtwang (2001) have suggested that the relationship of the gods with 
each other within the pantheon of Chinese religion, and their relationship with mortals, may be 
seen as a model for the relationship of the state bureaucracy and other high officials with
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ordinary humans. I intend to use this model as a template for coming to terms with this thesis’ 
main themes- the legitimacy of the local politician and the nature of his power.
Ahern identifies two ways in which Chinese gods’ power and authority may be viewed. One is 
the view from the top, or the official version of the source of their power. ‘In the government’s 
view, the god’s authority was delegated from above as they were admitted into the official lists 
and given honours and titles’ (1981: 95). Thus a god’s authority is likened to that of a 
bureaucrat or high government official. The other view is the one from below, emanating from 
ordinary worshippers. According to this view, gods are powerful to the extent that they have 
the ‘power to respond to requests and make things happen (being lieng) was the ultimate 
criterion of a spirit’s becoming a god...They say a god is lieng when many people say he is, 
lieng is a result of popularity and allegiance from the people...temples could decline in 
popularity and even be abandoned if the god were no longer thought lieng1 (Ahern 1981: 94- 
95).101 Lastly, she believes that Chinese religion has a mystifying function in that ‘leaders can 
use religion and ritual to enhance their power because religion and ritual hide the true source 
of power from those over whom it is exercised’ (1981: 77).
Chinese gods are, Feuchtwang (2001:3-4)102 argues, ‘actual historical persons', who ‘can be 
traced to and identified with historically documentable biographies’. He states that Chinese 
gods like Guan Yin and Mazu are intercessors. He also believes that these beings are 
comparable to Christian saints, among other things, because ‘like saints, Chinese gods are 
credited with a present effectiveness. It is not the effectiveness of faith or of intercession with 
a redeemer. But it is intercession in a hierarchy of gods and their underlings, having power to 
control malign and disorderly influences which are themselves also in principle historically 
identifiable individuals’ (ibid.).
Viewing local politics in Taiwan through the prism of folk religion as outlined above is helpful in 
three significant ways. First, ideal gods, seen from the perspective of ordinary mortals, are 
‘effective’ and ‘responsive’. In the same manner, I argue in chapter six that the ideal quality of 
a politician, from the perspective of local folk, is his ability to act as a generous patron, 
providing for his constituents and to ‘get things done’. Should he fail in this task his popularity 
will decline and he will probably not get re-elected next time.
101 Ahem, E. M. 1981. Chinese ritual and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
102 Feuchtwang, S. 2001. Popular Religion in China: The imperial metaphor. Richmond: Curzon.
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Second, intermediate or lesser gods perform the role of ‘intercessor* or ‘intermediary*, wherein 
they not only control ‘malign and disorderly influences’ but also intercede on behalf of ordinary 
mortals who wish to petition higher, more powerful but distant gods. Similarly, in chapter six I 
make the point that rural voters are intimidated by the bureaucracy, as well as the police and 
the justice system and they want their local politician to intercede with these institutions as 
well as with other politicians even more powerful and distant than himself, on their behalf.
Last, Chinese religion hides the true source of power from those over whom it is exercised. 
In chapter five I talk about the complex multifaceted nature of the Taiwanese local politician. 
He is seen as a ‘hero’ and ‘avenger’ in his hometown. But he also has strong links, sometimes 
of the unofficial sort, to the agents and organs of the state. Moreover, he is also aware that his 
long-term survival involves forging some sort of relationship or understanding and 
accommodation and cooperation with the nation’s elite. In chapter six I describe how 
Legislator Yen Ching-piao’s voters’ surgery emphasizes how hard they work at obtaining 
benefits for their voters through constituency service (xuanmin fuwu). He is humble and says 
that he is powerful only because he ‘works for the people’. Modesty aside, Legislator Yen is a 
truly powerful man in his own right whose primary legitimacy lies outside the state apparatus. 
Nevertheless, in an equally important sense, a significant part of his ability to deliver benefits 
to his constituents lies in his office, which gives him access to institutions and resources of the 
state. Thus, the nature of his power is at least partly derivative.
These three facts reflect common themes in the political culture of Southeast Asia. The 
chaopo, or Thai local politician ‘draws attention to certain persistent facts of Thai life: that 
patronage is important; that justice and protection are to be found more in personal 
relationships than in the law’ (McVey 2000: 14). In addition, in mystifying the source of his 
power, ‘the local politician affirms his privileged access to the spiritual world of 
kapangyarihan103 through identification with the institutions of organized religion...the local 
politician poses as the source of material welfare too. In assuming the role of the grand 
patron, the local politician frequently passes off public resources, funds and prerogatives as 
flowing from his personal powers and magnanimity’ (Sidel 1995: 159).104 Also, ‘legitimation 
along these lines also obscures the derivative nature of power...power is equated with
103 Intrinsic power
104 Sidel, J. 1995. “The Philippines: The Languages of Legitimation”. In Muthia Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia. Pp. 136-169. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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personal benevolence even as its source in the state apparatus and the cash economy 
remains hidden’ (Sidel 1995: 167).
Narratives of 'gangsters running temples’
One particularly good way of illustrating how some sectors of society have become extremely 
sensitized to notions of corruption and informal institutions is by looking at data I gathered 
from talking to Dajia’s schoolteachers and other highly educated professionals. As I 
mentioned previously in the chapter, most ordinary rural folk are quite accepting of Temple 
Chairman Yen Ching-piao and Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen. Indeed I have never heard 
them call these two men heidao although many acknowledge that these men do have such a 
reputation. In stark contrast to the acceptance and tolerance that most ordinary working class 
people show towards these two men, are the feelings of the rural schoolteachers:
Heidao have taken over Jenlangong Temple because it’s rich and famous. They operate all the
KTVs, video arcades, ‘barber shops’, billiard halls in Dajia's Guangming Road and have allied
themselves with Yen Ching-piao so that the police will leave them alone, as he's a legislator.
The above quote was from a Dajia primary schoolteacher. Her views on ‘gangsters’ and 
temples were typical of most of the professional classes from Dajia and Shalu I have spoken 
to regarding the issue. They have the perception that the temple has been taken over by 
‘gangsters’just like several other famous popular religion temples in the country. They largely 
agree that it is due to certain social forces, foremost of which is the cost-benefit scenario of 
temple management.
Chinese folk religion is very much concerned with worldly affairs and Chinese folk religion 
temples offer a dizzying array of services to people that, for a set fee, ensure academic 
success for one’s children (wenchangsui)f avoid bad luck and misfortune (pingansui), change 
the luck of those born in inauspicious years (antaisui), etc. These fees range between NT$ 
500-800 (US$1=NT$32) and are valid for the whole year. These informants believe 
‘gangsters’ take over temples because they make a lot of money. Running a highly successful 
folk religion temple in Taiwan can be highly lucrative. In addition it can also constitute a low- 
risk, high reward activity if we consider that very few people are convicted for fraud involving 
temple funds. Below is a quote from a source:
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Temples were initially a burden on whoever managed them as they had to give out of their own 
pockets to maintain many of the activities, as the government subsidies clearly weren't enough. 
Initially many of the temple managers were either businessmen or scholarly gentlemen types who 
could nevertheless raise money through their standing in the community. This situation changed in 
the 80s as a lot of money began pouring into temples in Taiwan. As people got richer they had 
more money to give in the form of donations to temples. Donations to the temple have always been 
substantial. But in recent years temples began to be run on different lines, like they were 
businesses. They would use guangmingdeng,105 antaisui, etc. Previously, donations weren't a big 
amount, if you wanted to give money, fine but now they print big posters advertising their'services'. 
Antaisui used to cost NT$ 200, now its NT$ 600.
Rising prosperity in Taiwan has been accompanied by rising expectations of wealth and 
comfort, and skyrocketing temple revenues are a reflection of this. Nonetheless, my fieldwork 
took place at a time of economic recession, rising unemployment and pessimistic economic 
statistics for the country, but this did not seem have reduced people’s spending in temples. My 
informants speculate that people have spent more money in temples in recent years precisely 
because they see it as an insurance against uncertain times. Many people have lost their jobs 
and companies are losing money, young men go to do national service, children face 
competitive entrance exams to enter the best senior high schools and universities, or they 
simply don't feel well- all these pressures contribute to people going to worship in the temple 
and giving even more donations.
Dajia Town’s Jenlangong Temple is one of the country’s most famous and profitable temples. 
I estimated its gross revenues for three of these ‘services’ for 2003 and they are as follows:106 
antaisui = NT$ 25,000,000 (NT$ 500 x 50,000), guangmingdeng = NT$ 36,000,000 (NT$ 600 
x 60,000), and finally, wenchangdeng = NT$ 2,400,000 (NT$ 600 x 4000). These three 
services alone add to a total of NT$ 63,400,000. This total figure is a highly conservative 
estimate, and it does not include revenue from all the other services the temple offers, and 
does not include other income such as donations of gold, value of the temple real estate, etc. 
Another informant is quoted explaining to me why temples increasingly became an attractive 
target for so called ‘gangsters’:
105 A candle or electric bulb kept in the temple with the donor's name written on it.
106 The figures consist of the price of the service times the number of receipts.
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Taiwanese people still aren’t sure what a religion is. Now Jenlangong Temple worship can’t be 
considered a religion, it’s a folk belief. A lot of people who come to worship Mazu don’t care who the 
temple committee and chairman are. They only care about Mazu. So they allow these people to 
control Jenlangong Temple through omission. If people decided that it was unacceptable, they 
would stop going and stop giving donations and the temple would run out of money. Then heidao 
would lose interest in it. Whoever heard of heidao taking over Dajia's Wenchangci (Confucius 
Temple)? It’s because there isn't any money over there! Although most major temples in Taiwan 
are caituanfaren (Consortium of Judicial Persons) and thus all financial deals must be made 
accountable and be open to the public, this apparent transparency doesn't stop them from 
skimming money off the top. They can ‘borrow’ money from the temple and return it at a later date 
without paying interest. Alternatively they can lend the money to their friends and charge them 
interest, pocketing the interest while returning the principal to the temple. W e don't know all the 
details, but there are a lot of ways to make money off temples if you put your mind to it. This 
problem isn’t unique to Dajia. Fengtiengong Temple in Xingang Town, Chaotiengong Temple in 
Beigang Town, and Nanyaogong Temple in Changhua City all suffer the same fate. Previously 
temple officials were scholarly, gentlemen types, but they don't want to get involved now that these 
people are here. No one wants to be coerced or threatened with physical violence just because 
they happen to have an argument over temple affairs.
It was evident to me that my informants who were professionals felt strongly about the 
temple/money nexus, which they felt has given rise to the current predicament. The truth is, 
their explanations are, at first glance, appealing for they appeal to a very strong human 
motive- greed. 'Gangsters’ have taken over temples because they are greedy. People’s 
theories about why 'gangsters’ have taken over temples notwithstanding, it must be made 
clear that to date no past or sitting temple official at Jenlangong has ever been convicted of 
any form of financial impropriety. Although rumours and conspiracy theories abound, there is 
no hard evidence of fraud involving temple funds.107
I have highlighted the profit motive as the primary explanatory force given by professionals 
regarding ‘gangster1 involvement in temples. What was not so clear to me was why ordinary 
people had allowed such a thing to happen in the first place. ‘Why don’t ordinary people 
protest’, I would ask the local schoolteachers. Certain recurring elements in their answers, 
some of which are reflected in the above quotes, ranged from public apathy- ‘many people
107 After coming to power in 2000, the DPP, suspicious that Yen Ching-piao and his ‘ilk’ had assumed control of 
Jenlangong the year before, and perhaps they were in a vengeful mood because Yen Ching-piao threw his weight behind 
James Soong of the PFP against aspirant Chen Shui-bian of the DPP in the 2000 elections, ordered a series of ‘raids’ of the 
temple and inspections of its financial accounts. These acts were in order to find proof Yen Ching-piao was up to no good. 
However, no evidence of wrongdoing was found and the government has left the temple management alone ever since.
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don't care who runs the temple here', or ‘many of today's youth aren't bothered at all about the 
temple and temple-related affairs’, to ignorance- Taiwanese don’t know what religion is’, or 
‘many are old and not very well-educated, they only want to worship Mazu’.
What the above comments regarding popular apathy and ignorance, seem to indicate is a 
discernible ‘middle-class educated’ bias against folk religion as well as other rural values. The 
suggestion by Dajia and Shalu’s intellectuals that ordinary people don’t care what goes on in 
the temple as long as they can worship Mazu, or that they don’t know what religion is, 
indicates a veiled criticism of popular religion and other folk values. The above quotes suggest 
that informants appear to be in favour of a religion in which moral rectitude on the part of 
worshippers and of those in charge of the temple were paramount. It may also be the case 
that they yearn for a form of religious practice in which doctrine and belief had a more 
prominent role. Indeed the repeated observations of many schoolteachers that previous 
temple directors were ‘scholarly, gentlemen types’, or at least ‘prominent local businessmen’ 
seems to support the idea that the intelligentsia have a clear bias towards the alternative kind 
of religion I have just mentioned.
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Conclusion
The Jen brothers are popularly known as the local jiaotou (big man) of Dajia Town and they 
have achieved success in business and local politics, often through illegal or semi-legal 
means. The Jen brothers achieved success largely by identifying the commercial opportunities 
in the leisure and gambling industry that opened up since the 1980s. This was a time in which 
Taiwanese society witnessed rapid economic growth accompanied later by social and political 
liberalization. These individuals have leveraged their wealth and influence in two ways. Firstly, 
they have entered local politics. Second, they have, with Legislator Yen’s assistance and 
collaboration, also managed to penetrate the management committee of two local popular 
religion temples.
The story of the Jen brothers illustrates on the one hand the ease by which locally prominent 
individuals in rural Taiwan are able to leverage their wealth and influence into occupying 
public office, in the cases of Jen Ming-zong and Jen Ming-fu, and getting involved in running a 
temple, in the cases of Jen Ming-kuen and Jen Ming-hui. On the other hand, their story also 
indicates that the two kinds of authority- that which flows from public office, and that which 
flows from being wealthy, influential, and having a reputation for leadership and organizational 
skills, are sometimes inseparable and intertwined. The ‘gangsters’ and temples phenomenon 
exemplifies the ‘temple/village political nexus in rural Taiwan, on the one hand, and rural 
factional politics, on the other. In southern Taiwan it’s not possible to separate temple affairs 
from local politics.
Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen got involved in running Jenlangong Temple because he 
yearned for a measure of public recognition commensurate with his power and wealth. Jen 
Ming-kuen’s position as temple vice-chairman signifies he is the boss, or to put it another way, 
he is the jiaotou (big man) of Dajia. Being boss of a famous temple gave him social ‘face’ 
(mianzi) with which he can present himself to the outside world. It is as temple bosses that he 
receives visitors to his hometowns. It is as temple boss that Jen Ming-kuen appears on cable 
TV to give interviews during the pilgrimage season. It is as temple boss (especially a famous 
one) that Jen Ming-kuen acted as host to a foreign scholar from a prestigious foreign 
university. For both Yen Ching-piao and Jen Ming-Kuen, as with the Thai chaopo, their 
connection with the temple as directors reflects the fact that they are powerful individuals. It 
may also, if we follow the Thai logic of merit and power, mean that they are ‘good’ people. 
There is a divide in the manner in which the ‘gangster’ and temples phenomenon is viewed in
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rural Taiwan. Ordinary, working class people are quite tolerant and forgiving of these ‘big men’ 
while highly educated professionals condemn them.
This chapter also talked about rural professionals’ disapproval of heidao involvement in 
temples. In the next chapter, I will describe and examine middle class values and attitudes 
regarding politics and political life. In summary, my middle class informants have broadly 
westernized democratic ideals and they are quite disappointed with the state of democracy in 
Taiwan. They share the view propagated by academic scholarship and the press that it is 
backward and unconsolidated. They yearn for leaders who are genteel, well educated, mild- 
mannered, scholarly, and most of all, incorruptible. They are quite disappointed that most of 
the politicians fall well short of their ideals and expectations.
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Chapter Three:
Taiwan is not a Real Democracy
He is very honest and incorruptible. He would make an ideal president one day.
I was interviewing Taipei and Taichung city residents some months after the March 2004 
presidential elections were held in Taiwan. I was gathering data on urban residents’ views on 
politics and democracy and so asked them numerous questions on the topic. My 
conversations with them ranged from highly abstract political principles to their views on 
several current politicians. A consistent theme in these interviews was a feeling of 
disappointment and frustration about the state of the country’s democracy in general, and 
about several politicians, in particular. It occurred to me to ask them, ‘who is your ideal 
politician and why?’ The majority of my interviewees nominated Taipei Mayor108 Ma Ying-Jiu. 
The above quote is one such comment I heard about him.
The year 2004 was very significant for Taiwan if only because two important elections were 
held that year; the presidential elections on March 20 and the legislative ones on December 
11.1 was doing fieldwork precisely during this period when the issue of elections dominated 
news stories and was a very common topic of conversation among my informants. Urban 
dwellers I spoke to have very clear notions of what a ‘true’ democracy needs to have and what 
kind of political class and citizens are necessary to make it happen. It is interesting that their 
views are an amalgam of contemporary notions of politics and recognizably Chinese moral 
categories and concepts. The former include the impartiality of the civil service, elections as a 
‘rational’ and ‘civil’ activity, elected officials acting as ‘monitors’ of the actions of bureaucrats, 
etc. The latter refer to ideas such as suyang (literacy) and fengdu (demeanour), both essential 
virtues of the Confucian junzi or gentleman. Here is a summary of their political beliefs and 
values:
108 Ma Ying-jiu did not run for re-election in the Taipei mayoral elections held in December 2006. His successor is KMT 
candidate Hau Lung-bin. However, as Ma Ying-jiu held the position during my fieldwork I  shall continue to refer to refer to 
him as Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jiu.
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•  Politics and especially elections should be a civil and orderly contest of ideas and platforms between 
parties where personal animosity between politicians is absent.
•  Opposition politicians should graciously concede the result and work with the ruling party after Election 
Day.
•  After the elections the whole country should put partisan interests behind them and unite and heal its 
divisions for the sake of the country.
•  The civil service and bureaucracy are impartial and objective arbiters of the law.
•  Politicians should be upright citizens with no previous or pending criminal conviction.
•  Politicians and voters should have fengdu (demeanour), as well as suyang (literacy).
This chapter will highlight a puzzle related to the political values of educated middle class 
voters who tend to live in the nation’s big cities and provincial towns. The paradox is, as I see 
it: why do they prefer politicians like Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jiu who are perceived to be 
ineffectual and indecisive? I believe the solution to the puzzle lies in understanding the 
political values and attitudes of these very same urban middle class voters. These voters are 
disappointed about the democratic development in Taiwan. They complained about the low 
quality of voters and politicians that the country has. They also complained that the political 
system is defective, allowing certain ‘crooked’ politicians to take advantage of the country’s 
democratic reforms for their own benefit. I argue that what people want is an honest and 
upright gentleman who is also daring and resolute (you poli de). People yearn for a politician 
like Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jiu, who can fix the rot in the system and rid it of crooked people. 
However, the paradox still remains because the very qualities that make for an upright, 
genteel, well-mannered and well-educated politician often militate against resolute and 
decisive action. These latter qualities are characteristic of the same ‘corrupt’ rural politicians 
the urban voters despise.
Taipei Mayor and opposition KMT Party Leader Ma Ying-jiu (see Photo 6) embodies the traits 
of the ideal traditional Chinese political leader. ‘He is handsome and likeable and holds an 
S.J.D. degree from Harvard and is tipped to lead his party, the KMT, to victory in the 2008 
presidential elections. His popularity transcends party lines and he is seen as a uniter, a sort 
of consensus politician unlike President Chen Shui-bian or the ex-KMT head Lien Chan, who 
are too divisive and polarizing. He is perceived as honest, decent, and possessing integrity. 
However he is thought too honest. Some people might say he is too gentlemanly. Given 
Taiwan's rough and tumble politics, these traits might work against him. He also cannot shake 
off perceptions that he is indecisive and ineffectual.
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Photo 6: Ma Ying-jiu  
Source: h ttp ://w w w .m snbc.m sn.eom /id /12441464/s ite /new sw eek/
It was precisely his perceived qualities of being indecisive and ineffectual that had been 
dogging him in the weeks that followed the presidential elections in March 20, 2004 and the 
‘shooting incident’ that preceded it a day earlier. It was March 19th 2004. Incumbents 
President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu of the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) were travelling in an open convertible jeep in the presidential motorcade on the last day 
of their campaign in the southern city of Tainan. The motorcade was slowly inching along a 
street teeming with supporters when one bullet grazed Chen’s stomach. Another grazed 
Annette Lu’s knee. They didn’t hear or notice anything unusual at the time, but shortly after, 
both would complain of stomach and knee pains. Once blood was found on their clothes, they 
were taken to hospital in Tainan, a statement was made to the press and shortly after both 
ruling DPP and opposition Kuomintang (KMT) parties decided to halt campaigning activities. 
At the time it looked like an assassination attempt. Fortunately both Chen and Lu did not 
suffer serious injury and were discharged from hospital that same day. But this incident would 
unleash a chain of events that will significantly influence the political scene for the next several 
months.
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The scheduled poll went on as planned on March 20th. The DPP/TSU Coalition won 50.11% of 
the vote, while the KMT/PFP Coalition managed 49.89%. It was the narrowest of victories. 
The incumbent had only 30,000 more votes than the challenger, a razor-thin margin of 0.22%  
of the votes. A total of 13,251,719 voted, representing an 80.28% voter turnout, but a high 
number of them, 337,297, were deemed invalid by the electoral commission. After the 
provisional results had been announced then KMT presidential aspirant Lien Chan refused to 
honour the result and wasted no time in demanding a recount. He also demanded a full 
investigation into what is now famously known as the ‘shooting incident’ (qiangjian), implying 
that it had been engineered by the DPP to garner sympathy votes for their side.
The KMT filed several lawsuits in several cities contesting the result and Lien Chan led 20,000 
of his supporters in a march in front of the presidential palace, this march eventually became 
an all-night sit-in. The boulevard outside the presidential office was continuously occupied by 
thousands of irate supporters for a week afterwards. The official results awarding a narrow 
victory to the DPP were announced on March 26th. This prompted more demonstrations as 
100,000 people massed in front of the presidential office on March 27th demanding a 
recount.109
As mayor of Taipei, the capital and scene of the majority of the opposition-led protests, Ma 
Ying-jiu granted the protestors permission to hold their rallies but cautioned them to respect 
law and order. However he took a lenient attitude towards the protestors, and was accused by 
people of being unable or unwilling to prevent incidents of violence from happening. He finally 
appealed to the central government to take over responsibility for handling the protest by pan­
blue (KMT/PFP) supporters in front of the Presidential Office building, saying the Taipei City 
Government was incapable of handling such a highly political controversy as he faced 
accusations that he acquiesced to the pan-blue camp's protests and failed to clamp down on 
the illegal rallies in the centre of the nation's capital. He tried very hard to maintain the 
appearance of neutrality regarding the controversy, but only succeeded in appearing 
indecisive and ineffectual in times of crisis.
109 A judicial recount under the jurisdiction of the High Court was held from May 10th -18th, composed o f460 teams in 21 
courthouses across Taiwan. The recount confirmed the initial result- DPP won, but with a smaller margin. Lien and Soong 
have to this day refused to concede that they had lost.
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He was caught in the middle, trying to appear neutral and wanting to be seen to be 
competently doing his job of mayor. However, his actions satisfied no one (see Photo 7). 
Those supporting President Chen Shui-bian berated him for not being more decisive and not 
acting sooner in quelling the riots in Taipei, while those supporting Lien Chan criticized him for 
calling on protestors to stop, or at least continue their demonstration peacefully. In an earlier, 
unrelated incident, Mayor Ma also was also the target of similar accusations of lack of 
leadership and indecisiveness as a result of the SARS epidemic that hit Taiwan in early 2003. 
He was criticized for not mobilizing the Taipei City Government quickly enough to effectively 
contain the outbreak of the virus. Likewise, flooding in metropolitan Taipei in 2004 also led to 
public questioning of his leadership and caused a slide in his popularity.
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Photo 7: Ma editorial cartoon
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The informants who provided the data for this chapter consisted almost exclusively of highly 
educated professionals- doctors, pharmacists, university academics, schoolteachers, and 
own*ers of private cram schools, reporters and journalists. They were among the large urban 
professional class of Taipei and Taichung, and also, to a lesser extent, the provincial towns of 
Dajia, Qingshui and Shalu, Taichung County. My informants do not constitute a representative 
cross-section of urban society and my findings here are not representative of the views of the 
average urban voter. Had I chosen my informants to include a much wider section of urban 
society- urban working class, owners of small eateries and scooter repair shops, urban poor, 
rural migrants, etc. my findings will undoubtedly have turned out differently.
I chose to focus on the urban and rural highly educated middle class professionals because I 
firmly believe that this group wields a disproportionate influence in shaping the debates and 
narratives regarding the country’s moral and political values. Highly educated urban politicians 
exert an influence out of all proportion to their numbers in setting the agenda of the country’s 
governance and politics. These politicians occupy the moral high ground in the debates 
regarding the country’s political corruption. Highly educated urban professionals occupy key 
positions in the country’s media and information industry- newspaper and magazine editors, 
journalists, commentators, etc. These people initiate and shape the media narratives and 
stories regarding politics, especially, political corruption. Highly educated university academics 
and elementary and secondary schoolteachers still command high status in society and their 
views are held in high-esteem. These people set the tone of the country’s moral and political 
education within the nation’s system of mass elementary, secondary and tertiary education. I 
wanted to be familiar with the dominant ideologies and values of the country. That is the 
reason why I decided to pay close attention to what the highly educated urban middle classes 
say and think.
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Democracy is not mature
Democracy is often about abstract ideas like equality before the law, the sanctity of the vote, 
respect for human rights, etc. However, it is through procedures and mechanisms such as 
electoral law, the civil code, etc., that people experience the aforementioned concepts in a 
tangible way. Without them, these concepts ring hollow. Elections are the most visible, 
spectacular manifestation of the practice of democracy. Indeed, when hitherto undemocratic 
countries undergo political reform, either voluntarily, as in the cases of Taiwan and South 
Korea, or involuntarily, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, there tend to be immediate 
calls to hold elections as soon as it is feasible.110
Urban informants I spoke to tended to view democracy in Taiwan in one of two ways. An 
optimistic minority felt that it has improved a lot over the years although it faces a lot of 
challenges {you henduo tiaozhan), and is very much a ‘work in progress’. A substantial 
majority, on the other hand, were very critical of it. I often heard the phrase Taiwan is a 
democracy in form but not in substance’, or ‘it is quite shallow’. Most of my urban informants 
felt that democracy and political life in Taiwan lacked essential characteristics a ‘true’ 
democracy needed to have.
They complained about the chaos and seeming disorder that come to mind when one thinks 
about politics. Indeed, at one level this is readily apparent when one watches scenes of 
fistfights between legislators at the Legislative Yuan. Informants complained it has made the 
country a sort of international laughingstock and people were worried their political class was 
harming their reputation abroad. The chaos and disorder can also be experienced at election 
campaigns. Indeed, elections share common characteristics with popular religious festivals in 
the sense that they are ‘renao’ (loud and noisy). A typical motorcade that precedes a 
politician’s entourage on its way to a rally would not be complete without a fleet of cars and 
three wheeler motorcycles normally driven by people with physical disabilities enthusiastically 
honking their horns. The candidate would normally be on top of a motorized float festooned 
with his picture while a pre-recorded message complete with the candidate’s theme song 
blares out from its powerful loudspeakers. The actual rally is even louder as supporters are all 
supplied with trumpet-like devices; aerosol-cans attached to a hollow cone that emits a 
powerful piercing wail once the button is pressed. Thus I have witnessed a few rallies wherein
110 It does seem to be the case that for many people, democracy means elections. I wish to make clear that this chapter is 
about urban residents’ emic views about politics, elections and democracy and not mine. Although I fully sympathise with 
my informants’ sentiments and find them quite reasonable, I  do not share them.
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the candidates’ speeches are often punctuated by these noisy contraptions. Whatever one 
may think of political rallies in Taiwan, they are certainly not quiet and orderly.
Politicians are not gentlemen
Another reason informants held this pessimistic view of politics and democracy is the palpable 
personal animosity and bitter hatred between politicians that become manifestly apparent 
during elections. Voters are accustomed to seeing political parties engage in verbal attacks 
(yuyan shang de gongji) as a default form of dialogue. This is heightened during election time 
but they are not uncommon during other times. In many countries people tend to have an 
ambivalent attitude towards politicians in the best of times. Yet the Taiwanese politician, in my 
impression, is regarded with especial distaste and cynicism. In the words of one informant:
Politicians pretend to act in the name of democracy (jiaji minzhu zhimin) but create social chaos 
(zhizao shehui hunluan) and opposition between parties (zhengdang de duili). W e have a formal 
democracy (xingshi shang minzu). The Pan-Green and Pan-Blues don’t cooperate (xuyao hezuo) to 
work toward improving social welfare (wei renmin de fuli zhuoxiang), but instead have a battle of 
words.
‘Taiwanese democracy is very shallow’, informants often liked to comment. When pressed to 
elaborate further, they stated that voting is only a small part of the democratic process and 
that a viable political system needs to have in place certain institutions and appropriate habits 
on the part of citizens and their representatives. One crucial institution which they felt was 
missing is the willingness to abide by the rule of law. The aftermath of the election in Taiwan 
not only highlighted the bitterly divided nature of the population. It also seemed to indicate to 
my informants that the Pan-Blues were willing to respect the results only when it suited them. 
Firstly, they refused to accept the provisional results issued after all 13,749 polling places had 
reported. Lien Chan demanded a recount, a full inquiry into the apparent assassination 
attempt, at the same time as his party filed lawsuits in several cities contesting the election 
result.
My informants’ negative comments regarding the chaos and disorder, the personal animosity 
and bitter hatred between politicians, and the widespread perception of the failure to respect 
the rule of law seem to suggest that they were actually expressing certain deeply held 
expectations of political behaviour that transcend the immediate context of the election results 
issue. People often used the term hen luan (chaos and chaotic) as what would ensue without
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the rule of law. But they also used the term hen luan when talking about the violent fistfights in 
the legislature and the numerous incidents of verbal attacks politicians hurled at each other in 
the election campaign. It is likely that the notion that politicians refused to abide by or respect 
the law when it did not suit them is about something more than just strict adherence to written 
laws. I suspect what people may be trying to do is to articulate the qualities of grace, honour 
and sportsmanlike behaviour that they expect in an ideal politician. It could be that they were 
indirectly referring to the rowdy, non-genteel behaviour of politicians when they talked of 
anarchy and chaos. It is possible that what people want is a gentleman-politician, not the 
rowdy, aggressive and often violent breed they presently are stuck with.
Pan-Blue protestors hurled eggs at the CEC headquarters in angry response, when Chen 
Shui-bian was officially declared the winner on March 26, 2004. A judicial recount 
administered by the Taiwan High Court between May 10-18 that confirmed Chen Shui-bian’s 
win by a smaller margin than initially supposed was again rebuffed by the Pan-Blues. Finally 
the lawsuit the opposition had filed on April 5 seeking to annul the election results was finally 
rejected by the High Court on November 4,2004. Again Lien Chan and James Soong refused 
to accept the verdict and promised to appeal, repeating their mantra ‘no truth no president’. 
Pro-DPP informants were appalled that KMT supporters put in doubt the impartiality, 
professionalism and integrity of the civil service through their actions and protests. Several 
pro-DPP informants stated their disgust, saying:
I trust the election result, because civil servants were involved, why would they falsify anything? I 
think we should trust their professionalism and impartiality. They tallied the votes accurately I Why 
on earth would they lean towards any particular party?
Another related factor is the perception that the country is unable to heal its divisions after the 
elections and work together for the national good. Informants who supported the ruling DPP 
felt frustrated that the opposition stymied their party’s policies at every turn. As the DPP has 
never had a majority in the legislature since it won power in 2000, it finds it cannot enact bills 
on its own. Informants complained that ‘the KMT always has to oppose and oppose, blocking 
the ruling DPP party’s initiatives and preventing the country from uniting and progressing’.
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President Chen of the DPP is not without fault either. A consummate politician, he is 
perceived to be constantly on campaign mode when what he really needs to do is govern and 
get things done. Others say he also makes foreign policy gaffes, as he tends to interpret even 
international affairs from the point of view of domestic politics. ‘He needs to take a higher level 
of analysis (zhi gaodian de jiaodu) to solve the question, and not provoke antagonism (tiaoqi 
duili), and mud-slinging (mohei) for political benefit’, was the comment of another supporter. 
The above comments by my informants indicate a strong desire that that both ruling and 
opposition parties should respect the impartiality of the civil servants, as well as rise above 
partisan politics and work for the common good. Also, the comments appear to indicate 
voters’ frustration that they either cannot or do not want to do so. It may be that voters feel 
their politicians lack certain moral virtues and qualities such as ‘respect’ for the rules of the 
game, a sense of ‘fair play’, and knowing how to be a ‘good loser’.
This feeling was further articulated as a result of a comparison with the American presidential 
elections held in November 2004, in the midst of the political impasse that resulted from the 
opposition KMT party’s refusal to accept the election result. Many Taiwanese consider the 
United States to be a point of reference. They like to hold up their country’s performance in 
certain areas, be it in per capita income, average life expectancy, etc., and compare it to the 
American counterpart as an indication of how far they have come and how much further they 
need to get until they are a truly advanced and developed country.
What was significant wasn’t so much a case of informants reacting to the events in the U.S., 
rather, they reacted to their interpretation of the unfolding of events in the U.S. They 
interpreted events in America in the context of what had been happening in their own country 
in the past months. The fact that the opposition was still disputing the results of the Taiwanese 
presidential election by at the time the U.S. presidential election happened, afforded to many 
a lesson in what a ‘true’ democracy really is. Democracy is America is ‘mature and 
consolidated’ while Taiwan is still backward or still has a long way to go till it becomes a ‘true’ 
democracy like the U.S. An informant had this comment:
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The U.S. is a country with a long history of implementing a democratic system, so basically it 
doesn’t matter who becomes president, politically there won’t be too much of a massive change, 
probably some things like tax policy will change substantially, but it won’t be a mess or a disaster. 
The system still emphasizes peoples’ wants and needs. Politicians put the citizens interests ahead 
of partisan politics. U.S. elections are a gentlemen’s duel (junzi zhi zheng) while Taiwanese 
elections are dirty slugfests. Taiwan uses lowly political tricks (beiwei shouduan), even gun attacks, 
just to win. John Kerry of the Democrats quickly conceded the elections while Lien Chan’s K M T did 
not concede defeat. Lien Chan has no honour. That’s not 'true' democracy. The U.S. was, like 
Taiwan, deeply divided into two camps who had very different ideas of what kind of country the U. S. 
should be. Nevertheless, after the elections, the whole country put its differences behind it and 
strove for national unity.111
The above comparison by my informant seems to reinforce the ideas mentioned earlier. 
Firstly, Taiwan is a ‘shallow’ democracy because politicians engage in partisan politics. 
Second, Taiwanese politicians are not ‘gentlemen’, in various ways- they engage in dirty 
slugfests, use lowly political tricks and even gun attacks to win. Thirdly, they do not treat 
politics, especially elections, as a sort of ‘gentlemen’s duel’- they do not abide by the rules 
when it does not suit them. They do not concede defeat and are not willing to put their 
differences aside and work together afterwards. Lastly, by saying that in the U.S. it ‘doesn’t 
really matter who becomes president’, informants seem to be yearning for a robust system, 
which does not depend on a few ‘good’ individuals to function properly.
The outcome of the 2004 presidential election and the way events played out in the 
subsequent months provided the context in which my informants gave their opinions on the 
nation’s political class. They accused them, among other things, of lacking fengdu or fengfan. 
These terms denote demeanour, bearing, grace, and honour. It is the way a person behaves 
toward other people. Thus proper demeanour for a politician, for my informants, consists of 
being able to graciously concede defeat, being sportsmanlike (you yundongjia jingcai) and 
being a good loser. ‘Lien Chan has no fengdu’, is a phrase I often heard, ‘the loser should 
concede defeat graciously and engage in self-criticism, to find out why he lost and strive 
harder (zaijie zaili). Once in opposition, he should assist and give appropriate and constructive 
criticism of the ruling party’. The proper demeanour for a voter is likewise, to calmly and 
serenely accept the electoral result regardless whether your preferred candidate has lost.
1111 got the impression that many people here hold a much idealized notion of America and democracy ‘American’ style. 
Taiwanese democracy, in stark contrast, is perceived in terms of a ‘lack’ or ‘deficiency’ in something. These gaps become 
noticeable in comparison to the American model.
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I shall now turn to the 2004 legislative elections. I will describe and examine a couple of 
candidates from rural constituencies and what urban people say about them. They are Yen 
Ching-piao from Taichung County, central Taiwan and Chang Rong-wei from Yunlin County, 
south Taiwan. Both won their respective seats in the December 2004 legislative election. 
These two rural politicians are alleged ‘kingpins’ of central and south Taiwan, respectively. 
Their histories, as well as my informants’ reactions to their election victories will serve to 
further illustrate urban middle class political views and attitudes.
Heavyweight politician Yen Ching-piao is from Taichung County, central Taiwan, whose 
biography I mentioned in the introductory chapter. Briefly summarizing, he ran under the 
banner of the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (Wudanglianmeng), a new party he co-founded 
with nine other veteran politicians and independent lawmakers in June of 2003. Mr. Yen won 
by a large margin and was re-elected for a second consecutive term in his district. What is 
unusual about this man is his past. He is a major political figure who is rumoured to have been 
a gangster. Jailed for three years in Operation Cleansweep, a government crackdown in 1984 
on gangsters during the martial law period, he was sent to a high-security prison on Green 
Island.
He entered politics upon his release and has won every election he has participated in ever 
since from borough warden to legislator. He was convicted and was sent to prison in March 
2001 for a decade-old bribery case as well as an attempted murder charge. He and his family 
have consistently protested their innocence, with his wife speculating that he is being 
punished for having openly supported James Soong of the PFP in the 2000 presidential 
election. He ran for legislator and won for the first time in December 2001. As he was behind 
bars at the time, his wife campaigned tirelessly on his behalf in their hometown of Shalu, 
Taichung County. He won the election with a comfortable margin and was released shortly 
after.
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The second one is Chang Rong-wei, a very powerful former commissioner, ‘kingpin’ of Yunlin 
County, south Taiwan. He, like Yen Ching-piao, was also caught and jailed for three years in 
Operation Cleansweep in 1984. He went to work as an aide for a KMT politician and was, by 
1989, elected county councilman and months later became county council speaker. He then 
won the Yunlin County Commissioner elections in 1999 amid allegations of massive vote 
rigging. He was convicted on August 26th 2004 for bribery in the 1994 Yunlin County Council 
speakership election and faced a 12-month jail term. He is also suspected of taking kickbacks 
in a racket involving the construction of an incinerator in Linnei Township in his native Yunlin. 
He disappeared and was declared a fugitive on August 13th and managed to give two 
exclusive interviews while his whereabouts were unknown.
During the interviews he denied the charges against him and claimed he was the victim of 
political persecution by the ruling administration as he openly supported the Pan-Blue Camp 
during the presidential election. He had been on the run for 107 days when the police caught 
him on December 9th 2004. This was exactly two days before the legislative elections took 
place. What is interesting about his case is that his younger sister Chang Li-shan, ran in the 
legislative elections as an independent and won a seat with 14.7% of all votes in the county. 
In addition, the cases of politicians like Yen Ching-piao and Chang Rong-wei’s sister being 
elected by comfortable margins despite their backgrounds represent the tip of the iceberg, so 
to speak. Informants reeled off a long list of similar past cases to further highlight the point that 
Taiwanese democracy is shallow. The other cases I have learned about are Wu Tze-yuan112 
and Zhu An-xiong.113
112 Wu Tze-yuan KMT member and former director of the Taiwan Provincial Government’s Planning and
Development Department was convicted of corruption and fraud in 1996 over a kickback scandal over the 1992 Sipiantou 
(E rtH ) waster-pumping station project in Taipei County. While he was released on bail for medical reasons and banned 
from leaving the country he ran and won a legislative seat as an independent for Pingtung County in December 1998 and 
was re-elected in December 2001. He managed to leave the country on a trip to Japan as a leader of a legislative delegation 
and failed to return with the group. The High Court has declared him a fugitive on November 19th, 2002.
113 Zhu An-xiong former speaker of Kaohsiung City Assembly was, on April 7 2004, along with 34 other Kaohsiung 
city councillors, indicted on charges of giving and taking bribes in the December 2003 Kaohsiung City Council speaker and 
vice speaker elections. Chu is alleged to have had a fund of NT$300 million to buy up votes at up to NT$6 million each for 
the speakership election and NTS2 million for the deputy speakership. Chu was supposed to begin his jail term on October 
16th 2004 but managed to escape and is believed to be hiding in China. This vote buying scandal resulted in enough council 
members being thrown out of office to require a by-election to fill those seats. Nine of the candidates who stood and won in 
the city councillor by-election were either spouses or relatives standing in for the expelled council members including Zhu 
An-xiong’s daughter Chu Ting-shan OfcgfJRIf).
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Yen Ching-piao and Chang Rong-wei’s sister’s electoral victories, as well as the cases of Wu 
Tze-yuan and Zhu An-xiong prompted an urban dweller to share his thoughts on the matter:
Criminals and those with criminal convictions or pending cases run for elected office in order to 
escape prosecution! Elected deputies with pending legal cases use their parliamentary immunity 
(huomianquan) to escape prosecution. It doesn’t matter who breaks the law, everybody should be 
punished equally before the law, and you can’t be exempt or immune just because you're a 
legislator. I think there is a logical fallacy at work here. If  a guy has broken the law, then you 
shouldn’t allow them to become legislators or councillors, but on the contrary, you use the immunity 
clause to protect them. I don’t think that’s democratic at all. Parliamentary privilege should be 
curtailed so that elected deputies with cases will not be allowed to leave the country.
These views seem to show that my urban informants do not feel that these types of people 
are fit for office. I would like to remind you of the earlier comments that my urban informants 
made about the ideal politician. They expected politicians to exhibit grace, honour, and 
sportsmanship- in short, qualities characteristic of a ‘gentleman’. From this we may infer that 
my urban informants see a previous criminal conviction as incompatible with public office 
because politicians should be ‘gentlemen’, and ‘gentlemen’ do not have criminal records.
The above quote regarding the two controversial rural politicians’ election victory also conveys 
the idea that politicians with past or pending criminal records should be prevented from 
running in elections. In addition there is the impression that the political system does not have 
built in features, which would ideally, prevent ‘crooked’ politicians from acceding to office in 
the first place. Failing that, the system should at least ensure that a crooked politician, once in 
office, does, no harm. This sentiment is similar to the earlier quote about the American 
presidential elections as not involving too much of a massive change because the system is 
robust enough not to be too dependent on a few ‘good’ people. The implication here is that 
informants want there to be a strong system of laws, checks and balances, in order to prevent 
too much corruption or mismanagement of the country.
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Voters lack political literacy
The urban voters with whom I spoke reiterated that Taiwanese is a ‘formal’ but shallow 
democracy as one essential ingredient is missing, and that is a certain quality that voters 
should possess. This quality is suyang. The term has no exact counterpart in English. 
Probably the closest approximation to its meaning would be a ‘general capacity and 
disposition as a result of long and regular self-discipline’. Informants likened it to literacy or 
being literate.
The word ‘literate’ is commonly known to refer to the ability to read and write. However, for 
most of its long history in English, literate has meant not only ‘familiar with literature’, or more 
generally, ‘well-educated, learned’, but also the condition or quality of being knowledgeable in 
a particular subject or field; cultural literacy, biblical literacy. Thus suyang, apart from denoting 
a capacity and disposition as a result of self-discipline, also implies a sort of political literacy; 
about people being politically aware and effective, able to read issues and events politically. 
Moreover, a politically literate citizenry must be able to effectively deal with political issues 
such as rights and responsibilities, public accountability and good governance.
My informants were very clear about what they understood a citizen’s duties and 
responsibilities were to be, and those were, above all, to rationally, cool-headedly, and 
critically choose and elect politicians who were honest, competent and upright. They should 
not let personal feelings and sympathies, nor regional or ethnic loyalties impede their good 
judgment. They should vote with their conscience. They should examine candidates’ platforms 
and ideological stance and must vote only for those whose principles and ideologies of they 
fully approve. Voters had the duty to evaluate their elected representatives’ performance and 
hold them accountable come election time. Competent politicians, those who have had a 
sterling record of good governance, are to be rewarded. Voters’ should reaffirm their 
confidence in them by re-electing them. Incompetent politicians should be thrown out. All 
these are fine words in theory, but as one voter added, ‘in democracy, the minority serve the 
majority (shaoshu fuchong duoshu), but you need to look at the quality of the majority’ (yao 
kan duoshu pinzhi).
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Below is a quote from an informant who explained how the 2004 presidential election 
demonstrated that Taiwanese people’s political literacy is not adequate:
Taiwanese people, during election time, let emotional reactions take over, while issues such as 
whether a candidate is really suited for the job, take second place. Voters vote out of regional 
loyalties and sympathy and do not rationally choose the best candidates. It is all about 7 sympathise 
with you, I like you1 (wo tongqing, ni wo xihuan ni), and not about the principles they stand for. Many 
KM T supporters say Chen Shui-bian used two bullets to influence the result and the shooting 
attempt (qiangjian) influenced the integrity (gongpingxing) of the election result. I think it is true 
because the hard core voters in either camp stili voted for their preferred candidate but it was the 
undecided, the ones in the middle who were swayed and voted for Chen Shui-bian. I believe the 
Taiwanese opposition and ruling parties can learn from the U.S example. The Americans 
demonstrated suyang and fengfan. The U.S. presidential elections were highly disputed due to the 
nature and design of the electoral system. Although both countries were bitterly divided during the 
elections the Americans did not take to the streets to riot and protest and politicians did not actively 
whip up their supporters (jiji shandong qunzhong). They demonstrated a high level of democratic 
demeanour (minzu fengfan), and that is as a result of their general capacity for self discipline 
(suyang).
People have speculated over what might have happened had the shooting incident not taken 
place on March 19th 2004. Many believe that Lien Chan would have won based on his and his 
running mates’ combined share of the vote in the previous election. Others surmised that in 
the event Lien Chan still lost the election he would have graciously conceded, as it would 
have been a fair fight. Although the result of such a hypothetical scenario is unknowable, this 
exercise in imagination serves to highlight what most see as the ideal scenario- that of a 
peaceful, uneventful election that was not marred by any irregularity or anomaly that might call 
the result into question.
Because the fact is that the assassination attempt has poisoned the atmosphere and has 
deepened the level of mistrust between both sides. Many KMT supporters are of the opinion 
that Chen Shui-bian masterminded the attack to win last-minute sympathy votes from 
undecided voters while many in the Pan-Green Coalition are indignant that they are suspected 
of foul play, as well as the fact that the other camp has questioned and compromised the civil 
servants’ role as impartial, independent arbiters of the political system. For our purposes, the 
most salient and interesting aspect of the gun attack is that it is significant for another reason, 
hitherto unknown. That reason is that the attack is perceived to have divested voters of their 
cool, detached, cool-headed rationality with which they were supposed to have deliberated 
and voted. The gun attack is unforgivable, just like President Chen cannot be forgiven,
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because it made undecided voters emotional and sympathetic. In short, they were deprived of 
their mature, cool-headed political literacy.
This was the comment of another urban informant who described why he thought rural 
politicians Yen Ching-piao and Chang Rong-wei’s sister won in the 2004 legislative elections:
Sometimes voters follow blindly or are blind, perhaps some voters think that these crooked 
politicians aren’t really guilty, or they don’t know the facts about the case, or the case hasn’t been 
proved, so they believe the candidates have been judged and treated unfairly, or they believe that 
post-election, after a change of government, some candidates will be punished for going against 
their party, or that some candidates are really honest but have got on their parties bad side so they 
have been persecuted and sent to prison, so a lot o f voters are sympathetic and vote for these 
candidates. Take President Chen Shui-bian for example. During martial law he was working as a 
lawyer in Meili Island but was sent to prison over an incident there. His wife campaigned as 
legislator on his behalf and she won. A lot of male D PP politicians were in the same situation, so 
their sisters and wives campaigned on their behalf and won. Voters should 'open their eyes’.
The above quotes on why people voted for President Chen Shui-bian after the assassination 
attempt, and for people like Yen Ching-piao and Chang Rong-wei, through his sister, appear 
to indicate some salient points. Taiwanese voters, in my informants’ view are too sympathetic 
and emotional. Taiwanese people vote for the ‘underdog’, either when he is the victim of an 
attempted assassination, in the case of President Chen Shui-bian, or when people think he is 
being persecuted by the government, as in the cases of Yen Ching-piao and Chang Rong-wei. 
From this we might make the deduction that urban informants assume that a ‘real’ and 
‘mature’ democracy necessitates the existence of a mature, rational and cool-headed 
electorate, in short, an electorate who possess suyang (literacy). This may explain the cliche 
that the country’s democracy is not mature.
My contacts simply do not understand how on earth voters can elect such ‘unsuitable’ people 
to represent them in office. They view elections as a venue not unlike a marketplace of ideas 
wherein different candidates compete for people’s vote on the basis of their of their vision of 
government and their personal integrity. The act of voting, for my contacts, implies a process 
wherein one enters this marketplace of competing ideas and visions of governance. One goes 
in and patiently listens to the ‘vendors’ try to sell us their ‘wares’. W e listen, compare, take 
notes and exercise a principled judgment and vote for the ones we believe have the best 
vision and competence. To vote for a candidate is really a vote of confidence in him or her. 
W e don’t just vote for people, we also vote for the ideologies and principles they stand for. It is
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in this light that other voters’ behaviour is incomprehensible. In addition, the prime duty of 
elected deputies is to monitor the actions of the government- they are the voters’ eyes and 
ears in the corridors of power, so, all the more reason why people should choose wisely.
Informants have another theory why voters elect such characters. It is because they are 
intimidated or bribed by politicians. Vote buying is prevalent and has a long history in Taiwan 
and people’s fears about its influence are entirely justified in the case of the two politicians we 
are examining here. Yen Ching-piao’s criminal conviction in 2001 was partly due to vote 
buying and Chang Rong-wei’s first election victory in 1999 happened amidst a lot of 
intimidation and bribery. Although people say it has improved a lot these past years compared 
to the past, its still a significant problem. It varies from place to place, depending on people’s 
different educational levels. People say that it was blatantly practiced, with vote captains for 
candidates going to people’s homes and paying the going rate multiplied by the number of 
registered voters in the household. It has virtually disappeared in large cities but it is rumoured 
to happen in a much more subtle form in rural areas where people are comparatively less 
educated.
It is wrong and must be eliminated, according to my sources, because candidates without 
good moral character or whose suyang (literacy) isn’t good enough can, if he has enough 
money, manage to get elected. Thus vote buying perverts the election process, so crucial to a 
‘real’ democracy, as it obviates the need for people to use their faculties of discernment of 
candidates, judging them on their merits and philosophies and platforms. Moreover, vote 
buying reduces the election process to a simple financial transaction, devoid of moral content. 
It also confirms the notion that voters’ suyang isn’t high enough because they sell their votes 
without considering the candidates’ qualifications or don’t consider the influence all this will 
have on the broader post election political environment.
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Middle-class disappointment
It is instructive to look cross-culturally and compare urban and provincial Taiwanese middle- 
class values and attitudes with that of their Thai counterparts as certain uncanny similarities 
come to light. I referred to literature in the introductory chapter, which stated that middle-class 
Thai voters are obsessed with a ‘clean’ politics’, ‘good government’, a merit-based society and 
a level playing field. Thai middle-class democratic ideals are modelled after those of advanced 
capitalist democracies that is premised on the following; that politicians should win votes 
through a platform of clear policies rather than bribes, candidates should seek political office 
in order to implement their policies instead of personal enrichment, that parties should have 
distinct ideologies, and lastly, politicians should stay in one single party and not be political 
opportunists, switching party affiliations when politically expedient (McVey 2000: 230).
In comparison, Taiwanese middle-class voters are obsessed with the idea that politicians 
should be gentlemen, and everyone should have both fengdu (demeanour) as well as suyang 
(literacy). Taiwanese middle-class democratic ideals are loosely based on an idealized 
American model. My informants considered democracy in the United States as mature and 
consolidated, with a robust and stable system of laws and checks and balances. They pointed 
to the recent presidential elections in November 2004 and marvelled at how the Democrat 
John Kerry was gracious enough to concede defeat shortly after polling booths closed. My 
middle-class Taiwanese informants’ democratic ideals are patterned after recognizably 
‘western’ ones and have the following premises; politics and especially elections should be a 
civil and orderly contest of ideas and platforms between parties where personal animosity 
between politicians is absent, opposition politicians should graciously concede the result and 
work with the ruling party after election day, the whole country should put partisan interests 
behind then and unite and heal its divisions for the sake of the country, the role of the civil 
service and bureaucracy as impartial and objective arbiters of the law should not be 
questioned.
The Thai urban middle-classes are ambivalent towards democracy, as they perceive it to be 
incompatible with their democratic ideals, and furthermore, associate it with ineffective 
government and corruption. The Thai provincial middle classes are also less enthusiastic 
about democracy. They feel it will be misused in the hands of rural people, who are often 
blamed for the continued pervasiveness of vote buying- they often sell their votes to rural
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patrons. What the middle classes want is ‘good government, not democracy for its own sake’ 
(McVey 2000: 20).114 In comparison, my Taiwanese middle-class informants felt ambivalent, 
even mistrustful of democracy, saying it is ‘not mature’, or ‘faces a lot of challenges’, and is 
‘quite shallow’. They are disappointed that most politicians are not ‘gentlemen’ and do not 
have demeanour and literacy. They also felt that many voters are too emotional and 
sympathetic and do not have political literacy. They are disappointed that rural politicians with 
criminal backgrounds who are unfit for office take advantage of the system for personal gain.
Thailand makes an interesting point of comparison with Taiwan because it too, is grappling 
with myriad cases of corruption, and of politicians with criminal backgrounds who have 
successfully participated in democratic politics. I am specifically interested here in talking 
about the Thai middle classes’ attitudes to democracy and reform and show how they may 
share certain similarities to the Taiwanese middle classes. To begin with, the Thai media has 
constructed a narrative connecting the country’s middle classes with the 1973 and 1992 
uprisings, which overthrew the then military governments that came to power in separate 
coups. The idea is that the uprising of 1992 was a middle class event. This ignores the role of 
the urban poor in that uprising, and who constituted most of the deaths in that incident. 
Moreover, the Thai press regularly put the blame on the poor and rural folk for the 
phenomenon of vote buying and other forms of corruption.
The 1997 constitution was drafted in an attempt to improve all aspects of Thai politics. The 
drafters wanted to ‘reform Thai politics’, and to end ‘the domination of parliament by provincial 
businessmen’, and several paragraphs focused on ‘measures to stamp out illegal canvassing 
practices and vote buying’ (Arghiros 2001: 235).115 The constitutional assembly, created for 
the purpose of amending the constitution of 1997, was composed entirely of people who had 
to have at least a B.A. degree, and of experts nominated by the universities. The assembly 
enacted reforms that expressly targeted vote buying and corruption. One reform required the 
government to set a national education policy that would teach democratic principles. This 
suggests that the problem of vote buying and corruption is essentially one of education. In 
other words the poor sold their votes because they lacked the middle class education needed 
to understand democracy. Another reform stipulated that constituency-based MPs cannot join 
the cabinet. This measure had the effect of undermining the power of provincial politicians. 
Another reform stipulated that all candidates for parliament should have at least a university
114 McVey R. (ed.) 2000. Money and Power in Provincial Thailand. Singapore: Silkworm Books.
115 Arghiros, D. 2001. Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon 
Press.
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undergraduate degree, ruling out the uneducated masses and rural countryside. The 
assumption here is that if politicians had a middle class university education, they would not 
be corrupt (Ockey 2004: 164-170).
In thie case of Taiwan, many highly educated urban legislators were behind moves to amend 
the constitution in August 2004 to adopt a single-member district, two-vote system, effectively 
replacing the current multi-member district system. This new system will take effect in the 
legislative elections of 2007 and it will halve the numbers of legislative seats from 225 to 113. 
Currently legislative candidates can get elected, by winning the support of a small proportion 
of voters in their district under the present multi-member district electoral system. Under the 
system to take effect in 2007 candidates will have to win the support of a majority of votes in 
their district to gain a seat. The electoral changes resulting in the reduced number of seats are 
meant to make it more difficult for candidates to win a legislative seat. In addition, the new 
electoral system favours relatively developed counties over less developed ones. For 
instance, Taoyuan County in the north will have six legislators, each representing 290,000 
voters, while less-developed llan County will only have one legislator representing 460,000 
voters. President Chen Shui-bian also proposed in June 2005 holding a referendum on 
whether township mayoral elections should be abolished on the grounds that they breed vote 
buying and local cronyism.116
The ostensive motive behind these political reforms is to ‘improve the quality’ of the country’s 
legislators by making it harder for politicians to get elected in the countryside, and to 
‘eradicate vote buying and local cronyism’ in the countryside. However, a practical 
consequence of these reforms is that they will undermine the sort of ‘grassroots democracy’ 
under which rural politicians thrive. In my view these constitutional reforms, alongside Chen 
Shui-bian’s proposal, will have the effect of diverting political power away from the rural areas 
toward the cities. In effect they are measures that will dilute the power of rural voters in favour 
of urban ones.
Thus we can see that in both countries, the middle classes, especially the intelligentsia, are 
behaving in ways that indicate that they are suspicious of rural voters. The press, sometimes 
subtly in the case of Taiwan, and sometimes not so subtly in the case of Thailand, blame the 
poor and rural voters for vote buying and other forms of corruption. The largely urban 
politicians are intent to enact laws, decrees and constitutional amendments whose purpose is
116 See “Township polls need to be gutted”. Taiwan News. June 27, 2005. p. 7.
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to restrict rural voters’ political participation. The middle classes seem to believe they occupy 
a privileged position from which they alone can understand the essence of democracy 
because they have the necessary education. They give the impression of being protective of 
democracy.
Although they do not say so explicitly, one can take the view that the middle-classes do not 
trust the rural masses, as well as the urban poor because they lack the necessary education 
in order to properly understand the essence and workings of a ‘democracy’. In short they are 
possessive of democracy. The intelligentsia, who write these stories about political corruption 
and who ‘invent’ the gangster politician- someone who is very attractive to the countryside 
because he acts like a benevolent patron, belongs to the ranks of these same middle-classes. 
Rural voters expect their politician to be generous and the successful rural politician responds 
in the form of vote buying, charitable donations, and bringing government resources to his 
town or village. The intelligentsia ‘criminalize’ his behaviour by calling it corruption, bribery, 
etc. In doing so they are also indirectly accusing those who vote for the rural politician of 
impropriety.
♦
The three types of politicians
From my conversations with urban people I can deduce two broad types of politicians and 
political styles. There is the zhengzhijia (good, upright politician), and then there is the 
zhengke (crooked politician). The first one possesses suyang (literacy and a high level 
education), as well as possessing all the attributes of fengdu (well mannered, virtuous, honest, 
sportsmanlike, noble and competent). This kind of politician works tirelessly for the welfare of 
constituents and will never put his own self-interest before the public good. The second type 
has negative connotations and is the exact opposite of the former. He can embody some, or 
all the negative traits that I have described so far. At least as far as people I have spoken to 
are concerned, some national politicians and most of the current crop of local politicians fit this 
second description.
The term zhengke (crooked politician) is a very broad category, however, which includes not 
only those who are the polar opposite of the ideal politician, but also those who possess only 
some, but not all of the attributes of the ideal politician. Lying, cheating, taking bribes and 
kickbacks, buying votes, promising everything in order to get elected then doing the opposite 
of what he promised, being violent, aggressive, foul-mouthed, having little education and
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being of a low social extraction- possessing or exhibiting any one of these characteristics, or 
any combination of them, will lay a politician open to accusations of being a zhengke. 
Nevertheless, the urban sophisticate shares one thing in common with his rural counterpart- 
both desire a politician who is ‘decisive’ and who ‘gets things done’. It is perhaps the great 
paradox of urban Taiwanese political values that ‘decisiveness’ is something that the country’s 
few ‘real life’ ideal politicians like Ma Ying-jiu seem to lack, whereas it is something rural 
politicians have ‘in spades’.
Urban voters feel that the country does not have the kind of politician that it deserves. They 
don’t have enough good politicians; people with suyang (education and literacy) and fengdu 
(grace and honour), meaning individuals who are clean, genteel, gracious, mild-mannered, 
well educated and competent. What they do seem to have in abundance are zhengke, or 
crooked politicians who I feel can further be subdivided into two subgroups. The first kind of 
zhengke has suyang but no fengdu. It means he is well educated, but is not noble or gracious. 
The second group has neither suyang nor fengdu. These are uneducated and vulgar local 
politicians who have ‘gangster’ backgrounds {you heidao de beijing) and criminal records 
(fanzui de jilu) and who abuse the system.
Informants complained of lack of a robust system of checks and balances, that would 
minimize the damage incompetent administrations and crooked politicians could do to the 
country. To counteract this lack, they used the word ‘bold’ and ‘resolute’ {you poli de) in at 
least two ways. They said ‘we need daring and resolute (you poli de) politicians, and not the 
crooked ones’, and ‘corruption must be thoroughly eradicated, and that requires boldness 
{xuyao poli)'. I interpret these two quotes to mean that what people really want is an honest 
and upright gentleman who is also daring and resolute {you poli de). People yearn for a 
politician who can fix the rot in the system and rid it of crooked people.
It is interesting that informants could classify many existing politicians as zhengke (crooked 
politician), but they are hard pressed to name one who they consider a zhengzhijia (good, 
upright politician). Zhengke has become a cover term for any and all politicians they 
disapprove of in one way or another. President Chen Shui-bian is a zhengke because he is 
not good at governing and is too divisive. Lien Chan is a zhengke because although he hails 
from a wealthy and privileged background and has a Ph.D. from Chicago, his reputation is 
dogged by rumours that his father accumulated ill-gotten wealth as a civil servant during the 
dictatorship. Moreover, he has no honour as he refused to concede defeat in the election.
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Some grudgingly nominate Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jiu as a zhengzhijia as he is perceived to be 
honest and decent as well as well educated and genteel.
They waxed nostalgic about an earlier age, a Taiwan lost in time, populated by honest, upright 
and noble politicians. For them the zhengzhijia has disappeared from the political scene out of 
disgust. Th e  noble politician is put off by his crooked counterpart so he decided to renounce 
active political life,’ as one resident put it. If that earlier age some informants are nostalgic 
about happened within living memory, that would refer to the fifty years of KMT authoritarian 
rule from 1950 to 2000 and the preceding fifty years of Japanese colonial rule from 1898 to 
the end of the Second World War. This is an age that preceded the country’s democratic 
transition. If the golden age of honest, upright and noble politicians referred to the twentieth 
century this would mean that people are nostalgic about Japanese colonial rule and KMT 
dictatorship.
This is improbable, given that the principles of democracy and self-determination have 
become mainstream only after the democratization movement began in the 1980s. What 
urban people yearn for is a better, ‘purer’ democracy, not a return to dictatorial, much less 
colonial rule. It is interesting to note that the zhengzhijia, or noble and upright politician many 
people yearn for and are nostalgic about, appears to share certain similarities with the junzi 
(gentleman) of Confucian thought and the scholar officials of the imperial Chinese 
bureaucracy.
One ideal of traditional Chinese political leadership is the junzi. Guo Xuezhi117 sees the junzif 
corresponding closely to the nobleman or gentleman of western culture, as a special class of 
individual that combines the most important Confucian virtues. The junzi personality refers to 
the inner virtue attained by cultivation and development of the self and demonstrates, among 
others, a strong sense of honour, a capacity for self-restraint, a sense of self-respect a sense 
of dignity and integrity. He further states that Confucian thought urges political leaders to 
follow the standard of the nobleman and gradually cultivate themselves into shengwang 
(sage-kings).
117 Guo, Xuezhi. 2002. The Ideal Chinese Political Leader. A Historical and Cultural Perspective. London: Praeger.
122
Another traditional Chinese political model is the bureaucrat,118 the ‘scholar official’ who 
belonged to the age of imperial China in the service of the shengwang (sage-king). From the 
3rd century BC to 1911, China was governed by a civil bureaucracy of scholar officials, who 
were recruited by a system of examinations under the Emperor. The scholar officials were 
educated in the moral teachings of the Confucian classics and thus supposedly endowed with 
inner virtue and outward refinement. The Chinese scholar-official occupied a position at the 
top of the traditional hierarchical society, for he possessed prestige, wealth, and authority.
Ancient Chinese culture revered the scholar and teacher and despised the merchant. 
Consequently, the government bureaucracy was composed of rigorously trained scholar- 
artists; conversely, poets and painters held official positions as powerful politicians. These 
ancient ‘scholar officials’ would certainly pass the suyang test with flying colours. My data lead 
me to believe that what people want is a sort of bold and daring scholar-official-type, or junzi 
(gentleman) who can neutralize the crooked gangsters.
However, as we have seen, the reality on the ground is the opposite of what for urban people 
constitutes a ‘real’ democracy. Urban voters are disappointed about the democratic 
development in Taiwan. They complained about the low quality of voters and politicians that 
the country has. They also complained that the political system is defective, lacking a robust 
system of checks and balances. This has allowed certain crooked politicians to take 
advantage of the country’s democratic reforms for their own benefit. Interestingly, the crooked 
politician that urban voters referred to is, in the majority of cases, the very same 
democratically elected rural or local politician who enjoys huge support in the countryside
I will tease out a paradox that emanates from an urban-centric perspective regarding the ‘true’ 
nature of democracy. The paradox is that people yearn for a daring and resolute hero who can 
check the power of the crooked politician- an upright, noble, mild mannered, well-educated 
politician versus the corrupt violent, aggressive, foul-mouthed and low educated rural 
politician. However, resolute and decisive action is not the scholar-politicians’ strong point. He 
is by nature, contemplative, averse to confrontation, and not given to impulse. It is possible 
that people may have made the wrong choice of ‘hero’.
118 Clever and ambitious young men would pursue an arduous course of study in the Chinese classics in preparation for the 
civil service examination, which required thorough knowledge of the Confucian canon, plus the ability to write essays on 
moral issues and current affairs and poems in a variety of formal styles. The candidate thus had to develop talent and 
worldly sophistication, as well as his erudition, to become a successful well-rounded literatus. Upon passing the 
examination, there was virtually only one career open to him, and that was to enter government service.
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The imperial bureaucrat has, historically been powerless and ineffectual while the ‘villain’119 
has been powerful and efficacious. I talked about the history of political leadership in Taiwan 
in the introductory chapter. Briefly summarizing, until the end of Qing rule in Taiwan in the late 
nineteenth century, bureaucrats were sent from China to administer Taiwan but they could not 
cope with the amount of responsibilities, given the meagre resources at their disposal, and 
their lack or familiarity with the local affairs. ‘The high cost of collecting revenue, the difficulty 
of constraining abuse by tax collectors, and the resistance heavy taxation created’ compelled 
the late imperial state to minimize expenditures, keep taxes low, and finally to rely on local 
elites to provide governmental services (Shepherd 1995: 5).
My point is that gentlemen/bureaucrats in the past, just like the current Taipei mayor, the 
noble, well-meaning scholarly politician Ma Ying-jiu, are well meaning but, to the 
disappointment of many people, are often not daring and resolute. Ma Ying-jiu cannot escape 
perceptions that he is ineffectual and indecisive. His scholarly style and genteel manner seem 
to preclude the bold type of actions needed in the context of political stalemate that the 
country found itself in after the 2004 presidential elections. These gentleman-types can be 
ineffective for many other reasons; they are too polite and timid to roll up their sleeves and 
‘muck in’ and fight tooth and nail for their constituents’ interests, they are too bookish and 
cannot relate to ordinary people, they often do not see serving their constituents as their main 
role, they are unfamiliar with realities on the ground, etc.
In stark comparison to the Taipei mayor, on the other hand, is Legislator Yen Ching-piao - the 
archetype of the rural politician -  he is always seen as the leader who gets things done, 
though with costs in terms of principle and justice. I believe the solution to this paradox will 
consist of viewing contemporary Taiwanese politics through the prism of the traditional 
political culture of Southeast Asia. This will be dealt with in chapter five.
The scholar-official had moral and legal authority, but little real power, while the rural elite who 
really ran the show in Qing era Taiwan, much like the current rural politicians, wielded 
effective power and influence, but little authority and legitimacy (from the point of view of 
urban voters). The gentleman/scholar-official is principle without action, while the rural 
politician is action without principle (except honour and loyalty). What I mean is that the former 
is well-meaning but powerless, ineffective in effecting change, in getting things done, while the
119 ‘Villain’ in this context not only refers to a vile, wicked person, but also harks back to a much older use of the term; he 
who lives in a village. It is interesting to note that the vilification of rural people has ancient roots.
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latter is very effective in getting things done (at least for the benefit of his constituents). Figure 
2 below is an etic table detailing a typology of Taiwanese politicians and their respective 
attributes:
Ideal Politician Intermediate Politician Local Politician
Type gentleman partisan/not noble gangster/heidao
Literacy and self- 
discipline?
Yes Yes No
Grace and 
honour?
Yes No No
Real life example Ma Ying-jiu Chen Shui-bian, 
Lien Chan, 
James Soong
Yen Ching-piao, 
Chang Rong-wei
Figure 2: Typology of Taiwanese politicians
I will argue that Taiwan has three broad types of political leaders. There is the junzi 
(gentleman) style leader, the jiaotou (big man) or heidao (gangster) type and an intermediate 
type who is an amalgam of the first two. Originally a term used to denote a gentleman or 
nobleman of the Confucian tradition, the junzi- type leader is above all incorruptible. He is also 
genteel, gracious, mild-mannered, well educated and competent. His political style revolves 
around compromise and mediation. He seeks consensus with political opponents and is 
averse to confrontation. His legitimacy comes from occupying an official post, which confers 
quanli (legitimate power and authority). However his mild mannered and scholarly ways also 
open him up to accusations of being ineffectual and indecisive. Educated, middle-class voters 
that I spoke to in the cities and in the provincial towns have indicated a strong preference for 
this type of leader but in reality the junz\ leader is more often than not the exception that 
proves the rule that politicians are generally sleazy and untrustworthy.
The jiaotou (big man) or heidao (gangster) type has little formal education, is vulgar and often 
has a criminal record. His legitimacy stems from shili (influence) a kind of power that is 
independent of the state apparatus and is exercised along extra-official or non-official 
channels and informal institutions. He is ruthless with his opponents but is benevolent and 
kind to his constituents. He is ahsali, meaning he will quickly respond positively when 
someone has a request or a favour to ask. He is not the contemplative type, and is expected 
to be decisive and effective when faced with a problem. He is also expected to be a generous
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patron and benefactor and is in reality very popular in rural areas precisely because he is very 
good at securing benefits for his constituents. Chapter six will describe the real-life story of the 
rural politician from Shalu, Taichung County, Legislator Yen Ching-piao who has all the above 
attributes of the jiaotou or heidao type politician.
The third type of politician combines the most salient characteristics of the two previous types. 
He is well educated, but is not mild mannered, noble or gracious. He has a partisan, 
confrontational style and is prone to accusations of corruption. He is not averse to the rough- 
and-tumble style in contemporary Taiwanese politics and proves that a well-educated man 
and a gentleman are not necessarily the same person. Most national politicians conform to 
this type. By saying this, I do not wish to say that most national politicians are corrupt or 
incompetent, but that the ideal of the gentleman-style leader is precisely that- an ideal to 
which very few politicians can measure up. Being labelled a gentleman-type politician implies 
living up to very exacting demands such that most politicians end up being classified as 
zhengke.
It may be helpful at this point to examine Thai classifications of leadership types, of which two 
broad types of traditional leadership can be identified. The first is the phudi (good person)- 
style leader, and the second is the nakieng (bandit leader)-style leader. Each type derives its 
legitimacy from different sources. The phudi-sty\e leader sources his legitimacy from moral 
goodness (khunna) and is sometimes associated with femaleness, while the nakieng- (bandit 
leader) style leader gets his from power (decha), and is always associated with masculinity. It 
is important to emphasize that though, in theory, many contemporary politicians in Thailand 
are classified as being either one type or the other, in practice, most leaders are complex and 
contain elements of both.
Originally used to denote the aristocracy, phudi retains this meaning but also refers to ‘well 
mannered’ and ‘good people’ in general. The phudi leader must be seen to be incorruptible, 
uninterested in populist politics, calm and deliberative. Thai prime ministers thought to be 
phudi were consummate compromisers and mediators. However, this deliberative style also 
opens him up to accusations of aloofness and indecisiveness. It is this phudi-style politician 
who the middle classes in Thailand, tended to support during the 1980s and 1990s (Ockey 
2004: 7-16).
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The nakieng (bandit leader)-style politician has his roots in the village communities in the days 
when the power and reach of the Thai monarchy did not extend far beyond the capital. These 
nakieng were ‘young toughs’ responsible for village protection. Often on the wrong side of the 
law, the nakleng-sty\e politician is tough, charismatic and above all loyal to friends. He is 
expected to exhibit manliness, decisiveness, and power. He is also expected be generous 
with his constituents, be it in the form of ‘vote buying, charitable contributions, or privileged 
access to government resources’ (Ockey 2004:15-17). He gives voters what they want, so It 
comes then as no surprise that this kind of politician is attractive to rural voters as he ‘delivers 
benefits that alternative forms of democratic participation, such as a public hearing or support 
for a political party, could not’ (Ibid.).
Thus comparatively speaking, Taiwan and Thailand both possess broadly similar typologies of 
political leadership. In both countries there is the gentleman-type leader, something I term 
junzi in Taiwan and known as phudi in Thailand, the gangster-type leader called heidao in 
Taiwan and nakieng in Thailand, and an intermediate type who is an amalgam of the first two. 
The gentleman-type leader is mild-mannered and genteel, well educated, incorruptible, calm 
and contemplative. The gangster-type politician is strong-willed, not highly educated, tough 
and ruthless with his enemies, generous to his supporters, unsophisticated, has a criminal 
record, and is generous. His most significant trait is his decisiveness. The gentleman-type 
politician derives the source of his legitimacy from authority (quanli) in Taiwan, and moral 
goodness (khunna) in Thailand. The gangster-type politician sources his legitimacy from force 
and power (shili in Chinese, decha in Thai). The gentleman-type politician finds his core 
support among the urban middle classes while the gangster-type politician finds his primarily 
in the countryside.
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Conclusion
Urban dwellers I spoke to have very clear notions of what a ‘true’ democracy needs to have 
and what kind of political class and citizens are necessary to make it happen. They believe 
that politics and especially elections should be a civil and orderly contest of ideas and 
platforms between parties where personal animosity between politicians is absent. Also, 
opposition politicians should graciously concede the result and work with the ruling party after 
Election Day. After the elections the whole country should put partisan interests behind then 
and unite and heal its divisions for the sake of the country. The civil service and bureaucracy 
are impartial and objective arbiters of the law. Politicians should be upright citizens. Politicians 
and voters should have fengdu (demeanour) as well as suyang (literacy).
Urban people want there to be a strong system of laws, checks and balances, in order to 
prevent too much corruption or mismanagement of the country. However, the urban voters 
with whom I spoke reiterated that Taiwanese is a ‘formal’ but shallow democracy. The reasons 
are principally, that the system is not robust and is too dependent on the competence of a few 
‘good’ people. They also feel that voters do not possess political maturity or suyang, and too 
many politicians are crooked.
Taiwan has three broad types of political leaders. There is the junzi (gentleman) style leader, 
the heidao (gangster) type and an intermediate type who is an amalgam of the first two. The 
gentleman is popular among the middle classes. The gangster is very popular in the rural 
areas, and the intermediate type represents the vast majority of the country’s national and 
urban politicians. What people really want is an honest and upright gentleman who is also 
daring and resolute. They yearn for a resolute and upright politician who can fix the rot in the 
system and who can rid the system of crooked politicians. The paradox is that the gentleman 
type politicians tend to be indecisive and ineffectual while the gangster type politician is bold 
and decisive.
Much as the middle classes loathe the existence of heidao in Taiwanese politics, it is 
undeniable that they enjoy broad popular support in the countryside. The term heidao only 
came into existence in the early 1990s, when the DPP took advantage of the country’s media 
and political liberalization and used it to tarnish the KMT, and in particular the rural strongmen 
who supported the KMT to deliver the vote in the rural areas. However, locally powerful and
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influential people, who enjoyed popular support, have existed in the countryside for hundreds 
of years. In the past they were informal leaders, whereas now they have decided to participate 
in the democratic process, running for and winning local office.
The next chapter will use newspaper and film sources to explore the changing meaning of the 
character of the Taiwanese ‘gangster’. I will show that before 1991 ’gangsters’ (liumang) were 
at worst, social deviants, and at best, they were perceived as flawed heroes. However, by the 
time of my fieldwork in 2002, ‘gangsters’ (heidao) had taken on a new meaning, that of ‘public 
enemy’. I will argue that this change in the meaning of the term, is largely due to how scholarly 
literature, print media and the film industry have run corruption stories that portrayed certain 
politicians as heidao. I will argue that these new narratives of corruption and gangsters as 
‘public enemy’ are a way of instilling new attitudes and behaviours among the Taiwanese 
electorate. They are a way of forming new notions of what it means to be a ‘citizen’ of a 
modem, western-leaning, democratic country.
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Chapter Four:
Narratives of Corruption in Taiwan
This problem of ‘black’ political influence is truly one of the most serious weaknesses of Taiwan’s 
young democracy...(newspaper editorial on March 17, 2005)120
The worst part of this ‘black and gold’ system is the fact that people with organized crime 
backgrounds often played the role of ’fat cat’ in local politics...(newspaper editorial on June 27, 
2005)121
The topic of corruption with special reference to political corruption was a recurrent theme in 
the news during my period of fieldwork in Taiwan from 2002 to 2005.122 News stories and 
reports exposing corruption, corrupt politicians and businessmen, appeared with surprising 
regularity in the print and broadcast media. These stories gave the impression that Taiwan 
was a ‘weak’ state, struggling to preserve its civil and democratic institutions from malicious 
elements. Broadcast and print media took the view that crime, especially political corruption 
and the abuse by politicians of the nation’s political process is somehow reflective of certain 
significant facets of Taiwanese society; the Taiwanese state is ‘weak’ and besieged by 
lawlessness and rampant crime, the state of democracy is precarious and constantly under 
threat, corruption is endemic, the rule of law is weak, unscrupulous politicians abuse their 
privileges to escape prosecution, criminals are subverting and on the verge of taking over the 
state.
This chapter will analyze the transformation of a fluid concept- political corruption. It will 
explore the context within which this anti-corruption and anti-gangster narrative has arisen at 
this specific moment in Taiwan. Gupta (2005:175),123 commenting on corruption stories in the 
Indian press, asserts‘I want to ask what such stories are good for; in other words, what is the 
work that such narratives of corruption accomplish?’ Regarding corruption stories in the 
Taiwanese press, I wish to ask the questions: in whose eyes and under what conditions of 
looking do ‘black gold crimes’ and ‘gangsters’ appear? Also, what are the circumstances and
120 See “Black gangsters still influence Taiwan politics”. Taiwan News. March 17,2005. p. 7.
121 See “Township polls need to be gutted”. Taiwan News. June 27, 2005. p. 7.
122 This phenomenon is partly to do with the fact that two highly important elections (one presidential and one legislative) 
were held on the island in 2004 and magazine and newspaper articles regarding the subject of corruption tends to appear 
most pronouncedly during election time. This is, in my view, because elections are the most spectacular visual and 
experiential manifestation of the democratic process, and incidents such as vote-buying and candidates running for political 
office with past or pending civil and criminal cases are deemed incompatible with the spirit and practice of democracy. 
These acts then tend to be classified as ‘corrupt’ and criminalized.
123 Gupta, A. 2005. “Narrating the State of Corruption”. In Chris Shore & Dieter Haller (eds.) Corruption: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Pp. 173-193. London: Pluto Press.
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conditions under which distinctively modern notions of political corruption as crime become 
thinkable? In addition, I will explain what they try to accomplish.
This chapter will explore the different ways in which crime, especially political corruption and 
the abuse of the political process by politicians, is being talked about in Taiwan. This chapter 
is not about cases of corruption per se, nor is it about the objective existence of political 
corruption in Taiwan. Rather, as Gupta (2005: 174)124 argues, ‘if we recognize that the 
phenomenon of corruption cannot be grasped apart from narratives of corruption’, then a good 
analysis of it needs to take into account the stories that are being told about it. In addition, 
following Gupta, I wish to use the narratives of corruption that appear in the media in order to 
‘draw attention to the powerful cultural practices by which the state is symbolically 
represented’ (1995: 377). Thus, an examination and analysis of specific narratives of 
corruption in scholarship, media and the culture industry can help us pinpoint the significant 
ways in which the state is represented to its citizens.
The Taiwanese media regularly disseminates and creates, with an alarmist tone, the 
perception of crisis and deep rot in the political system. Is Taiwan’s political system really that 
corrupt? Figure 3 below features data about Taiwan taken from the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) compiled annually by Transparency International, an international NGO devoted 
to combating corruption. The CPI in 2005 ranked more than 150 countries ‘in terms of 
perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys’ 
and gives each country an overall score ranging from a maximum 10 points (highly clean) to 0 
points (highly corrupt). In addition, each country is given a numerical ranking according to its 
CPI score out of the total number of countries that are assessed in a given year.
Taiwa n
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
Score 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.9 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.02 4.98 5.08
Rank 32/158 35/145 30/133 29/102 27/91 28/90 28/99 29/85 31/52 29/54 25/41
Figure 3: Taiwan’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index
124 Gupta, A. 2005. “Narrating the State of Corruption”. In Chris Shore & Dieter Haller (eds.) Corruption: Anthropological 
Perspectives, Pp. 173-193. London: Pluto Press.
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Taiwan’s performance in the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2005, in terms of its overall 
score, was the best score it has ever achieved since Transparency International began 
conducting its annual survey in 1995. In 2005 it was ranked 32 out of 158 countries, lower 
than Singapore (5), the United Kingdom (11) and Japan (21), but higher than Malaysia (39), 
Italy (40) and South Korea (40). Indeed, over the past decade, its ranking has experienced 
some fluctuation within a narrow band, but has consistently remained within the upper 
middling group of countries and not too far below the advanced industrial ones. This chapter is 
not really about objective cases of corruption and ‘gangsters’ per se. Its object of inquiry is not 
whether society has become more lawless, nor whether cases of corruption have actually 
increased. The point I’m making here is that according to this CPI index, Taiwan is not 
particularly corrupt, and has not gotten worse since records began to be kept in 1995. Indeed, 
the CPI data suggest that it has gotten less corrupt with time.
If we take this index to be an objective representation of the ‘real’ state of corruption in the 
country, then we are faced with a paradox. Why do media stories such as the two extracts at 
the beginning of the chapter, paint such a depressing picture of corruption? In other words, 
why is there such a glaring difference between ‘perception’ and ‘reality’ regarding corruption in 
Taiwan? Could it be the case that ubiquitous stories about corruption in the media, help create 
the appropriate conditions in which certain practices become ‘tainted’, ‘criminalized’, and more 
importantly, ‘thinkable as crimes’ in a country that had replaced authoritarian ways with 
democratic institutions since the early 1990s? May these representations of corruption and of 
the ‘gangster’ in Taiwan result in a reading public that is aware of certain values and 
behaviours appropriate in a democracy? I argue that corruption stories characterize 
behaviours typical of informal institutions as ‘criminal’ and ‘illegal’. They deem certain 
behaviours to be inappropriate in the new political context and instead emphasize laws and 
‘formal institutions’. Specifically, these corruption stories expressly condemn vote buying, 
‘gangsters’ who enter politics to further their own selfish ends, factionalism and patron- 
clientism.
I will argue that these stories of corruption can also be interpreted as another manifestation of 
an ongoing process that I talked about in the introduction, wherein the political legitimacy of 
certain elected politicians are being contested and disputed. They may be viewed in broad 
terms as representing an urban-rural divide, wherein the educated urbanites have a radically 
different measure of a sound democratic system to that of rural voters. Going back to the 
ideas of legitimacy I mentioned in the introduction, the former insist on much more than
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conformity with established rules for acquiring power as a precondition for recognizing a 
politician as legitimate. In addition, efficiency, integrity and honesty are additional elements 
essential for political legitimacy. ‘Corrupt, inefficient, and self-seeking politicians will not be 
tolerated’ (Sukatipan 1995: 221). Media stories of corruption prove that some controversial 
politicians are not fit to govern.
An interesting case in point is the 1991 coup, which deposed Chatichai Choonhavan, 
Thailand’s first elected prime minister in twelve years. When Chatichai first assumed office, 
his government initially enjoyed considerable legitimacy, having derived its legitimacy from the 
fact that it acquired power in conformity with established rules. The middle classes and the 
media initially were also quite supportive of his government. However, this state of affairs was 
short lived as stories of corruption in the media gradually undermined the administration’s 
support among the middle classes, who even responded quite favourably to the military coup 
in February 1991. A crucial factor in Chatichai’s loss of legitimacy and support was precisely 
the stories of corruption that were published in the country’s papers:
Commentary in major newspapers and by leading academics encouraged and reflected the public’s 
resentment of the rampant corruption, cronyism, and unprincipled behaviour of politicians, especially 
the cabinet members. The government’s claim that it had a popular mandate was largely rejected on 
the ground of the alleged vote buying practices in the previous election. Thus while the middle class 
supported a democratic regime in theory, it was unhappy with the incumbent government. For the 
middle class, Chatichai’s claim to legitimacy based on democratic principles could not be sustained 
because his government was using state power for private gain (Sukatipan 1995: 219).
My interest in stories of corruption in the press was aroused early on in my fieldwork, when I 
discovered that the majority of my informants were convinced that ‘gangsters’ were 
everywhere, and that corruption was pervasive in Taiwan. This was evident in chapter two, 
where practically all the schoolteachers and other professionals I spoke to in Dajia Town 
thought that ‘gangsters’ had taken over Jenlangong. From my conversations with people, I got 
the impression that they sometimes lurked in the shadows, but they would often openly 
operate with people around them fully aware of their presence. It seemed that nearly every 
one of my informants had an opinion on the subject. Below is a poem I heard on more than 
one occasion:
Gangsters are afraid of police (Heidao pa jingcha)
Police are afraid of elected deputies (Jingcha pa mindai)
Elected deputies are afraid of journalists (Mindai pa jizhe)
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This was a poem I was going to hear over and over during the course of my fieldwork in 
Taiwan. It represents a sort of ‘pecking order’, or ‘food chain’, if you will, that purports to 
describe the constitution and composition of certain powerful institutions in the country, and 
how they related to each other. Thus, first, gangsters are ‘checked’ by the police. This means 
the police tolerate the existence of gangsters and regulate their activities, but will from time to 
time impose a crackdown and throw them in jail when they get out of hand.
Second, police are ‘checked’ by elected deputies.125 These elected deputies are supposed to 
represent the interests of their voters in the halls of city and town government. However, they 
can also represent ‘gangsters’ or any hoodlum or gang boss they owe a favour to. So for 
example, if a ‘gangster* is arrested for extorting protection money from shops, the elected 
deputy can turn up at the police precinct and demand that he be released. High-ranking 
elected deputies usually have leverage over local police as they have a say in deciding the 
annual police budget. So should they so decide, they can cut the police budget for the next 
year. This means police are wary of them and are careful not to get on their bad side.
Elected deputies are in turn ‘checked’ by journalists. This means that the members of the print 
and broadcast media can investigate cases of corrupt acts by deputies and publicize them, or 
at least threaten to do so. So deputies are wary of acting too brazenly lest they attract the ire 
of journalists. In this sense, journalists and reporters are perceived to act as a kind of ‘third 
estate’, a counterweight to the abuse of political power by deputies.
‘How do you become a gangster’, and ‘how do you spot one?’ are questions I asked my 
confidants. Regarding the first, one replied:
Although there is no cut and dried method or route, children of lower socioeconomic backgrounds, 
are predisposed to be drawn into the world of heidao. The main route for upward social mobility for 
these children are: If they are clever, a few can go to college and later on get a professional job, or 
they can join the police force, and lastly they can become heidao. Community influences and 
socioeconomic factors are determining factors. At elementary school you hang out with your older 
brothers’ friends. In junior high you become a rascal (xiaohunhun) and you don’t do well at school or 
you drop out. One starts early, you start out by working for the boss of a karaoke bar (KTV) or a 
barbershop, as an assistant of a doorman. Then you can work your way up the ranks. If you have 
potential you can be the boss’ right-hand man.
125 The latter are any type of individual who holds elected office, from village representative (xiangmindaibiao), to town 
representative (zhenmindaibiao), all the way up to national legislator (liwei).
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To the second question another respondent replied: ‘you can usually spot a heidao (gangster) 
by his crew cut, tattoo-laden limbs, necklace, chain smoking, betel-nut chewing, and a plain 
dark-coloured shirt.’ Below he started to describe what it is that heidao do:
Heidao may be understood as a group that uses illegal means to manipulate the activities of the 
state. For example, in local government they bypass the state and official mechanisms and 
institutions. Citizens and voters who have a grievance or dispute will call on them to mediate rather 
than use official channels. During elections they will act as vassals of a political overlord like the 
KMT by using their coercive power to buy votes, intimidate or sway voters. Finally, they will 
manipulate the tendering process in construction projects to ensure their friends and associates get 
the contracts for civil works projects, getting kickbacks in the process. The counties with the highest 
concentration of heidao are Changhua, Chiayi and Yunlin Counties in South Taiwan, among the 
country’s poorest counties. People from these counties often go to work in the cities, usually in 
construction and other manual jobs. They are less educated, vulgar and somewhat naive. They 
drink Wispy (a mix of Chinese ‘Gaoliang’ liquor and coffee) and seek their own kind in the cities. 
There was a big surge in the 1970s of people going to Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung cities. The 
fact that they exist means that Taiwan is not yet a place where the rule of law applies 100%.
Political corruption is known in Chinese as black gold (heijin). The word ‘black’ refers to 
organized crime groups entering the political arena by violent and/or unlawful means, while 
the word ‘gold’ points to subsequent abuses of political power in pursuit of financial interests. 
The term commonly refers to ‘gangster’ involvement in politics, bribery and vote buying. 
Heidao (literally, the ‘dark path’) are, according to informants:
Gangsters are people involved in organized crime. These are the denizens of the underworld, the 
archenemies of the baidao (the white path) who inhabit the upper world of the police, the law, and 
other instruments of state power.
Loosely translated as ‘gangster’, the English term for heidao is, however, misleading, as this 
conjures images of a Sicilian-type mafia, or Al Capone in prohibition era Chicago. The 
Taiwanese heidao foot soldier, whenever I saw him portrayed on television and the in the print 
media, is a stern-looking man in a crew cut, sometimes smoking a cigarette and chewing betel 
nut, wearing dark sunglasses and a plain black collar shirt. The Taiwanese ‘gangster’ boss is 
portrayed as the powerful local politician with presumed links to the underworld. Arguably, the 
most notorious one is Legislator Yen Ching-piao, a controversial local politician from central 
Taiwan who enjoys national prominence, and who is the subject of this thesis.
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I gradually came to realize that the term ‘gangster’, like the phenomenon of corruption, was a 
highly problematic analytical category. It was a very loose coverall term that could apply to 
several kinds of ‘bad’ elements in society. I found the usage of the word so broad in scope 
that it became virtually meaningless. Apart from referring to elected deputies (mindai) who 
collude in bidding for engineering and constructions projects (baopiaogongcheng), as well as 
make money from kickbacks and commissions on these projects, the term can also refer to 
those involved in illegal activities (badahangye), such as loan sharking (dixiaqianzhuan), video 
arcades (diandongyouxichang), KTV restaurants, brothels and bars. Not only did the term 
heidao refer to mafia bosses, and corrupt politicians, they also came to refer to those who 
occupied the bottom rungs of organized crime such as gang foot soldiers. Lastly the term can 
also apply to all forms of lowlife (liumang) such as punks, rascals, hoodlums, rogues and 
ruffians.
I was faced with a dilemma. ‘Gangsters’, much like the phenomenon of corruption I mentioned 
in the introduction, are not a straightforward subject of study, from a theoretical and 
methodological standpoint. Do I study ‘punks’, hoodlums and rascals as well as corrupt 
politicians? How do I compare data on these different kinds of ‘gangsters’ in an analytically 
meaningful way? Notwithstanding the vagueness that surrounds the term, my descriptions in 
the preceding paragraphs are vivid proof that my informants are convinced ‘gangsters’ are ‘for 
real’ and are not an ambiguous category. I thus have to take the matter seriously as an object 
of investigation. I have decided to study not cases of ‘gangsters’ and corruption per se, but 
what stories are being told about them.
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The ‘gangster’ in the media
I will now deal with stories of ‘gangsters’ and political corruption in newspapers and 
magazines in Taiwan. I wish to show here that the media, initially, silent about these issues, 
underwent a process of transformation whereby by the time of the first direct presidential 
elections in 1996, it was full of stories, articles and reports of ‘gangsters’ and corruption cases. 
In the early 1990s, Shaw (1991: 173)126 says that liumang, a loose term referring to a social 
deviant, similar to the English terms rogue, hoodlum, hooligan and gangster, ‘are depicted in 
the media in Taipei as destroyers of common social and moral values, as enemies of the 
people and of public morality’. Note that in 1991 Shaw did not refer to ‘gangsters’ as heidao, 
nor did he refer to any aspect of ‘gangster’ involvement in politics and corruption.
This seems to indicate that the concept heidao, particularly the notion of heijin (black gold) 
that is to gain notoriety in later years, was inexistent at the time. Likewise, referring to political 
corruption in the media in Taiwan, Fell (2005:881) states that ‘as late as 1991 corruption was 
not a central issue’. Fell (2005),127 in charting the fluid and ever expanding nature of how 
corruption is seen and defined in Taiwan from the start of the country’s experiment with multi­
party democracy in the 1980s to the present, asserts that Taiwan’s ruling and opposition 
parties had ‘contrasting definitions of what constituted political corruption in the early 1990s’ 
(Fell 2005:882). However, the then opposition DPP party rapidly took advantage of the newly 
liberalized political and media environment to ‘expose government corruption and challenge 
corrupt governance norms’. By exposing corruption in the media, Taiwanese opposition 
parties created a heightened awareness and greater intolerance of corruption and also 
managed to unseat the ruling power by portraying it as a corrupt party.128
126 Shaw, T. 1991. “Taiwan: Gangsters or Good Guys”. In M. Freilich, D. Raybeck, J. Savishinsky (eds.) Deviance: 
Anthropological Perspectives. Pp. 173-190. New York: Bergin & Garvey.
127 Fell, D. 2005. “Political and Media Liberalization and Political Corruption”. China Quarterly 184: 875-893.
128 The DPP endeavoured to portray the KMT as a corrupt party in the mind of the public by taking out anti-corruption ads in 
newspapers and television, televised debates between mayoral and presidential candidates, live broadcasts of campaign 
rallies and speeches, and finally TV talk shows. The DPP’s anti-corruption campaigns consistently targeted vote-buying 
practices, gradually succeeding in widening ‘the scope of what is seen as vote-buying, reduced the efficiency of vote-buying, 
promoted anti-vote buying measures, and contributed to making this formally tolerated practice into “black corruption’” 
(Fell 2005: 891). The opposition party also succeeded in broadening the scope of practices that are seen as ‘corrupt’ by 
targeting the KMT party assets as well as links between the KMT and ‘gangsters’. To a lesser extent, the DPP has sensitized 
the public to the phenomenon of local and central government corruption, and as a result, since 2000 ‘all three leading 
parties have attempted to keep their distance from local politicians with corrupt reputations’ (Fell 2005: 892).
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The initial efforts by the opposition parties to raise corruption as an electoral issue by 
sponsoring TV and newspaper ads had gathered momentum and the issue largely became 
self-sustaining by 1996, the year of the first direct presidential election. By the time of my 
fieldwork between 2002 and 2005, stories about crime and law and order cases involving 
theft, murder and bank robberies have become fodder for the island’s popular print and 
broadcast media. Likewise, stories about different forms of corruption, such as embezzlement, 
opaque business deals, government tenders for public works projects, especially construction, 
that involve kickbacks and commissions, all featured very prominently in the popular press. I 
will highlight those stories about crime and political corruption that focus on the local politician 
because I wish to argue that the local politician is the locus of many of the political, even 
social and economic ills that form the backdrop of many media stories.
I will use sources from the country’s English and Chinese language broadsheets as well as 
various Chinese language tabloids and rumour and gossip magazines to describe five major 
sub genres of political corruption stories in the print media. I am not trying to compile a 
comprehensive list of all possible kinds of stories and articles detailing corruption and crime in 
Taiwan as objects of analysis, as that would be too broad and unwieldy. Instead I have 
sampled a few representative stories from select genres about crime and corruption that are 
directly relevant to my arguments about the nature of crime and corruption stories in the 
island.
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Photo 8: This particular m agazine contains an article alleging
‘g angsters ’ m obilizing to  influence the March 2004 presidential
e lections. The im age o f the ‘gangster’ alm ost alw ays show s him to be a 
sin is ter figure  dressed in black, w ith a crew -cut and dark g lasses, as 
you can see in the photo in the top right hand corner of the m agazine  
cover. Source: TVBS Weekly. 2004.3.4-3.19.
The tabloids and gossip magazines, on the one hand, tend to feature lurid, sensationalist 
stories about the exploits of ‘gangsters’ or people suspected of having a ‘gangster 
background’. These stories tend not to be based on factual and verifiable sources but on 
rumour and hearsay. The English and Chinese language broadsheets, on the other hand,
mainly cater for an urban, educated and middle class readership, and this holds true
especially for those readers of Taiwan’s English language press. The English and Chinese 
language broadsheets, the ‘serious’ press, regularly publish factual stories and articles about 
cases of rampant crime, lawlessness, feelings of insecurity, and political corruption in the 
country. Moreover, the editorials on the same topic tend to dwell not so much on particular 
incidents of crime and political corruption. Rather, editorial pieces use particular incidents as a 
starting point from which they launch totalizing, moralistic, ultimately pessimistic narratives 
about what these incidents say about the nature and character of Taiwanese democracy.
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The first sub-genre of crime and corruption story comes mainly from the country’s tabloid and 
sensationalist press, which often feature lurid, violent, sensationalist and unsubstantiated 
stories. I will select three stories, which make particular reference to corrupt practices and 
involvement in politics. The first is (see Photo 8) ‘Gang members get mobilized, their power 
could translate into half a million votes for their chosen candidate, swaying the election result 
in exchange for favourable treatment by the winner afterwards’.129 The second story (see 
Photo 9) is ‘Gangsters use their influence to manipulate the futures stock market in order to 
make a killing’.130 The last one is ‘Underworld is being smeared by the government with 
involvement in the March 20 assassination attempt, gang members will stage a nationwide 
march protesting their innocence’.131
All three are baseless conspiracy theories, but are appealing to readers inasmuch as they 
seek to give an explanation to many of the opaque and mysterious events in the country, 
which seem to defy rational explanation. The country’s financial sector is quite 
underdeveloped and not subject to effective government regulation and oversight, which gives 
way to frequent financial scandals. The first story’s suggestion that the underworld 
manipulates trading behind the scenes constituted a psychologically satisfactory explanation 
for an otherwise mystifying institution. Suggestions in the other two stories regarding 
underworld involvement in the 2004 presidential election results played on popular fears and 
anxieties regarding the propriety and fairness of the results.
TVBS Weekly n. 322. March 13-19,2004. Pp. 10-17.
I  Next Weekly. March 4, 2004. Pp. 34-40.
: TVBS Weekly n. 338. April 24-30, 2004. Pp. 15-17.
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Photo 9: G angsters in the stock m arket. Note the shadow y figure in dark  
glasses ta lk ing behind the stock m arket trading m onitor. The visual 
representation o f the ‘gangster’ suggests his im plicit rejection o f 
dem ocratic  ideals such as honesty, transparency and rule o f law.
Source: Next Magazine. 2004.3.4.
Stories about incidents of vote buying, the second sub-genre, invariably appear in the period 
immediately before and after elections, and 2000 and 2004 were years when numerous 
stories about vote buying appeared. The story ‘Anti corruption drive renewed’132 reported 
comments by then Justice Minister Yeh Chin-fong that although 9,000 people have been 
prosecuted for taking and giving bribes since 1993, the conviction rate is too low and few 
politicians have ever been convicted of bribery. The story ‘Black gold rises sharply’133 reported 
that the Ministry of Justice is actively investigating 800 cases of vote buying in the run up to 
the March 20 presidential election. What is interesting is that the stories give the impression 
that cases of vote buying appear to be on the increase and that they stress the fact that the 
act is ‘criminal’ and ‘illegal’.
132 Taipei Times. January 24, 2000. p. 4.
133 Taipei Times. March 4, 2004. p. 3.
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The third sub-genre, about stories linking politicians with crime, constitutes an important 
subgenre of the crime-reporting phenomenon. For instance, the story ‘Judicial Yuan sheds 
light on the darker side of politicians’134 publicised the names and photos of several elected 
politicians who had pending criminal charges against them. The story quoted the Ministry of 
Justice in saying that 205 elected representatives in the country’s National Assembly, 
Legislative Yuan, City and County Councils, and Township representatives appeared on its 
criminal database. The news article ‘Corrupt politicians, tycoons choose exile over jail time’135 
not only ‘names and shames’ several politicians with criminal cases who run for office, but it 
also detailed their use of parliamentary immunity and other privileges to flee the country rather 
than appear in court or serve time.
The story ‘Lawbreakers can serve as lawmakers: CEC’136 detailed how the Taichung County 
politician Yen Ching-piao won a legislative seat in the December 2001 elections despite being 
in jail for the whole campaign period. The article reports doubts by some as to whether he can 
actually carry out his role, as he is in jail. However, the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
ruled that as Mr. Yen was appealing the conviction, he and another incumbent lawmaker in a 
similar situation, were qualified to serve as lawmakers while their appeals were being 
considered. They were ‘future legislators who were elected by voters’, and ‘their victories in 
the campaign are valid and have nothing to do with their criminal cases’. The story further 
detailed Mr. Yen’s criminal history and made the comment that he was the first elected 
lawmaker to run a campaign from behind bars.
Another story, ‘Former Yunlin County Commissioner Detained’137 reported on the detention in 
December 2004 of Chang Rong-wei, ex-commissioner of Yunlin County, who had been on the 
run from the authorities since August of that year. He had been found guilty in that same 
month of bribery charges relating to the 1994 Yunlin County speakership election. Chang 
Rong-wei’s detention was actually only of secondary importance in the news story though. It 
only formed the background of the more ‘significant’ story that his sister Chang Li-shan had 
won a seat in the December legislative election when she ran as an independent in their 
Yunlin stronghold. Chang’s sister’s victory happened just a few days after he was caught, and 
‘she arrived at the Yunlin District Prosecutors' Office around 8:30pm to inform her brother in
134 Taipei Times. October 30,1999. p. 1.
135 Taipei Times. September 14, 2004. p. 3.
136 Taipei Times. December 3, 2001. p. 3.
137 Taipei Times. December 12,2004. p. 6.
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person of her victory’. The implication here is that Chang Rong-wei’s detention generated 
sympathy for his sister, enabling her to win the elections despite being a political neophyte.
The fourth sub-genre is the story dedicated to factions, factionalism, and patron-clientism. 
‘Democracy remains precarious’138 listed the obstacles and challenges that the island’s 
democracy faces, among which are ‘informal institutions and channels such as corruption, 
local factionalism, personal connections, political clientelism and organized crime’. The story 
‘Factional politics can’t be eradicated: analysts’139 reported two Taiwanese academics 
expressing doubts that the phenomenon of factions will ever disappear, given that they offer 
too valuable a service to political parties- winning votes. The first story’s characterization of 
factions as one of many ‘informal institutions and channels’ implied the latter category is 
somehow not conducive to a democracy. The second story added that it’s good for the DPP to 
‘seek to rid itself of the image of factionalism and make the party system more transparent 
and fair’. Again, the message is made clear that factions are incompatible with a transparent 
and fair system.
The fifth sub-genre is the newspaper editorial that goes beyond the simple reporting of ‘facts’ 
and attempts to contextualize them in a wider historical context. These editorials provide the 
‘genesis’ story of ‘gangs’, ‘gangsters’ and the ‘underworld’. For example, the editorial The  
KMT-Bamboo Union connection’140 seized on two unrelated stories, one about the country’s 
biggest ‘organized crime group’, the Bamboo Union, the other, a news story on comments by 
ex-President Lee Teng-hui that one of the greatest challenges facing the nation is what to do 
about the remnants of the Chiang family dynasty, two of whom ruled Taiwan during the 
country’s long dictatorial period, to make a point that the two stories actually possessed a 
historical link. The connection lay in the fact that the Bamboo Union Gang prospered because 
the authoritarian government of the 1980s was more concerned with suppressing political 
dissidence than with law and order. Thus the KMT regime ‘tapped’ the gang, guaranteeing it a 
degree of impunity in return for use of its ‘muscle against the democracy movement’. The 
editorial then proceeded to weave a narrative of how that initial complicity led to today’s 
political dilemma of a ‘gangster’ dominated legislature:
138 Taipei Times. June 8, 2004. p. 8.
139 Taipei Times. June 10, 2004. p. 3
140 Taipei Times. November 8, 2004.
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As Taiwan started to democratize, gang connections became useful to the KMT in a different way. 
The KMT decided that as it actually had to fight elections, then it might as well load the dice in its 
favour. So it relied on its gang connections- indeed still does- to buy votes... gangsters soon learned 
that rather than simply enjoying the KMT’s mercurial protection, they could enjoy more protection by 
entering politics themselves and availing themselves of the constitutional protection from arrest 
elected officials enjoyed. And so we end up with a legislature dominated by a party extensively 
connected to racketeers, many of whose legislators are racketeers themselves.
The editorial Th e  deep wells of black gold’141 reported on three corruption stories, the most 
noteworthy of which was the Supreme Court ruling that found Legislator Yen Ching-piao 
innocent of vote buying, an accusation he was first charged with when he ran for the Taichung 
County Council Speakership in 1994. The editorial then briefly described Yen Ching-piao’s 
background and political career with the intention of making a ‘distressing’ point- that the 
culture of ‘black gold’ is firmly embedded in the country’s political culture. The article also 
made a veiled criticism of the quality of the average voter. The story’s implicit arguments 
seem to be that, ultimately, the success of the country’s democracy hinges on a well informed, 
educated and vigilant electorate, and that the nation had the democratic system and 
politicians that it deserves:
Yen’s success story begs the question: Are honesty and respect for the law actually virtues voters 
expect of their legislative representatives? In more mature democratic countries, someone like 
Yen— whose reputation is tainted by serious allegations of corruption— would never have been 
elected to a city council, never mind the legislature.
The editorial ‘Black gangsters still influence Taiwan politics’142 used the news about the 
conviction and sentencing to one year in prison of Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Rong-wei 
for fraud as a vehicle for denouncing the abuse of the nation’s democratic system by 
‘gangsters’ who run for office:
141 Taipei Times. October 19,2003.
142 Taiwan News. March 17, 2005.
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Chang and numerous other Taiwan politicians represent the unfortunate but still all too common 
phenomenon of office-holders with 'black gang’ or'organized crime’ backgrounds. In other countries, 
there is no need for any restrictions on the electoral participation or office-holding or underworld 
figures for the simple reason that voters absolutely do not elect such candidates. However, the 
existence of such restrictions in Taiwan has been unable to prevent the election of numerous 
underworld or gang related politicians to the Legislative Yuan or county or city councils or city or 
council mayoralties. This problem of ‘black’ political influence is truly one of the most serious 
weaknesses of Taiwan’s young democracy and requires serious consideration and re-examination 
on the part of our people.143
I have been showing fragments of different kinds of articles and stories from a variety of 
contemporary Taiwanese print media in order to show that as late as 1991 ‘gangsters’ were 
seen merely as social deviants, minor irritants in Taiwanese society, and corruption was not a 
central electoral nor media issue. But by the late 1990s their image had undergone a rapid 
transformation. Gangsters and political corruption were by then the major social and political ill 
in the country.
143 The same editorial goes on to mention that the country has 1,236 major gangster organizations as well as ‘underworld’ 
organizations that ‘spread their influence all over Taiwan’. These ‘underworld’ organizations then ‘expand their activities’ 
outside Taiwan and form ‘close linkages with underworld or organized crime organizations throughout the world in order to 
engage in ‘human smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping and money laundering’. Even petty criminals are mentioned. The 
end result is that Taiwanese people live in fear for their safety because such ‘underworld organizations are able to engage in 
criminal behaviour and violate the human rights and personal safety of many citizens’. The editorial attempts to construct a 
seamless narrative which links unrelated groups of people who may be committing some form or another of illicit or 
improper behaviour and it conflates all of them under the rubric of ‘gangster’. Most importantly the editorial gives a simple 
overriding explanation for the country’s various maladies- ‘gangster involvement in politics’.
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The ‘gangster’ in film
I now wish to explore the theme of ‘gangsters’ in film. I wish to look at three films, The Story of 
a Gangster (Daowen), Island of Greed (Heijin), and Born to be King (Shengzhi wei wang). I 
wish to show that the portrayal of ‘gangsters’ on screen has changed from the early to the mid 
1990s. ‘Gangster’ films in the early 1990s resembled a Greek tragedy, where the gangster 
was a ‘flawed hero’ who embodied many virtues like loyalty and a strong sense of justice, who 
fought against perceived injustices, but realizing only too late that he was ultimately fighting 
for a lost cause. By the late 1990s the theme of gangster films became overtly political, 
representing the gangster as immoral, scheming, and a threat to the country’s political 
stability. In short, the ‘gangster’ became a ‘public enemy’.
Photo 10: S tory of a G angster
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Set in the 1970s, Story of a Gangster144 (see Photo 10) tells the story of an aging small-time 
mobster called Old Wang who owns a teahouse, and enjoys boasting about his past exploits 
as a gangster. His son Hui has always been fascinated with his father’s stories and dreams 
about a glamorous career as a gangster when he is older. Charismatic and active in high 
school extracurricular activities, Hui rises in stature within his own gang of youths and earns 
the ire of other gangs in school when he becomes involved in the intramural election of the 
president of his school’s students’ association. Hui falls in love with Chew Hung, the daughter 
of Chuen, his father’s old partner and sworn brother, who later became wealthy and influential. 
Chuen tries to keep his daughter away from Hui and tries to consolidate his position by 
offering his daughter to the son of a prominent local politician. Hui finds out one day that Chew 
Hung was to be engaged to the politician’s son. Furious, Hui tries to beat up the politician's 
son and elopes with the girl Chew Hung, but is pursued by killers sent by her father. Anxious 
to protect his son, Old Wang rushes after them and is killed. The girl is captured and forced to 
marry the politician's son but the evil former partner Chuen is assassinated in the wedding. 
More than a decade later, Hui, now a rising politician himself, after winning a campaign for 
political office, returns home to visit the graves of his father and grandfather.
Story of a Gangster (1989) is, at least overtly, a film about a tragic family history and a love 
story about a boy losing his father and girlfriend, a boy’s struggle against feelings of inferiority 
to rich man’s son, etc. The point here is that, apart from implied references145 to the KMT’s 
strategy of cooptation of the local elite, there was no direct mention of the KMT and 
‘gangsters’ colluding to manipulate and undermine the country. As we shall see with two 
scenes from the next film, political references are very explicit to the point of being libellous.
144 The film dwells on the effects of the localization of political power, as seen through the lives of a Taiwanese high school 
student and his family. The story unfolds in a time of political change in Taiwan. The authoritarian KMT regime realized, 
that it was viewed by local Taiwanese as a brutal, and foreign occupying force that was simply biding its time in its quest to 
retake the Chinese mainland as early as the 1970s. The KMT realized that in order to hang on to power it had to localize and 
bring in the local Taiwanese elite into government, thereby co-opting them and preventing them from agitating for reform or 
from revolting. Among those local elites it co-opted were local village and town strongmen, whose powers of organization 
and mobilization it needed to win in local elections.
145 In two scenes about elections, Story of a Gangster makes implicit references to the patron-client relationship the KMT 
had established with local strongmen with a view to helping its candidates win elections. For example, the first scene is 
about the intramural election for president of the students’ association. It made veiled references to the KM T’s local clients. 
When Hui and his gang toured classrooms promoting his candidate, one of his complaints about the school was the fact that 
the school’s in house convenience store was too expensive. The store was owned in fact by another candidate. He was the 
school authorities’ favourite in the elections. The other scene features the politician’s daughter, Chew Hung, complaining 
about the fact that her father was secretly collaborating with a KMT employee in order to win the local election that was 
being held in the locality.
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Island of Greed (1997) is a depiction of underworld involvement in Taiwanese politics (see 
Photo 11).
Photo 11: Island of Greed
Underworld boss Chau is trying to consolidate his power and gain mainstream respectability 
by running for office, since the police can't touch politicians. Trying to stop him is Inspector 
Fong, a police inspector, who, because he can't abide corruption, doggedly tries to shutdown 
Chau's gambling joints and find witnesses brave enough to go on the record and testify before 
Chau manages to manipulate his way into power. The film follows Chau's rise and fall, over 
the course of an election campaign in Taipei. In the first scene near the start of the film, Police 
Inspector Fong Kuo-fei is discussing the case of mafia boss Chau with his superior at the 
police station:
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Fong: A nationwide raid against gangs, codenamed Operation Cleansweep was conducted in
1989. Chau Chiu-sen was put behind bars for five years. Now he's an entrepreneur with 
a net worth of over NT$ 3 billion. Let’s focus on his video arcades business. He has 38 
video games shops, which are actually underground casinos with a daily turnover of 
NT$ 50 million. He is bigger than McDonalds. Approximately half of his revenue goes 
into bribing government officials.
Fong’s Superior: This big boss, being the head of the Sung-lin Gang, now wants to enter politics. He has
become a candidate for the coming legislative elections.
Fong: There is a government practice that once a person becomes a legislator he then is
above the law. Even his seedy past will be buried. It doesn’t make sense!
In the second scene near the end of the film, the gang bosses celebrate their various 
candidates’ victory in the legislative elections at an outdoor hot spa pool at Master Tao’s 
opulent mansion. All thirteen victorious legislators, both new and serving, are gathered, all 
naked, tattoos resplendent:
Master Tao: May I propose a toast to the four new legislators. In the Legislative Yuan, there are 164
seats, we 13 legislators are gang members, we 13 must unite...we must not have a 
Judas...betraying each other. I heard the government is preparing a third crackdown. 
The code name is Chi Ping. That’s why you’re all here today. W e need a solution. Mr. 
Chau is coming up very fast. It’s just like sitting in a helicopter. That’s because he 
bought a helicopter, ha ha!
Chau: W e treat the government as our friend. We are most obliging to their needs... anything
they want, we provide, money, manpower...But once they think you’re useless or get in 
their way they’ll get rid of you. The first and second crime sweeps, iron-fisted 
campaigns, no judiciary process, instant arrest and jail sentence. Quite a few of us 
here, including me were imprisoned. Tough life, uh! As our Master Tao Yu-sang said, 
the government treats you like a piss pot. When you’re no longer useful, they think you 
stink. They will just throw you under the bed. During the first two crackdowns none of 
our buddies were legislators. Now among the 164 seats we occupy 10%, and over half 
of the rest are closely associated with us. They include elected deputies, city and town 
mayors and county governors. Many are gangsters. W e have over two million 
gangsters in Taiwan. Let me ask you this. Can you tell me whether the 13 legislators 
here are gangsters or upright politicians?
Gang member: Gangsters and politicians have become one and the same.
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Chau: When gangsters become politicians, after the process of whitening, from black to white,
what exactly have we become? I say we are neither. We are a hybrid! So why don’t we 
organize all our buddies all over the country. Dissolve all the gangs and form a new 
party! I guarantee that we will become the biggest party within 3 years! We can easily 
become the ruling party! We can have our meetings at the President’s house. We won’t 
need to act stealthily anymore. We can hold our heads up high! We can go to Green 
Island by helicopter and turn the place into a golf course. Let’s go play golf 
Master Tao: Yeah, play golf on Green Island! Brilliant speech!
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Photo 12: Born to be King
The next film (see Photo 12), Born to be King (2000) is a ‘gangster’ movie involving the 
struggle for regional dominance among the underworld of four countries; Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
China and Japan. The main character, Chicken is a young Hong Kong mobster who is married 
to the daughter of the Japanese mafia boss Taka. Unfortunately, Chicken is dragged into the 
middle of a power struggle between Taka and three other gangs from Hong Kong, China, and 
Taiwan. Enlisting the help of a friend, Chicken's involvement in Taka's war deepens until he 
and his friend find themselves involved in a showdown between the four rival organizations. It
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is set in Taiwan just after the 2000 presidential elections. With the victory of the Democratic 
Progressive Party in the election, the face of Taiwan was set to change. President Chen Shui- 
bian's pledge to eliminate corruption is a threat that all of the various gangs must deal with. 
The storyline revolves around a dilemma that the underworld has never before had to deal 
with in Taiwan; now that the KMT is out of power how will the new administration deal with the 
immense power and influence of the underworld in Taiwan? In one key scene the Taiwanese 
mafia bosses organize a meeting to discuss their future under the new DPP administration:
Brother Eagle:
Boss Longda:
Lieutenant 1: 
Brother Eagle:
Boss Jinlao: 
Brother Eagle:
Boss Longda: 
Brother Eagle:
Boss Jinlao: 
Lieutenant 2: 
Brother Eagle:
Long time no see...sit down...have some tea...make yourselves comfortable. I'm calling 
this meeting for us to get together. Since the March 18, 2000 Presidential Elections 
there have been lots of changes in society. I think we should get together and discuss 
how to manage the changes.
I think we should wait and see. Whoever is the president of the ruling party only cares 
for money. Money can buy off God, political parties, and even the president. In the past, 
we dealt with the Nationalist Party (KMT), and now we can do the same with the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
But the new president has declared that he will eliminate political corruption!
His first priority is to stabilize the cross-strait relationship. Then, he can deal with the 
triads. To make peace with the triads, he needs our help.
Brother Eagle, what is your comment on the new government policies?
Political wisdom tells us that suppression and purges don't work. I believe the best way 
is to 'pacify'.
'Pacify!' What do you mean?
Like the ancient story about the 108 heroes. They revolted against the imperial court for 
years. In the end they complied with the emperor.
You mean our government should transform all triad members into civil servants! 
What is his theory, damn I don't care! It doesn't apply to the triads!
The means maybe different, but the end spirit is the same. I guess they want us to 
cooperate and be under their control. Then it's business as usual. Anyway, let's just 
play by the rules. The world is constantly changing. W e should go along with the trend.
Island of Greed explicitly weaves a narrative of gangsters entering politics because they got 
fed up with the government that, alternately, either utilized their manpower to repress the 
political opposition, or threw them in jail under various crackdowns when it suited the 
authorities. Thus, the story goes, gangsters learned while interned in Green Island Maximum 
Security Prison that the best way to protect their interests was to enter politics and get 
immunity from the police and the law. The ‘gangsters’ in Bom to be King discuss how best to 
deal with the new DPP administration. Their options range from continuing the patron-client 
relationship they enjoyed under the KMT, to direct participation in electoral politics.
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These narratives are new
Nevertheless, as seductive and appealing as this ‘gangster’ narrative may be, the concept 
heijin (black gold) is vague and imprecise. Its use in conversation could evoke so many 
referents and connotations that it becomes, in effect meaningless. Below is a list of various 
definitions and meanings that I have encountered the term to mean:
•  Organized crime groups entering the political arena by violent and/or unlawful means.
•  Abuses of political power in pursuit of financial interests.
•  ‘Gangster’ involvement in politics.
•  Bribery, vote buying, political violence, insider trading, bid rigging, and official and unofficial corruption.
•  Convergence and/or collusion of 'gangsters’, businessmen and corrupt politicians in Taiwan, or even a 
blurring of boundaries, making it difficult to tell these three categories apart.
•  Patron-client relationships with local factions turned into one of mutual dependence.
The World Bank asserts that corruption is ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ and 
indeed, that is what these different definitions listed above have as a common denominator. 
However, most definitions of corruption somehow ‘rest on the separation between the state or
its agents and the rest of society’, but Haller and Shore (2005: 5)146 insist that this ‘public-
private dichotomy is often an arbitrary and inherently ambiguous cultural category’. Moreover, 
the boundaries between the public and private spheres, as well as public office and private 
gain, are culturally specific to the west and certainly do not conform to people’s expectations 
in the countryside in Taiwan, as well as some pockets of her cities. Heijin (black gold) is an 
extremely imprecise and vague analytical category. The term heidao (gangster) is really not 
so much an accurate, unproblematic definition of an individual engaged in an objectively 
verifiable act, as it is a morally charged accusation. Why do they appear so frequently in 
scholarship, media and the culture industry? What impressions do these narratives give to 
those who read them?
Media stories and films about corruption and ‘gangsters’, seem to introduce and reinforce the 
idea that there is something deeply troubling and unsettling about the country’s present 
political system. This is also somehow detrimental to the country’s broad economic and 
political interests. The country’s democratic transformation and the political and social reforms
146 Haller, D. & Shore, C. (eds.) 2005. Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto Press.
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that have accompanied it, have also allowed a small but powerful group of people to take 
advantage of the system for their own ends. The narrative goes like this:
Gangsters have always existed in politics but before Operation Cleansweep in 1984, they were 
content to serve under their KMT overlords, using their muscle to help them win local elections and 
getting protection and impunity from the law in exchange. But they got fed up and decided after 
Operation Cleansweep that their interests were best served not by continuing to work under their 
mercurial KMT overlords. Rather, they should actively enter politics and be ‘untouchable’, and 
‘above the law’.
Narratives regarding ‘why gangsters penetrated politics’ like the dne above, at first glance, 
appear persuasive. It portrays ‘gangsters’ as rational agents who realized that their best 
interests are served by direct political participation, rather than by working as the KMT’s ‘hired 
guns and goons’ during elections. It is undoubtedly true that prominent and powerful local 
individuals known as ‘gangsters’ used their resources and organization in order to mobilize 
rural votes for a designated candidate. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that in 
an electoral democracy, national parties need to have a presence in every locality, down to 
the village level, if they are to be successful. Locally influential and prominent individuals in 
the countryside provide this function for parties by mobilizing people, canvassing and buying 
votes, intimidating voters, etc.
Having said that, I find the narrative unconvincing by way of a causal explanation for direct 
‘gangster’ involvement in politics. In the introductory chapter I mentioned that in rural Taiwan, 
influential people were initially loath to enter politics, preferring instead to exert influence from 
behind the scenes, as public office was not financially rewarding. However, this state of affairs 
changed by the early 1980s, as the KMT regime had given up its dream to ‘liberate the 
mainland’, and vast amounts of money were earmarked for thousands of construction projects 
for roads, bridges, and buildings to be built in the countryside. The substantial sums for 
construction projects went into local coffers whose disbursement was largely under the 
discretion of locally elected officials. This new development changed the costs and benefits of 
occupying public office, prompting locally influential businessmen, and entrepreneurs to run 
for local office. Interestingly, the KMT policy of disbursing vast amounts of funds for rural 
development reached its zenith from the mid 1980s onwards. This was the period immediately 
after the ‘gangsters’ were released en masse from Green Island Maximum Security Prison. 
Thus, it is easy to see why the narrative attributes a causal relationship between the release 
from Green Island and the subsequent ‘gangster’ involvement in politics.
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If we look at Thailand, we also see a parallel development occurring much earlier. In the 
introductory chapter I mentioned that rural Thai strongmen have existed for a long time, but 
have traditionally been reluctant to take on the responsibilities of public office, and ‘as recently 
as the 1960s the positions of kamman (sub district head) and village head were deeply 
unpopular’ because local office held few rewards. Again the situation started to change in the 
mid-1970s when development budgets to the sub district council were decentralized, and 
suddenly influential individuals saw ‘predictable and significant economic gains’ from the post 
of kamman or village head (Arghiros 2001: 71).147 From the two cases we have just viewed, 
we may make the proposal that the entry of ‘gangsters’ into rural office was initially due to the 
availability of new sources of generating wealth, and not to a desire to capture political office 
per se.
So-called ‘gangsters’ use their ‘dark’ power to influence events like the stock market, and 
even the presidential elections behind the scenes. By the liberal use of the cover-all term 
‘gangster’ and ‘gang’ to refer to all types of criminal, deviant and antisocial acts, what these 
types of stories do is to create the impression of an intimate link between crime, deteriorating 
law and order, moral decadence, and ‘gangs’ and ‘gang members’. Sensationalist stories 
suggest that they are ‘everywhere’, lurking in every corner. Glossy magazine covers show 
photos of stern, black-clad foot soldiers with short hair, dark glasses up to no good. Editorials 
in the island’s broadsheets appear to be weaving a persuasive narrative that resonates with 
many of the nation’s urban residents. Urban residents are disappointed with the country’s 
politics and law and order situation. They are pessimistic about their economic prospects. 
What the editorials seem to be doing is to construct a persuasive narrative explaining how 
things in the country got to be that way. In short ‘gangsters’ are the root of many of Taiwan’s 
social and political ills and the state and its citizens must be vigilant against them.
However, one must point out that these narratives of ‘gangsters’ and ‘corruption’ are 
extremely recent and, in my view, this present and fluid conception of the two terms is largely 
the product, and consequence of the nation’s political transformation which only really started 
in earnest in the early 1990s. As late as 1991 Shaw148 perceived ‘gangsters’ as young social 
deviants who band together while espousing values of ‘community, personal freedom,
147 Arghiros, D. 2001. Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.
148 Shaw, T. 1991 “Taiwan: Gangsters or Good Guys”. In M. Freilich, D. Raybeck, J. Savishinsky (eds.) Deviance: 
Anthropological Perspectives. Pp. 173-190. New York: Bergin & Garvey.
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autonomy, equality and universal responsibility’. Shaw attributes this deviance as a rejection 
by the youths of the dominant Confucian morality that emphasized family, acceptance of 
obligation and subordination according to one’s social position, obedience and subordination 
to authority, especially elder kinfolk. ‘For many young males, joining a gang means finding 
freedom from family authority, learning to rely on friends as equals, and using one’s own 
judgment and intelligence and intelligence as guides to action’ (Shaw 1991:174). As regards 
corruption, on the other hand, Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties had ‘contrasting 
definitions of what constituted political corruption in the early 1990s’ (Fell 2005: 882), the era 
immediately prior to the country’s first fully democratic elections. ‘As late as 1991 corruption 
was not a central issue’ (Fell 2005: 881).
In the introductory chapter I showed that academic literature on Taiwanese politics underwent 
a transformation sometime in the mid 1990s. Throughout the past two decades, the core belief 
that the country’s democratic achievements were fragile and unconsolidated stayed the same. 
But the nature of the ‘informal institutions’ that were believed to cause the country’s 
democratic precariousness have changed. Until the mid 1990s, scholarship took the view that 
factional politics and patron-clientism were the major informal institutions that undermined the 
nation’s democratic consolidation. However, after the mid 1990s political corruption and 
‘gangsters’ were now seen as the major informal institution impeding democratic progress.
What I am trying to do is to show that there has been a substantive and noticeable change in 
the way the media and films talked about corruption in the two periods immediately before and 
after the mid 1990s. This change has also been reflected in scholarly literature regarding the 
reason why Taiwan’s democratic system is unconsolidated. What happened in the intervening 
years between 1991 and 2002, the year my fieldwork began? What factors contributed to the 
transformation from the idea of the gangster as minor social deviant, prevalent until 1991, to 
the idea of the gangster as ‘public enemy’? What factors led to the phenomenon of corruption 
being perceived as the major social ill in Taiwan at the time of my fieldwork in 2002 when it 
was hardly an issue at all as late as 1991?
155
Instilling new attitudes
It is undeniable that the reason why this transformation has taken place is at least partly due 
to the liberalization of the nation’s press as well as opposition DPP party attacks on the KMT 
that occurred in the early 1990s. Media reports and stories of corruption simply were not 
possible in the days when the authoritarian KMT regime’s power was at its height. The media 
were heavily censored at the time. Thus, press liberalization allowed corruption stories to 
appear. Also, the then opposition DPP party rapidly took advantage of the newly liberalized 
political and media environment in the 1990s to attack the ruling KMT, exposing government 
corruption and challenging corrupt governance norms. Thus the DPP’s constant association of 
the KMT as the party of ‘black gold’ also played a part.
Nevertheless, I shall argue that other forces have played an equal, if not greater role in this 
transformation. The selected news stories and films about corruption we have just seen 
suggest that the Taiwanese ‘gangster’, portrayed in DPP presidential election rallies before 
the March 2000 elections, where supporters carried large placards with photos of men 
accompanied by phrases depicting them as Taiwan’s ten ‘most wanted fugitives’ (da tong qi 
yao fan), or the one played by actor Tony Leung in films like Island of Greed (1997), or the 
ones depicted in the innumerable stories of corruption depicted in the media, suggest that 
there are now new values appropriate to a changed socio-political context. Narratives of 
corruption are a symbolic system, tropes with which people make use of the political system 
that they inhabit (Haller & Shore 2005: 21). And it is through these narratives that the 
legitimacy of certain traditional politicians is questioned. These politicians in question are 
corrupt, and seek private gain from public office. They are therefore unfit to govern!’
In order to make certain values ‘normal’ or ‘mainstream’, it is necessary to make other values 
which conflict with the former appear as ‘abnormal’ or ‘deviant’. Representations of corruption 
and of the ‘gangster’ in Taiwan appear to emphasize to their readership certain values and 
behaviours appropriate in a democracy by highlighting what is inappropriate. They appear to 
criminalize behaviours characteristic of informal institutions, perhaps because they are 
inappropriate in the new political context, and instead emphasize laws and formal institutions. 
These representations of corruption make certain long-held and accepted practices 
unacceptable. They create the conditions so that they become ‘thinkable as crimes’. Those in 
a position of influence in the media appear to be indirectly stating that notion that electoral
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democracy does not only entail multi-party competition and free elections, but call for a new 
way of thinking and behaving. In other words, conformity with established rules for acquiring 
power, by itself, cannot confer legitimacy. What is crucial is the existence of shared norms and 
values (Alagappa 1995).
Electoral democracy may call for a whole new way of thinking about not only politics, but 
about one’s own place in society as well. It may be helpful to consider narratives of corruption 
as serving to drive home the idea that democracy is not only about voting. It is about an 
individual’s relationship with the state as a ‘citizen’. It is about a whole set of rights and 
responsibilities that a ‘citizen’ possesses. Ideas of ‘corruption’ are intimately intertwined with 
‘modern’ notions o f‘good governance’, ‘efficiency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ (Haller 
& Shore 2005: 4).
The concept and practice of corruption is invariably perceived as something which is by nature 
hidden and occult, and the various definitions of the concept involve ‘the abuse of public office 
for private gain’, ‘that which harms the public interest’, acts that transgress the ‘separation 
between the state or its agents and the rest of society’ (Haller & Shore 2005:2-12), ‘violation 
of norms and standards of conduct’ (Gupta 1995: 388). These corruption stories, give the 
impression of educating the readership about what is or is not considered ‘corrupt’, by 
criminalizing traditional practices and beliefs in Taiwan. By creating the conditions within 
which longstanding practices become ‘thinkable as crimes’, those in positions of influence 
appear to inculcate, through the media and the culture industries, idealized western views of 
democracy and citizenship.
Gupta (1995) believes that stories of corruption are useful because they allow the citizens to 
imagine the state and their relationship to it. Applying this reasoning to Taiwan, corruption 
stories may be viewed as a process of transforming oneself into a ‘citizen’, marking a new 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled in a modern democracy. Unlike the old patron- 
client relationship characterized by unequal, personalisticties of obligation and gratitude, the 
new ‘citizen’ enters into an agreement between equals with his politician. In exchange for his 
vote, the politician promises to govern wisely and for the public interest. The voter will, watch 
and pass judgment, holding the elected representative accountable for his actions come 
election time. In short, narratives of corruption, and more importantly, the act of making acts 
and behaviours characteristic of informal institutions ‘thinkable as crimes’, could be viewed as 
part of the attempt at making people into ‘citizens’ fully aware of their rights and
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responsibilities, what they can expect from their politicians, and lastly, the primacy of laws and 
formal institutions.
In other words, narratives of corruption, and more importantly, the ‘criminalization’ of acts and 
behaviours characteristic of informal institutions (see Figure 4 below), help to make the 
readership aware of new concepts and attitudes such as accountability, transparency, good 
governance, their rights and responsibilities, what they can expect from their politicians, and 
lastly, on the primacy of laws and formal institutions.
Act deemed ‘criminalizable’ Democratic principle violated
Black gold politics • Separation of public and private spheres
• Public office versus private gain
Vote buying • Accountability
• Citizenship
Factional politics/patron clientism • Transparency
• Individual integrity
• Elections as ‘open competition’
• Fair play
• Laws and formal institutions
Elected office being occupied by 
‘gangsters’
•  Notion of right and wrong wherein the culprit is 
administered justice
Figure 4: Criminalization of behaviours characteristic of informal institutions
Stories about ‘black gold’ create the environment in which the various practices covered by 
the term become ‘thinkable as crimes’. ‘Black gold politics’ is inappropriate in a modern, 
western-leaning democracy because the latter entails the separation of the public and private 
spheres. Elected officials occupy public office and operate in the public realm. They must not 
use the prerogatives of office for private gain! They must not enrich themselves or their 
families and friends while in office! That constitutes ‘corruption’!
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W hat constitutes vote buying in the legal sense? It is an integral part of the democratic 
process for candidates to make verbal promises to voters during the election campaign. What 
appears to be the case is that an agreement to exchange one’s vote for money, gifts, or a 
promise to build a bridge, school or bring jobs to one’s constituency is unacceptable. Thus it is 
frowned upon for a candidate to promise to somehow deliver a material benefit of some kind 
to voters. However, what is acceptable is an agreement to exchange one’s vote for certain 
policy proposals, or philosophies, or platforms, which will benefit the whole community and not 
one group. Vote buying, although typified as a straightforward ‘criminal offence’, obscures the 
grey legal areas and ambiguity of the term, as well as the difficulty in proving these 
accusations in court.
Why is vote buying considered ‘corrupt’, and why should it be stamped out? Gupta (1995: 
388) states that contemporary notions of ‘accountability’ surface in a postcolonial context 
wherein, in a newly independent nation-state, ex-colonial subjects are transformed into 
‘citizens’, with a set of rights. Hence, actions once tolerated or considered legitimate now are 
classified ‘corrupt’ because an electoral democracy is deemed ‘accountable to the people.’ If 
we were to apply Gupta’s ideas to the practice of vote buying, it should in theory be deemed 
unacceptable, according to the media, because it violates the idea that politicians are 
ultimately ‘accountable to the people’. Being elected to office is, according to this theory, a 
covenant with the people, a promise that the politician is obligated to fulfil. The people have 
deposited their confidence in a candidate by electing him, so then he must fulfil his side of the 
bargain by implementing his campaign platform and electoral promises.
The theory of accountability as applied to elections would take the view that the popular vote 
is the ultimate arbiter of a politician’s past behaviour and track record. A competent and hard 
working elected representative who has delivered on his electoral promises should in theory 
be rewarded by the electorate by a mandate to serve another term, and an incompetent and 
‘lazy’ representative would face the ultimate sanction, at voting time, of being voted out of 
office. What effect do stories about vote buying have? Stories about vote buying seem to 
create the appropriate environment in which vote buying becomes ‘thinkable as a crime’. 
These stories appear to create the association between criminality with the act of vote buying 
through the inclusion of the phrases ‘black gold’ or ‘gangster’, or ‘mafia’ within the text. The 
simple message is: ‘votes cannot be bought!’
159
Unlike vote, buying, factionalism or patron-clientism is not strictly an act; rather it is mode of 
political organization as well as a description of a symbiotic relationship between two unequal 
actors. What is it about patron-clientism that is ‘corrupt’? It may be that personal ties between 
social superiors and inferiors, a crucial element of factionalism and patron-clientism inherently 
belong to the informal sphere, and ‘stand in contrast to the Western focus on laws and formal 
organizations’ (Neher 2000: 5).149 Secondly, Haller and Shore (2005: 4) see ideas of 
corruption as being ‘intertwined with “modern” notions of good governance, efficiency, 
accountability and transparency’. In short, for many, good governance is efficient, accountable 
and transparent. Thirdly, Sparkes (1998: 188)150 believes that democratic elections, if held 
according to western multi-party ideals are characterized by ‘individual integrity’, ‘fair play’, 
and ‘open competition’.
Candidates ideally should contest seats openly, putting their reputations, prestige, and 
background up for public scrutiny. Hence, elections and party nominations of their respective 
candidates should be an open, transparent process, wherein candidates should be nominated 
by their parties, and elected, on the basis of merit, competence and moral integrity. Any 
governance marked by exchanges and agreements that are hidden, occult, and clandestine 
must therefore be ‘corrupt’. Contrast this to factional politics wherein the nomination process is 
opaque and connections, power and gratitude for past favours are the dominant factors in 
candidate selection. Moreover, as candidates put forward by the parties are, in the great 
majority of cases, the most influential and powerful individuals in the localities where they are 
running for office, the election ceases to be an open contest. The voting procedures merely 
confirm the obvious- that the winner is the most powerful person in the constituency. Stories 
about factionalism and patron-clientism create the environment in which these practices 
become ‘thinkable as crimes’. The effect these stories may have is to create the impression 
that factions are incompatible with a ‘democratic’ system.
Finally, why is it objectionable that a man charged with an offence or someone with a pending 
civil or criminal case should seek political office? Sparkes (1998: 186) states that a central 
part of western jurisprudence is ‘a sense of justice or a notion of “right and wrong” that is, 
identifying the victim and the culprit and administering justice, in the form of punishment or 
compensation.’ Hence western notions of political participation, this notion of right and wrong,
149 Neher, C. 2000. Southeast Asia: Crossroads of the World. Dekalb, IL: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast 
Asian Studies Northern Illinois University.
150 Sparkes, S. 1998. “Conflict, Hierarchy & Democracy in Thai Society”. In Ing-Britt Trankell & Laura Summers (eds.) 
Facets o f Power and Its Limitations: Political Culture in Southeast Asia. Pp. 177-189. Uppsala: Dept, of Cultural 
Anthropology, Uppsala University.
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the need to mete out punishment to people deemed to have committed a crime, effectively 
exclude ‘criminals’ from office. The outcome of stories linking politicians to crime may be the 
trope of the criminal, who runs for office and wins as soon as he is formally accused of a 
crime. He does so in order to avail himself of the immunity that the post confers and thus 
escapes punishment while in office. His victory indicates the ineffectiveness of the laws and 
institutions of the state, a confirmation of the state of lawlessness in society. Stories about 
‘gangsters’ in office create the environment in which these practices become ‘thinkable as 
crimes’.
These types of stories also point out a popular practice in Taiwan wherein some locally well- 
connected people charged with a crime run for elected office, or in case he happens to be in 
jail or on the run, his sister, wife or son. These candidates very often win in their bailiwicks and 
their electoral victories are touted as a powerful, yet undeclared statement of their innocence, 
at least in the eyes of their supporters. These types of stories also could have the 
consequence of an oblique criticism of voters who do vote for these candidates, saying in 
effect: Do not vote for criminals who run for office!
I am not saying that the objective practices and acts normally grouped under the umbrella 
term ‘black gold’ do not exist. Practices like the abuse of public office for private gain, vote 
buying, bribery and fraud, patron clientism and factional politics, individuals who run for office 
in order to escape prosecution, all exist. I mentioned early ethnographies by Gallin, 
Thompson, and Crissman in the introductory chapter wherein many of the above practices 
were commonplace and accepted in rural villages and towns. These practices have existed for 
a long time. These practices predate Taiwan’s democratic transition. These practices have 
long been tolerated by the state. My point is that now the state has become much less tolerant 
of them and the media publish stories vilifying them. High-ranking government officials 
regularly denounce ‘black gold’ and the media very regularly publish stories about ‘black gold’, 
‘gangsters’ and corruption. I argue that scholarship, media, film and pronouncements by high 
government officials question the legitimacy of certain ‘traditional’ politicians by highlighting 
practices that are now considered ‘corrupt’. ’Efficiency, integrity and honesty are additional 
elements essential for political legitimacy. Corrupt, inefficient, and self-seeking politicians will 
not be tolerated’ (Sukatipan 1995: 221). In doing so they create the conditions in which the 
above practices become ‘thinkable as crimes’.
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The westernizing project
I have enumerated and expounded on the various theoretical underpinnings of an idealized 
system of governance and political participation, parts of the whole ‘package’ o f‘shared norms 
and values’ in an ideal democracy. I must admit though, all of the above concepts are totally 
alien to the great mass of people living in the rural areas in the central and southern parts of 
the island. There is a significant urban-rural divide in Taiwan and the precepts enumerated 
above enjoy only partial acceptance, even among many of the residents of Taipei. Indeed, 
one could take the above ideals as simply that, a ‘mission statement’ or a ‘declaration of 
intentions’ for where those in power want the whole country to be in future. Could the 
‘package’ of new attitudes and behaviours be simply the latest instalment of the elite-led 
modernizing project for Taiwan, which began with the country’s economic transformation and 
industrialization in the 1960s and continued with the political reforms in the 1980s?
It has been estimated that in the 1990s more than 100,000 Taiwanese went to pursue 
graduate studies in the United States. I am astounded at the amount of national politicians 
who have American Ph.D.s. Thus it is not an exaggeration to say that the nation’s academic 
and intellectual elite is heavily Americanized. Taipei, and to a lesser extent the other provincial 
cities, embody the most developed and culturally sophisticated places on the island.
People I’ve met in Taipei and other cities although proud of their country’s economic and 
political achievements, nonetheless manifest angst, and worry that they are not ‘western’ 
enough (bu gou xifanghua). People I know feel a certain cultural inferiority to westerners. Most 
Taiwanese are very deferential towards foreigners, especially white westerners. The latter find 
it quite easy to get jobs teaching English, make friends and to integrate in society. Every 
household desperately wants their children to speak English, hence the proliferation of extra­
curricular cram schools. News articles continually harp on about the needforthe country to be 
more ‘internationalized’ (guojihua) and ‘globalized’ (quanqiuhua), terms that for the average 
person really mean ‘westernized’.
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Could it be the case that the narratives of corruption are largely a product of a small section of 
the country’s urban, highly educated, middle-class-the intelligentsia? These are the country’s 
university academics, schoolteachers, urban politicians, newspaper editors, reporters, 
journalists, etc. They are the political and intellectual elite and they see it as their mission to 
modernize the country. They feel that their recent industrialization now has to be matched by 
a political and cultural transformation, as part of their race to ‘catch up with the West’. And to 
modernize the country, they also need to modernize the countryside, where the majority of 
people live.
They may not necessarily consider their rural brethren backward, they simply consider them 
even less ‘westernized’ than they are. Informants envy the development, achievements and 
sophistication of the ‘West’ who they imagine to be more advanced, rational, efficient, 
prosperous, etc. Friends of mine tell me the cultural divide is not simply between urban and 
rural residents. ‘Many of our top politicians and intellectuals don’t even consider the ordinary 
Taipei resident as “western” enough’, says one informant.
Electoral democracy in Taiwan, in the sense of political rights and responsibilities enunciated 
earlier, simply do not resonate with rural residents. These political ideals stem from various 
premises that do not hold true in the countryside- that individuals see themselves and 
everyone else as morally autonomous and equal, that they understand and wholly accept 
concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ as defined by the state, that public office 
alone invests the office holder with political legitimacy and authority, that individuals 
distinguish between public and private spheres, that people fully understand and have 
complete confidence in the laws and formal institutions of the land, that the number of votes a 
candidate for office gets reflects the degree of confidence voters place in him, that elections 
are ‘open competitions’, etc.
My experience of the Taiwanese countryside tells me that rural people do not operate along 
the premises enumerated above. They have a practical approach to politics and may not be 
too interested in political philosophies or platforms. Rather, when voting, they place 
importance on what material benefits a candidate for office can deliver. Often they expect their 
representatives to talk, look, and dress like them. Rural residents want and expect to cultivate 
personalistic relationships based on ideas of obligation, reciprocity and gratitude with their 
political leaders.
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Country folk are deferential to those with power and influence and expect their elected 
representatives to be powerful and influential, in order to get things done. Rural folk expect to 
be able to treat their political representatives as a sort of ‘one-stop shop’. They expect their 
politicians to mediate in marital and neighbourhood disputes. They look to them for help in 
getting their children into good schools. They ask them for loans and other financial help to get 
by. They go to them whenever they have a traffic violation or an accident, hoping they will use 
their influence to resolve the case in their favour. They are intimidated when dealing with 
organs of the state such as the courts, public hospitals, etc., and will ask for their elected 
official’s help in dealing with them. In short, rural residents want a politician who acts like a 
patron. Chapter six will deal with this in more detail.
It is not an exaggeration to say that many urban residents in Taipei, and to a lesser extent the 
other cities, do not understand the countryside. Unsurprisingly, the Taipei-based elite 
understands rural realities even less. Many people who live and work in Taipei have no 
meaningful contact with people in the country. The country’s terrestrial and cable TV  
networks, print media, culture industries, all base their headquarters in the capital and 
consequently, adopt and disseminate a Taipei-centric view on news and events.
For many, the rural south is a foreign country to which they go back to for a week or two 
during Chinese New Year and other holidays, assuming they have relatives there. Informants 
claim to glean what little they know of rural ways from popular afternoon Taiwanese language 
soap operas (see Photos 13 and 14) like Blood is Thicker than Water (Qinqia ma/gegao),151 
or Uncle Niaolai and thirteen Aunts (Jiaolaibe ga capsa yi).152
151
152
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Photo 13: Blood is Th icker than W ater 
Source: h ttp ://w w w .ftvet.com .tw /D ram a/R elative /R elative .h tm
Photo 14: Uncle N iaolai and Thirteen Aunts  
Source: h ttp ://w w w .settv .com .tw /ta iw an /tw d010/dow nload.h tm
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One can make the argument that the list of typical qualities of the ‘irresponsible’ voter- 
irrational and emotional, easily swayed by personalities, unsophisticated and unaware of his 
rights and duties as a ‘citizen’, - these form part of a catalogue of stereotypes that urban, 
middle-class people have of people who live in the countryside. In a similar vein, the anti- 
‘gangster’ narrative could be viewed as a thinly disguised description of the local/rural 
politician. It is not a coincidence that so-called ‘rural’ politicians, for whom it is not unusual to 
have spent time in jail, who enjoy grassroots support, tend to be concentrated in the nation’s 
rural areas. In this sense, narratives of corruption and the ‘gangster’ are really aimed at the 
rural south.
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Conclusion
This chapter talked about the print media and the film industry. It argued that the media was 
largely silent regarding the matter of corruption until 1991. However, by the time of my 
fieldwork in 2002, stories of corruption had become commonplace in the papers. In addition, 
‘gangster’ films likewise reflected the recent developments experienced by the realms of the 
academe and media. The film Story of a Gangster released in 1989 portrayed the ‘gangster’ 
as a romantic, principled, but ultimately flawed character. The later films Island of Greed and 
Bom to be King, released in 1997 and 2000, respectively, portrayed the ‘gangster’ as ‘public 
enemy’. I have just presented material about political corruption and ‘gangsters’ from the 
media, and films in order show the changing nature of the narratives about them. I argue that 
these new stories create the conditions by which certain accepted beliefs and practices are 
‘criminalized’ because they belong to a past age and are incompatible with a very particular 
notion of electoral democracy. Stories of political corruption seem to make certain practices 
‘thinkable as crimes’. In doing so, they help usher in new ‘democratic’ values such as 
citizenship, accountability, transparency, etc. They also serve as tools by which the political 
legitimacy of certain accused politicians are contested. The next chapter will describe one 
such individual, Legislator Yen Ching-piao, who is seen by many as a heidao par excellence. 
In the next chapter I will argue that far from being uni-dimensional villains, these rural 
‘gangsters’ play complex, multifaceted roles in society.
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Chapter Five:
The Man of Prowess
Yen Ching-piao is a legislator who possesses a lot of power and influence {shili).
I heard the above statement several times within the first months of my stay in Taipei, the 
capital. I was going to do fieldwork in the neighbouring towns Shalu and Dajia, both in 
Taichung County. The towns Shalu and Dajia share a connection in the person of the 
politician Yen Ching-piao- the former place is his hometown and the latter is the site of 
Jenlangong Temple of which he is the chairman. I was curious what people in Taipei thought 
of the places where I was going to spend the next few years of my life. What struck me about 
the above statement was that the people saying it were describing a democratically elected 
politician using the phrase ‘power and influence’ (shili).
I gathered from people who uttered that statement that somehow the idea of an elected 
politician sat in an uneasy tension with the latter. ‘Surely an elected politician will have “power 
and influence”, because that is a consequence of public office’, I remarked. Informants, 
however, were quick to make a distinction between legitimate power and informal influence. 
What they meant was that ideally politicians would derive their power from the ‘authority’ that 
comes with public office. However, certain politicians like Yen Ching-piao possessed power 
and influence of the illegitimate or illicit kind. And the fact that he now occupies public office 
does not necessarily legitimize his power, nor does it confer ‘authority’.
Contemporary rural politics marks a considerable change from the past. Since Taiwan 
democratized in the 1980s, a certain class of powerful individuals who normally hail from the 
countryside, and who wield ‘influence’ in their places of origin, have gone on to participate in 
the political process and have captured political power- winning local, regional, even national 
legislative elections. These ‘influential’ individuals from the countryside play complex, 
multifaceted roles in the present, as they did in the past. From the start of nominal Qing rule in 
Taiwan, there has always been a class of rural elite whose power and legitimacy emanated 
from outside the state. The composition of this local elite varied and shifted according to the 
changing economic and political circumstances during any given period. However, unlike the 
present, the local elite more often than not chose not to occupy official government posts, 
although they often took on roles and dispensed services we now associate with the state.
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This chapter argues that there exist two parallel forces- quanli (legitimate power) that 
originates from ‘authority’, and shili (informal power or influence). The tension between these 
two forces is really about contested notions regarding the legitimacy of power. Quanli and shili 
reflect an uneasy tension between contemporary notions of power derived from ‘authority’ and 
a much older tradition of power based on ‘influence’.
Quanli is that power that the office holder wields. It is legitimate and upright, as it originates 
from the b aidao (upper world) or the authorities. Quanli necessarily derives from an 
association with the state and its institutions, making it by definition ‘legal’ and ‘legitimate’. It is 
the power that appears as a consequence of holding political office. The office holder derives 
his power from the state in whose name he acts. Consequently there is no question that his 
power is legitimate and that he has ‘authority’.
Shili is that power which originates outside of the state apparatus. The source of the power is 
independent of the state- it does not depend on haying an association with the state and its 
institutions. The individual who wields it has status or position (diwe'i) and seeks to achieve 
ends outside of the usual channels of rules, laws and institutions that characterize the upper 
world. Shili is seen as illegitimate and illicit. It is thought by informants to manifest itself 
through coercive force and violence.
I argue that a paradox occurs when these two forces coexist and collide. Since the 1980s, a 
new class of individuals have used their power, resources and connections at the local level to 
initially gain local, and later on regional and even national political office. These individuals, 
popularly known as heidao (gangsters), possess shili. While in office individuals who have shili 
do not limit themselves to exercising power as ‘authority’, meaning they do not rely exclusively 
on the power that accrues from occupying an official position in order to govern. They also 
complement it with their ‘influence’, mobilizing informal channels and institutions whenever 
they deem fit. Thus, it is evident from this line of reasoning that the source of their power, sM/, 
is illegitimate, as it originates outside the state apparatus.
I first suspected that quanli and shili were opposed forces when, while I was discussing the 
heijin (black gold) problem, an informant said ‘gangster influence in elections is a 
phenomenon wherein official authority is not exercised’ (Zhege heidao shili jieru xuanju shi 
gongquanli bu zhang de xianxiang). In this sentence heidao (gangster) functioned like an 
adjective which modified the noun shili (influence) and I figured it somehow is opposed to or
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incompatible with gongquanli (official authority). I was able to work out this distinction between 
the two opposed forces in more detail, as a result of repeatedly hearing informants use the 
concept shili alongside the modifier e (evil) as in eshili (dark, evil influence). Also, I repeatedly 
heard urban informants refer to rich and powerful businessmen and people such as Legislator 
Yen of having money and power (youqian youshi)t a phrase that suggests that the two are 
interrelated. I also often heard of politicians people regard as corrupt as having dark influence 
(you eshili). I have never encountered an occasion when quanli was used to describe rich 
businessmen or ‘corrupt’ politicians. I do not wish to say that shili can never be good or 
neutral. I am merely looking here at a particular instance of a distinction in Taiwanese society 
between formal power/authority and informal power.
Complex, multi-faceted roles
I will now talk about hitherto unexplored aspects of the public person that is Legislator Yen 
Ching-piao. I believe that his story constitutes evidence for my assertion that there are 
individuals in the periphery with alternative sources of power and legitimacy to the state. 
Furthermore, the state shapes the dominant mores and discourses about what constitutes 
‘legitimate’ forms of power, but it cannot completely suppress nor control influential people in 
the peripheries, nor can it prevent rural folk from admiring them, or voting for them. I will 
challenge dominant interpretations of these individuals that exist in the media. I will also 
suggest an alternative way of viewing this handful of powerful yet ‘dangerous’ men from the 
countryside that traditional media reports tend to vilify.
Legislator Yen is reputed to be the ‘kingpin’ of central Taiwan due to his resources, influence 
and connections in that part of the country, added to the fact that he is now chairman of the 
country’s most famous popular religion temple. Indeed, he was someone who the country’s 
presidential candidates in sought to make deals with 2000, as well as in 2004, as his influence 
in central Taiwan was thought to be crucial in winning. When I asked him about his reputation, 
he did not deny that he was influential, but sought to attribute this to his record of public 
service, his status as the ‘loyal servant’ of the goddess Mazu and his plans for the future. He 
did not admit to possessing any sort of power other than the public recognition of his public 
service. He also denied having made any ‘backroom deals’ with anybody. His response was 
as follows:
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I have been helping people from all walks of life as legislator. I have helped people, notwithstanding 
their party affiliation, be it KMT or DPP. I am a man with a lot of ideals and aspirations {hen lixiang, 
hen baofu de ren). I can speak on behalf of everyone here as I am an Independent Solidarity Union 
Party member. The KMT and DPP cannot resolve the deadlock over the proposed arms purchase 
because they, unlike my party, do not have projects {meiyou baofu). The current monthly retirement 
pension is NT$ 6,000, I want to raise it to NT$ 7,500. Taichung County has a lot of different 
councillors and legislators. I, together with them, can work together to improve things in Taichung, 
like construction. In order to encourage tourism, I would like to set up a tourist information centre in 
the Taichung area and at the Taichung airport. That way Dajia and Shalu will prosper. I want to 
improve transportation facilities around the new Science Park and Taichung Harbour, that way, 
Houli, Dajia and Fengyuan will benefit economically. These are all Taichung County’s most 
pressing construction projects. Under my leadership, a lot more temples have participated in the 
annual Xingang pilgrimage, they all want Mazu to visit their temples along the route. I am committed 
to serve Mazu 100%. Because Mazu has confidence in me, her believers also have confidence in 
me.
In the introductory chapter I included his biography, wherein he was convicted and went to 
prison for being a ‘hoodlum’ under the country’s then martial law regime in 1984. He briefly 
went back into jail in 2001 for vote buying, bribery and other offences until he ran and won the 
legislative elections in that same year while in prison. I will argue that he belongs to the new 
class of locally influential individuals from the countryside whose source of ‘influence’ is partly 
independent of and outside the state. That his political career has culminated in the national 
legislature is a reflection of one fact- that he has ‘influence’. And lastly, he plays complex 
multifaceted roles in contemporary politics.
Legislator Yen is without doubt a household name on the island with an instantly recognizable 
face and physique. His appearance is distinctive and unmistakable. For me it took on cartoon­
like properties due to its ubiquity in the national media. ‘Piao the Stone Pumpkin’ 
(dongguapiao), that’s how people affectionately call him, in obvious reference to his round 
chubby face set on a short, squat and obese body. In the course of my three years of field 
research I would stare at his ‘pumpkin-like’ visage several times on TV news broadcasts, and 
in various national newspaper and magazine articles.
His public persona notwithstanding, relatively few people outside the two towns of Shalu and 
Dajia, and perhaps the halls of the national legislature in Taipei have actually seen him in 
person. Legislator Yen is undeniably, a media phenomenon of considerable impact in Taiwan. 
Most Taiwanese have only ever experienced him through the print and broadcast media, their
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opinions of him shaped by opinion makers and commentators who are almost always based in 
the capital, Taipei.
This point is important, especially as this chapter is about the multi-faceted nature of the 
Taiwanese strongman. The nation’s print and broadcast media tend to reduce the complex 
roles these individuals play in public life, reducing them to being mere criminals who strive to 
occupy public office with the intention of ‘bleaching’ (piaobai) their unsavoury pasts. Several 
news articles about this sort of political entrepreneur that I have read explicitly disapprove of 
this contemporary phenomenon of political life. Several editorial pieces about them have 
lamented the ‘fact’ that democracy in the island is precarious. The fact that these characters 
continue to exist is a symptom of this precariousness. Rural politicians are really Southeast 
asian ‘men of prowess’.
The following is a brief outline of the different facets and roles of the ‘man of prowess’:
■ He is both bandit and hero
■ He is an informal broker and kingmaker
■ He is a mobilizer of masses and a giver of feasts
■ He is a fixer and mediator
Bandit and hero
The first time I heard his name mentioned was in a bohemian bar in downtown Taipei 
frequented by locals and foreign residents alike. Although I had arrived in the capital only a 
couple of months earlier I was already getting impatient with it. I was itching to get started on 
my research- the very reason I had come to Taiwan in the first place. I was looking forward to 
swapping life in the island’s bustling metropolis for a small non-descript town in central 
Taiwan. That town was Dajia, a 20-minute ride from Taichung city, and whose major claim to 
fame was largely due to its being the birthplace of Dajia’s renowned buttered cakes 
(naiyoushubing), taro cupcakes (yutoushu), and yes, the immensely wealthy, high profile Dajia 
Jenlangong Mazu Temple.
‘So you’re here to do research, what on?’ two male Taipei urbanites I had just met in a hip bar 
started asking me over a game of pool. ‘What, you’re going to study the Dajia Mazu Temple!’ 
the two exclaimed, ‘It’s full of gangsters!’ Unsure whether I had misunderstood them, I 
pressed them for more details. The chairman of that temple is a legislator (liweh and formerly
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a heidao. He entered politics in order to get immunity from the law’. They quoted a saying that 
aptly describes this particular phenomenon: ‘If you win the election you’re fine, if you lose you 
go to jail’ (dangxuan meishi, luoxuan beiguan) ‘Hang on’, I objected, ‘there must be a mistake, 
what’s his name?’
That was the first time I heard his name. Needless to say, in the three years I eventually 
ended up spending in Taiwan, I was to hear it again and again from several informants. Most 
urban informants would mention that name with disgust, and disapproval. It is thus important 
to point out at this stage, that dominant media representations of Legislator Yen have as their 
most receptive audience, highly educated, urbanite residents of the country’s major cities. As 
I explained in chapter four, they largely agree with the views disseminated by the media about 
him and people like him because they share the same basic assumption as the journalists and 
editors who are responsible for them. That is, they largely subscribe to a concept of 
democracy and politics that I discussed in chapter four.
However, rural attitudes toward him are very different. In chapter six I show that people in the 
countryside want and expect their elected representatives to behave like patrons and 
benefactors. They do not care as much about a politician’s values and political philosophy and 
do not expect them to be saints. They judge them chiefly on how ‘effective’ they are as 
patrons and expect to have personalistic ties with them. Furthermore, they want somebody 
who can relate to ordinary folk. In this respect, Legislator Yen Ching-piao plays the part of 
patron and benefactor extremely effectively and is seen by the majority of his constituents as 
something akin to a ‘hero’, ‘protector’ and ‘avenger’. In short Legislator Yen plays a complex 
role in the nation’s popular imagination. Whereas in Taipei people like him are considered to 
be bandits, in the country and especially in each of these ‘influential’ local leaders’ 
hometowns, they are seen as heroes, protectors, and avengers.
Informal broker and kingmaker
As the nation’s pre-eminent popular religion temple, and organizer of one of Taiwan’s most 
famous yearly pilgrimages, Jenlangong Temple, has long been courted by politicians who 
sought the temple’s favours. Presidential candidates routinely stage high-profile visits to the 
temple in an attempt to win the sympathy of the masses. As one of the most powerful county 
council speakers and chairman of one of Taiwan’s richest and largest religious organizations 
in 2000, then Taichung County Council Speaker Yen Ching-piao’s influence could not be
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underestimated. His support was courted by all four presidential candidates in the 2000 
elections, particularly, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, Lien Chan of the KMT, and James Soong, 
formerly of the KMT, but who broke away to form a new party, the PFP, to contest the 2000 
presidential elections.
Yen was a good friend of James Soong because the latter had visited his constituency more 
that 200 times and provided ample funds for local infrastructure projects for Yen’s hometown 
during Soong’s tenure as Taiwan Provincial Governor. But he was unsure who he would 
support. He knew that if he threw his lot in with a losing candidate he could eventually be 
prosecuted and singled out by the winning party. He declared that he ‘needs to ask Mazu for 
magic’. He subsequently openly expressed support for the independent candidate barely three 
days before the presidential election in March 2000. ‘Mazu spoke to me and told me to 
support him’ Yen said. He was expelled from the KMT soon after, in April 2000. 
Notwithstanding Yen Ching-piao’s support of James Soong’s PFP party, the DPP won the 
2000 presidential election, ending fifty years of KMT rule on the island.
The DPP party had, while it was in the opposition during the waning days of the island’s 
dictatorial regime, repeatedly denounced all sorts of political corruption (heijin). It’s objective in 
the early 1990s was to associate the then ruling KMT party with corruption. This strategy 
worked and the DPP gradually increased its share of votes until it finally captured power in
2000. During the 2000 presidential election, the DPP tried to expose the heijin (black gold) 
connections of personalities such as Legislator Yen Ching-piao as well as Yunlin County 
heavyweight Chang Rong-wei while aspirant Chen Shui-bian indirectly courted the support of 
the former. Legislator Yen has long been accused by the DPP of political corruption (heijin) 
and it is not a coincidence that he was convicted and jailed for bribery and vote buying in early
2001. This happened barely a year after he ‘bet on the wrong horse’ in the 2000 elections and 
the DPP assumed power.
His political comeback came when he won a legislative seat while campaigning behind bars in 
2001. The most evident public manifestation of his political comeback and transformation into 
a respectable politician occurred during the annual Dajia Mazu pilgrimage to Xingang, in 
Chiayi County, held in April 2003. There, at the pilgrimage’s climax, on April 9, 2003, 
President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu made an unprecedented 
appearance, sharing the stage with Mr. Yen at the prayer ceremony. Chen offered his prayers 
and shook hands with him, triggering speculation that the president sought to court support
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from the controversial lawmaker and temple president for the upcoming 2004 presidential 
elections.
The 2004 presidential elections were full of speculation. My informants wondered aloud who 
Yen would throw his lot in with this time. ‘Which way will the divining blocks go this time 
around?’ was a question frequently asked in Dajia. Even Chen Shui-bian visited Jenlangong 
Temple during the campaign period. He seemed to ignore his own pronouncements on ‘black 
gold’ and his previous denunciation of the legislator by seeking Mr. Yen’s support. Mr. Yen, 
unsurprisingly, declined to declare his support for anyone this year. His mother had died 
shortly before Election Day, so he used the 40-day mourning period to ask for privacy and 
kept quiet over his favoured candidate. The DPP eventually won in a narrow and very 
contested victory, which the KMT has, to this moment refused to recognize.
Despite Legislator Yen’s denial that his ‘influence’ stems from sources other than his ‘good 
works and public service’, I think the important point here is that he is a broker and kingmaker 
in central Taiwan of such magnitude that all main political parties yearn for his endorsement in 
national elections. This undeniable fact has given way to the irony that the ruling DPP has 
solicited his support in two successive presidential elections, 2000 and 2004, at the same time 
as it denounced the phenomenon of ‘black gold’ politics in Taiwan of which Legislator Yen is 
accused of being one of its principal practitioners. This is another way of saying he plays 
complex and multifaceted roles in politics.
Mobilizer of masses and giver of feasts
Yen Ching-piao’s mother died shortly before the presidential elections in March 2004. She had 
suffered a debilitating stroke several years ago and she had been bedridden ever since. She 
was 68 and left four sons, of which Mr. Yen was the eldest. He is reputed to be a very filial 
(xiaoxun) son and visited his mother at hospital every day. The day of the funeral (sangli) on 
April 14th, 2004 was memorable, because a lot of Taiwan’s most prominent personalities were 
in attendance. The press named it a ‘gathering of black and white’.
Not only were a lot of Taiwan’s most prominent politicians and businessmen in attendance, 
they were joined by a cross-section of Taiwanese society. More than 10,000 people filled the 
Shalu sports stadium where it was being held and over a hundred procession brigades 
(zhentou), manned by relatives and supporters of Mr. Yen, snaked more than ten kilometres
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around the stadium. Legislative Speaker and KMT Vice-Chairman Wang Jing-pyng officiated, 
James Soong of the PFP, Minister of Transport Chang Lin-ling, as well a several legislators 
from all political parties, were present. President Chen Shui-bian did not go, but had an 
embroidered silk mourning banner bearing his name, sent to the funeral. Members of four 
international charitable organizations, as well as Taiwan’s so-called four major gang 
organizations, including the United Bamboo Society (Zhulianbang) and the Four Seas 
(Sihaibang), had also sent several hundred representatives. Outside, there were estimated to 
be more than 130 black Mercedes cars.153
In another event, on Saturday January 21, 2006 Legislator Yen Ching-piao hosted a lavish 
feast for his son’s wedding in Shalu (see Photo 15). His 17-year-old son was marrying his 
heavily pregnant girlfriend. The event broke two records; one for the total number of guests 
attending, the other for the total amount of ‘gate’ receipts, or cash gifts inside a red envelope 
given by the guests for the couple. While President Chen Shui-bian was busy with the Cabinet 
reshuffle over the weekend and did not attend, top politicians from the opposition pan-blue 
camp attended the wedding in the legislator’s stronghold of Shalu, Taichung County.
Former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan praised the extravagant 
wedding as setting a new Guinness World Record. The pan-blue camp's other leaders, KMT 
Chairman and Mayor of Taipei Ma Ying-jiu, People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong 
and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng as well as dozens of lawmakers representing all of 
Taiwan’s political parties and other luminaries and VIPs were all sat at the VIP tables. The 
Yen family invited more than 19,000 guests, filling at least 1,900 banquet tables, with ten 
guests sat per table. They received more than NT$30 million (US$940,000) in cash gifts. The 
double record of biggest wedding party in Taiwan and highest amount o f ‘gate receipts’ used 
to be held by a former DPP lawmaker Hsu Chih-ming, with guests occupying 1,688 tables and 
donating NT$ 20 million.154
153 See “Gangsters and the authorities gather together at Yen Ching-piao mum’s funeral”. United Daily News. April 14, 
2004. p. 1.
154 See “Editorial: Still wedded to black gold”. Taipei Times. January 24,2006. p. 8.
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Photo  15: Y en  C h in g -p ia o ’s s o n ’s record  b reak ing  w e d d in g  ce leb ra tio n  
Source: www.taipeitimes.com/.../2006/01/22/2005048702
Urban informants were very cynical regarding his ability to gather both the ‘upper world’ and 
the ‘underworld’ together for his mother’s funeral. They made the following comment:
Both ‘black’ and ‘white’ want to curry favour with him (heibai Hang dao dou yao mai ta de zhang). He
is formidable (hen lihai) and nobody dares to displease (dezui) him.
Why did you go to Legislator Yen’s funeral service for his mother, I asked my rural informants 
sometime after the event. Most people replied using the language of community solidarity with 
one of their own. They talked about Legislator Yen as the filial son, ‘before his mother died, he 
would visit his mother every day and talk to her everyday.’ They described him as a very 
likeable man, ‘he is very good with people. He is very personable.’ Whenever I brought up the 
issue of Legislator Yen’s controversial background and murky past, people did not see it as 
important. They understand that people need to do what they have to do in order to succeed. 
When they are rich they can give something back to the community. An informant puts it this 
way:
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People laugh at a poor man, but they don’t laugh at a rich and immoral one (xiaopin buxiaozhang). 
Whatever he may or may not have done in the past is water under the bridge now. What matters is 
that he is a powerful man who now does good things for the community.
I think the two quotes made by urban and rural informants, respectively, point out once more 
the duality or even multiplicity of roles that individuals like Legislator Yen plays. He is much 
liked and admired in his hometown, but that does not negate the fact that he can also be 
someone you do not ‘mess with’. Legislator Yen’s power to convoke and assemble people 
from opposite ends of the moral spectrum evokes complex and wildly divergent reactions. 
Urban people are cynical that so-called ‘upright’ politicians and other symbols of authority take 
a morally superior ground when they denounce ‘gangster’ involvement in politics yet see no 
problem in attending a gathering where the very elements they denounce are present. On the 
other hand rural informants do not see any contradiction in attending the funeral and refrain 
from taking a moralizing stance on the matter. For them, the gathering of ‘black’ and ‘white’ is 
simply further proof that Mr. Yen is powerful. He plays complex and contested roles in society.
Fixer and mediator
I shall now talk about an episode that seems to suggest that Legislator Yen possesses shili 
(power/influence) of the kind that bypasses official channels and institutions. Jenlangong 
Temple Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen was kidnapped (see Photo 16) on the night of June 1st 
2005 in Dajia. That night, he disappeared while on his way to see friends on his scooter. 
Apparently, three suspects were following Mr. Jen as he was riding his scooter around Dajia, 
and at around 10pm forced him to get into their car and drove off somewhere in Southern 
Taiwan. His wife, after receiving a phone call from the alleged kidnappers, hurriedly got in 
touch with Yen Ching-piao, who immediately used all his connections to help find his close 
friend. Mr. Jen was released eleven days later. His family was rumoured to have paid NT$ 
100,000,000 in ransom to secure his release.155 In addition, Legislator Yen was rumoured to 
have mobilized resources at his disposal, both the upper world and underworld (dongyuan 
heibaidao), to negotiate his release and try to reduce the amount of ransom demanded by the 
kidnappers. In effect, he bypassed the police in his attempt to find the kidnappers on his own.
155 See “Yen Ching-piao mobilizes upper world and underworld”. United Daily News. June 12,2005. p. A3.
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I asked urban residents what they thought of the matter and they felt that the incident was 
scary (hen kepa) and lamented the fact that the ‘authority of the police and the law was not 
exercised (gongquanli bu zhang), which makes us feel powerless (wuli).' I elicited reactions 
from rural informants regarding Legislator Yen’s role in the kidnapping case. Rural people I 
spoke to saw Legislator Yen’s actions as righteous (hen zhengyi) and loyal (man yiqi). The 
data here have led me to a couple of observations. The first is that in times of crisis or 
emergency people look to influential and powerful individuals for help, and not necessarily to 
the authorities, who in this incident proved powerless to help. The second is that people saw 
nothing wrong with one man doing whatever he can to help his friend, even if that meant 
resorting to informal channels. What matters is efficacy. Thus Legislator Yen’s demonstrated 
ability to use his ‘influence’, bypassing official channels and institutions to achieve his desired 
ends evokes similarly complex and divergent opinions from people. For urban people his use 
of ‘influence’ is an indication of the inefficacy of official institutions to resolve problems. His 
influence coexists with and even counterbalances the power of the state- something highly 
undesirable. While for rural people it merely reinforces the fact that in times of emergency it is 
ultimately powerful patrons who people should look to for help, not governments or 
institutions. The former ‘get things done’, the latter are incompetent.
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Photo 16: Jen M ing-kuen describ ing his e leven-day kidnapping ordeal to reporters outside his Dajia 
residence. B elow  are the photos o f the kidnappers. Source: Apple Daily. 2005.6.20. p. A1.
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The jiaotou was an informal leader
The act of naming someone as having ‘influence* can be construed as a language used by the 
state or its agents to stigmatize that person. Stating that the origin of their power came from 
outside officially approved channels has the effect of making it illegitimate. In short, to say 
certain people have ‘influence* implies it is ‘dark influence’ (eshili) and that they are ‘corrupt*. It 
is my belief that the dominant narratives of corruption that conflate these ‘influential’ 
individuals with ‘criminals’ are simplistic and obscure the larger picture. I have shown that 
these ‘influential’ individuals play complex, multifaceted roles in the present, as they did in the 
past.
The tension between ‘influence’ and ‘authority’ really reflect a situation wherein dominant 
notions of power derived from ‘authority’ conflict with a much older tradition of power based on 
‘influence’. This older tradition of power dates back hundreds of years to a time when the Qing 
dynasty administration exercised very little power to effectively govern the island and had to 
rely on locally powerful individuals for support. I discussed the historical evolution of local 
political organization and the jiaotou (big man) in Taiwan in the introductory chapter.
The point I am making here is that from the start of nominal Qing rule in Taiwan, there has 
always been a class of local elite whose power and legitimacy emanated from outside the 
state. The composition of this local elite varied and shifted according to the changing 
economic and political circumstances during any given period. Contemporary local politics, 
especially since the 1980s marks a slight change from the past. In the past the local elite often 
did not actively take on official roles in government. Recently, a new class of individuals have 
used their power, resources and connections at the local level to initially gain local, and later 
on regional and even national political office.
The term for a local leader in the informal sense is jiaotou. I came across the term when I 
asked people in Shalu and Dajia who the most powerful men in the two towns were, expecting 
them to reply that it was the local mayor or the legislator, or even a local industrialist or 
entrepreneur. The answer was that, for Shalu, it was Legislator Yen Ching-piao, and for Dajia, 
it was Jen Ming-kuen, vice-chairman of the famous Jenlangong Temple. The first reply was 
not surprising, but the second was unexpected. I quizzed my informants as to how a local 
Dajia resident who did not occupy public office and did not own a prominent factory or 
business could be the town’s most powerful individual.
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People simply shrugged their shoulders and said that he was more powerful than even the 
mayor or the local legislator. Though he calls himself a businessman, informants remarked 
that he is extremely wealthy and owns and operates a string of local motels, karaoke bars, 
and video arcades in town. He is rumoured to wield a lot of power behind the scenes and is 
not someone you would want as an enemy. I discovered another thing. Although Legislator 
Yen is the most powerful man in Shalu, his power does not originate from his having a seat in 
the national Legislative Yuan. ‘Yen Ching-piao has been the most powerful man here for a 
long time. He only won the legislative seat for the first time in 2001, and before that he held a 
variety of lesser elective posts. But for a long time, when you wanted to get things done 
around here, he was the man to talk to’, one informant told me in confidence.
They were referred to as jiaotou (big man). Moreover, I learned that the term had slightly 
negative connotations. I worked this out when I discovered that although people would openly 
call these two individuals jiaotou, they would never dare to address them that way in person. 
When people spoke to them face-to-face they would address them by their formal titles 
‘Legislator Yen (Yen liwei) and ‘Vice-Chairman Jen’ (Jen fudongshizhang). A journalist 
describes it to me this way:
Jiaotou is the head of the most basic unit, but larger in scope than the head of the household 
(jiazhang) in each Taiwanese village, hamlet, district, etc. A jiaotou could be a rich businessman, or 
a guy with an extensive network of relationships whose resources he can mobilize. He is also one 
who can persuade wealthy people to give donations or contribute financially in community 
undertakings. They were traditionally very important in village life, where they were called upon to 
handle or deal with all manner of things. In modern society the term has acquired negative 
connotations. W e have liumang (petty criminals) while jiaotou (T: kaktau /big man) and heidao are 
organized criminals. Jiaotou is now seen as virtually identical in meaning as heidao.
Prominent, locally influential individuals from the countryside have long wielded autonomous 
sources of power. They were sometimes independent of the state, and at other times even 
cooperated with the state and assumed state functions. These individuals have existed for 
centuries in Taiwan and continue to exist to this day, a time when the state’s power is at its 
zenith, and does not, in theory, need to rely on powerfully individuals outside the state in order 
to govern. Since the country’s political transition many of these individuals have entered the 
political arena. My data on Shalu and Dajia have led me to make two important observations. 
First, the most powerful man in the countryside is often, but not always, also the locality’s 
highest elected official. Second, money, resources, influence and connections are crucial to
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capturing public office. This leads to the following corollary; the fact that a man occupies one 
of the locality’s highest elected posts is a reflection of the fact that he is powerful.
However, in the present the term for the traditional informal leader (jiaotou) is now normally 
conflated with the term heidao (gangster). There have been numerous instances when my 
informants, be they the urban or rural members of the local intelligentsia and traditional rural 
elite, said derogatory things about Legislator Yen and other rural politicians. It is my belief that 
this may represent an attempt by the nation’s political elite located in the capital, as well as 
intellectuals in both the cities and rural areas, to denigrate and delegitimize the new class of 
politicians that have appeared in the countryside.
In chapter four I argued that the scholarly literature on Taiwanese politics from the mid 1990s, 
much like the corpus of earlier work on the same topic, saw it as ‘unconsolidated’ and 
‘backward’. However, whereas the earlier research attributed the island’s ‘unconsolidated’ and 
‘backward’ democracy to informal forces such as factionalism, the later research saw new 
informal institutions such as ‘mafias’, ‘gangsters’, and ‘black gold (heijin) political corruption’ 
as the prime culprit behind the country’s underdeveloped political institutions. The received 
wisdom seems to be that ‘gangsters’ took advantage of Taiwan’s nascent democratization by 
running for political office, especially in the countryside, and even in the national legislature. 
They did it to protect their ill-gotten gains and to secure for themselves immunity from 
prosecution. In the process they have undermined the nation’s democratic institutions.
Interestingly, a corpus of research conducted recently in neighbouring Southeast Asia that I 
mentioned in the introductory chapter has examined the political evolution of countries such 
as the Philippines and Thailand since their respective transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy. This body of research has reached strikingly similar conclusions to the case of 
Taiwan. Trocki calls these states ‘gangster democracies’, wherein ‘the emergence of 
gangsters, gang violence, and corruption’ are characteristic o f‘democratic political life’ (Trocki 
1998: 11). Thus, regional strongmen like the Philippine boss (Sidel 1999) and the Thai 
chaopo, or godfather (Ockey 1998), are said to dominate local politics in their respective 
countries. They have achieved power through the electoral process, and enjoy recognition 
from the central government, and would by most measures be considered politicians. They 
are not however, ordinary politicians. These local political leaders are ‘not the most admirable 
of individuals’. They are men of violence, murderers, ‘gangsters’, etc. He considers their 
nature to be of the following:
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They have their hands in most forms of large-scale crime, but these are gangsters of a special kind. 
They are involved in drugs, prostitution, gambling, and extortion. Political ‘corruption’ is fundamental 
to their way of life. They prosper with the collaboration of other public servants...They maintain 
active and intimate relations with the underworld. In short, they are gangsters, thugs, and members 
of what Americans would class as organized crime (Trocki 1998:10).
However, these are no ordinary criminals. There is an element of truth in viewing them as a 
class of outlaws whom the ‘lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant 
society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for 
justice... men to be admired, helped and supported’ (Hobsbawm 1981).156 It may be a stretch 
to claim, as Hobsbawm does, that they are ‘social bandits’ and ‘noble robbers’. However, the 
words and actions of these ‘social bandits’ indeed reflect the morality of that community. In 
many respects they do not contravene local values. This idea strongly implies an ideological 
conflict between the local community and wider community. In chapter six I describe local 
attitudes and values, particularly those to do with politics and politicians. In it I will talk about 
how voters in Shalu view Legislator Yen Ching-piao as a hero, a champion, and avenger. The 
Taiwanese state may call him a heidao, but in his hometown he is seen in a very different 
light.
Nevertheless, recent literature reconsidering the role of ‘bandits’ in countries such as China, 
the Mediterranean, and Latin America as well as Southeast Asia invites readers to see them 
as playing ‘multifaceted roles in state formation, class conflict and popular culture’ (Sidel 2000: 
153).157 W e must not limit ourselves to studying only the peasants and the bandits in isolation. 
W e must also take into account the relationship of the peasant community to higher levels of 
society around it. Bandits are ‘social’ in that they had strong ties to their local community, 
often, ties bound by loyalty and duty, resulting in mutual benefit. But these ties do not end 
here; they extend upwards, to include the agents and organs of the state. They are only too 
well aware that their long-term survival entails forging some sort of relationship or 
understanding and accommodation and cooperation with the nation’s elite. These ‘gangsters’ 
play complex, multifaceted roles in class conflict and state formation as they have tried to 
maintain their control over local manpower and other resources and to mediate, to their own 
profit, new instruments of power emanating from the centre.
156 Hobsbawm, E. 1981 .Bandits. New York: Pantheon Books.
157 Sidel, J. 2000. “Filipino Gangsters in Film, Legend, and History: Two Biographical Case Studies from Cebu”. In Alfred 
M. McCoy (ed.) Lives at the Margin: biography o f Filipinos, obscure, ordinary and heroic. Pp. 149-191. Madison WI: 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
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Thus, following in this revisionist vein, I will argue that the Taiwanese ‘gangster* turned 
politician also plays equally complex roles in society, and hence, is much more than simply a 
reformed criminal. I discussed Legislator Yen’s life in the introductory chapter, where I have 
mentioned his past, including his involvement in various illegal and semi-legal activities, his 
criminal convictions and his subsequent political career. I have also looked at other, equally 
important elements in his biography. I have done this in order to make my argument that he is 
much mQre than just a ‘gangster* turned politician.
He is seen as a ‘hero’ and ‘avenger’ in his hometown. But he also has strong links, sometimes 
of the unofficial sort, to the agents and organs of the state. The latter have, on occasion, 
turned to him for help, relying on his extra-official ‘influence’, in order to achieve things and 
reach places that official channels are not capable of achieving or reaching. Nevertheless he 
is also aware that his long-term survival involves forging some sort of relationship or 
understanding and accommodation and cooperation with the nation’s elite although the latter 
frequently denounce him and his ‘ilk’ in the media. Finally heidao play complex, multifaceted 
roles in contemporary political life as they have tried to consolidate their control over their local 
strongholds and to mediate, to their own profit, opportunities emanating from the centre.
Thus ‘gangsters’, and stories about them, such as how they came to be, or what insidious 
things they do, are cultural inventions intended for the educational and didactic purpose of 
instructing the public on the mores and behaviours appropriate for citizens and politicians that 
belong to a modern ‘westernizing’ democracy. Media stories of Legislator Yen and people like 
him constitute the next logical step of cultural invention by personalizing the generic gangster, 
giving him a particular name, face, place of origin and professional career. People are 
fascinated by Legislator Yen. Notwithstanding that fascination, urban residents largely held 
the view disseminated by the country’s Taipei-centric broadcast and print media, that he was 
just another example of a ‘gangster’ turned politician. Legislator Yen, though a real-life ‘flesh 
and blood’ individual, existed for most people, only as a cultural invention, a uni-dimensional 
cardboard cut out character, interchangeable with other specimens of the same genus.
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Crissman (1981: 107),158 in a seminal study on local politics I mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, described the leaders of political factions in Taiwan as ‘Melanesian “big men” who, in 
the absence of corporate hierarchies, hold sway over others by virtue of the force of their 
personalities, their control of resources, and their ability to dispense favours’. An aspiring big 
man, to succeed in local factional politics in Taiwan, must have money and invest it in making 
generous contributions to temples and to charities, and in other politically relevant ways. I am 
trying to build on the early work done by Gallin, Crissman and Thompson, by making the point 
that whereas the phenomenon of the big man in Taiwan is very old. What is new is that 
democratic politics has allowed the big man to transform himself into a politician. In some 
cases, exceptionally powerful big men like Yen Ching-piao to even become national 
politicians.
The big man in Southeast Asia
The introductory chapter talked about the utility of locating contemporary Thai politics within 
the broader context of the political history and traditional political culture of Southeast Asia. I 
shall now briefly summarize it and will juxtapose the figures of the Thai and Taiwanese rural 
strongman within their respective historical contexts. Southeast Asian political history has 
long been characterized by the shifting dynamics of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies 
wherein successive monarchies and colonial administrators have, with limited success 
attempted to assert the primacy of central state structures in the region.
In contemporary Thailand, provincial ‘criminals’ have become possible, even indispensable in 
government, due to the uneven pace of change between the centre and periphery with 
regards to the culture, economy and class structure. Though their rise to national prominence 
has begun with the advent of democratic rule in Thailand, throughout history, dubious figures 
have always existed, at the periphery of the Siamese kingdom in an established pattern of 
collaboration with administrators, exerting control and collecting taxes. Under military rule, 
especially at the height of the cold war, government counterinsurgency measures frequently 
tapped the power of these figures in its fight against communist rebels. While the authorities 
may view him as a criminal, local voters see in him a natural choice to represent their interests 
in Bangkok. Offers to buy their votes are not seen as corrupt; rather it is a sign that the 
individual is very generous (Ockey 2000: 81).
158 Crissman, L. 1981. “The Structure of Local and Regional Systems”. In Emily M. Ahem and H ill Gates (eds.) The 
Anthropology o f Taiwanese Society. Pp.89-124. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
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An illustrative case would be the story of the infamous Thai ‘godfather’, Sia Yae (Somchai 
Rerkvararak) born in 1936 in the central paddy-growing area of Angthong, Thailand. An 
elementary-school dropout, he repaired bicycles for a living in his early days. He made his 
fortune by opening his gambling den in the mid 1950s. The income from vice enabled him to 
build a fortune and he was able to diversify into trading in construction materials, timber, and 
contracting civil works projects. He cultivated contacts and relationships with low and high- 
ranking government officials and police and even sponsored local politicians. He became the 
chief financial backer of candidates in Angthong and managed to become the secretary 
general of the Chart Thai Party.
He had created a lot of enemies on his way to the top and had survived at least two attempts 
on his life. However, his luck ran out in 1989 when he was killed on the front steps of a 
provincial court building by a modified claymore mine detonated by remote control. His funeral 
was a star-studded affair, and the mourners included prominent citizens, members of 
parliament, and cabinet ministers. Then Prime Minister, Chatchai Chunhawan, was also 
originally scheduled to preside, but had sent his brother-in-law, the Minister of the Interior to 
preside in his stead, alleging a previous engagement (Phongpaichit & Piriyarangsan 1996: 
73).169
Cross-cultural comparisons between Taiwan and Thailand are instructive because the Thai 
case can help shed new light on the phenomenon of the ‘gangster’ politician on the island. In 
both countries, state structures and their power to govern and exercise control over the 
country have historically ebbed and flowed. There were periods in history when the state was 
strong and there were other periods when the state was weak. In both countries locally 
powerful and influential individuals, usually in the periphery, far from Beijing or Bangkok, have 
long enjoyed status in the community and commanded a local following due to their abilities to 
mobilize men and resources. In both countries whenever the state was weak it relied on these 
individuals’ cooperation in order to execute basic state functions and provide services. 
Sometimes these individuals, the Taiwanese jiaotou (big man) and the Thai nakleng (village 
strongman) and phuyai (big man) were deputized as semi-official state agents- effectively 
ruling by proxy.
159 Compare this with the funeral service held for the mother of legislator Yen Ching-piao. It was also a star-studded affair 
wherein prominent government officials rubbed shoulders with ‘mafia’ characters.
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Contemporary Taiwan and Thailand now boast strong, centralizing state structures that have 
both the willingness and the means to impose their presence far from the traditional centres of 
power. In the last two decades these two countries have embarked on a path of political and 
economic reform. However, in both countries, the local ‘man of prowess’ has not gone away. 
He continues to exist, even thrive in the periphery, using his power and resources to win, 
initially, local political office, and gradually, regional and national office. Recently he has 
parlayed his power, influence and connections at the local level in order to gain a presence at 
the regional and national level.
The terms ammat in Thai, and quanli in Chinese mean ‘legitimate power’-that being derived 
from official authority. The Thai itthiphon, and the Chinese shili, on the other hand, mean 
influence, an informal kind of power. This is something that is now associated with impropriety 
and illegality, something a charismatic leader traditionally outside of the state apparatus 
possesses. High officials and bureaucrats possess ammat, and quanli-X he power of authority, 
while nakleng (village strongman), phuyai (big man), jiaotou (big man) and heidao (gangster) 
at best have ‘influence’. This is illegitimate because the proper locus of power resides in the 
state alone. Indeed, in recent times the only adjective that ever occurs alongside, itthiphon is 
the term muet, which means ‘malign’ and ‘dark’, whereas shili is often preceded by the 
adjective e, meaning ‘dark’ and ‘evil’. Note that the term heidao literally translated, means the 
‘dark path or way’, another indication of the illicit and illegitimate nature of the power they 
possess.
In both countries, scholarship and the information industry decry the participation of the ‘man 
of prowess’ in the democratic political process. In Southeast Asia this trend is called ‘gangster 
democracy’ while in Taiwan it is heijin (black gold politics). The Thai terms nakleng (village 
strongman) and phuyai (big man), along with the Chinese term jiaotou (big man), formerly 
terms that denoted a certain celebration of power, have given way to chaopo (godfather) and 
heidao (gangster), terms that connote power derived from illicit and illegal sources and 
behaviours.
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Conclusion
The tension between power (quanli), which originates from ‘authority’, and power (shili) that 
emanates from ‘influence’ is really about contested notions regarding the legitimacy of power. 
It is about a conflict between contemporary notions of power derived from ‘authority’ and a 
much older tradition of power based on ‘influence’. Power emanating from ‘authority’ 
necessarily derives from an association with the state and its institutions, making it by 
definition ‘legal’ and ‘legitimate’. It is the power that appears as a consequence of holding 
political office. Certain individuals outside the state apparatus wield a much older tradition of 
power emanating from ‘influence’. The source of their power is independent of the state- it 
does not depend on having an association with the state and its institutions. These individuals 
did not traditionally occupy public office. They exercised their power along extra-official or 
non-official channels and informal institutions.
A contradiction arises when these two worlds collide. Since Taiwan democratized in the late 
1980s, a certain class of individuals who normally hail from the countryside, and who wield 
‘influence’ in their places of origin, have gone on to participate in the political process and 
have captured political power-winning local, regional, even national legislative elections. The 
act of naming someone as having ‘influence’ can be construed as a language used by the 
state or its agents to stigmatize that person, by saying that the origin of their power came from 
outside officially approved channels and is thus illegitimate. In short, to say a person has 
‘influence’ implies it is ‘dark influence’ (eshili) and that he is ‘corrupt’.
But this obscures the larger picture. These ‘influential’ individuals play complex, multifaceted 
roles in the present, as they did in the past. From the start of nominal Qing rule in Taiwan, 
there has always been a class of local elite whose power and legitimacy emanated from 
outside the state. The composition of this local elite varied and shifted according to the 
changing economic and political circumstances during any given period. Contemporary local 
politics, especially since the 1980s marks a slight change from the past. In the past the local 
elite did not actively take on official roles in government. Recently, a new class of individuals 
have used their power, resources and connections at the local level to initially gain local, and 
later on regional and even national political office.
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Prominent, locally influential individuals from the country have long wielded autonomous 
sources of power. They were sometimes independent of the state, and at other times even 
cooperated with the state and assumed state functions. These individuals have existed for 
centuries in Taiwan and continue to exist to this day, a time when the state’s power is at its 
zenith, and does not, in theory, need to rely on powerfully individuals outside the state in order 
to govern. Since the country’s political transition many of these individuals have entered the 
political arena. However, in the present the term for the traditional informal leader jiaotou is 
now normally conflated with heidao. It is my belief that this represents an attempt by the 
nation’s political elite located in the capital, as well as intellectuals in both the cities and rural 
areas, to monopolize all claims to political legitimacy by denigrating and delegitimizing the 
new class of politicians that have appeared in the countryside.
This chapter has explained the reasons behind the existence of rural strongmen from a 
historical perspective. It also explored the their complex and multifaceted nature. The next 
chapter will explore the rural strongman’s appeal from the standpoint of ordinary rural folk. I 
shall try to address why they are hugely successful and why rural voters vote for them in large 
numbers. What is it that rural people want in a politician? Briefly, rural voters want a patron 
and expect their politicians to act like one. These rural strongmen fill a gap between rural 
interests and national politics. They address rural needs that national politicians either cannot 
or will not address.
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Chapter Six:
The Rural Politician
Southerners are very emotional and sympathetic. They vote for politicians who have criminal ties
because they are able to portray themselves as the ‘underdog’ persecuted by the government.
Southerners vote for politicians with criminal ties because they are intimidated and bullied by them.
The above quotes come from urban Taiwanese who try to explain a persistent characteristic 
of rural political life- the presence of individuals occupying elected public office who happen to 
have past or current legal problems. People I spoke to in the cities very often uttered the 
above comments, or something similar, in an attempt to account for what they saw was an 
anomaly in the Taiwanese countryside. Nevertheless, there is an uneasy tension between the 
two quotes. The first attributes rural solidarity and support for ‘criminal’ politicians to their 
‘emotional’ and ‘sympathetic’ nature. There is a hint of condescension here on the part of 
urban people, who think their rural counterparts are confused and misled by these individuals. 
However, this observation sits uneasily with the second one, which clearly imputes violence, 
coercion and threats as the motive force behind rural support for local politicians. But how can 
they be supportive of and show solidarity with politicians, while at the same time be 
intimidated and bullied by them?
It is my belief that this particular ‘anomaly’ of rural politics is largely an urban perception, a 
view shaped by the media, scholarship and culture industries that are all based in the capital 
Taipei. These purveyors of ‘public opinion’ tend to possess a highly westernized and 
modernising attitude and outlook on matters of public life. Voices in the media and scholarship 
tend to transmit a Taipei-centric worldview, insisting on viewing the reality in the rural south 
through the western-leaning prism of the metropolis. In their insistence that Taiwan be a 
modern, westernized country in all aspects that matter- political, social, economic, etc., many 
urban residents struggle to come to terms with this one crucial element of rural political life. 
They misread and misunderstand reality on the ground in the south.
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This chapter is about rural expectations, particularly, what rural people want and expect from 
an elected politician. I have brought together a corpus of ethnographic data that I have 
collected; urban informants’ views on their rural counterparts, rural people’s own views, 
comments by the local politician turned Legislator Yen Ching-piao and his brother about rural 
Taiwan, and my own analysis and insights regarding the Taiwanese countryside. It is my 
belief that that by sampling widely, and from many sources, both from inside and outside the 
countryside, from talking to people from different backgrounds, I shall be able to provide a 
fuller and richer description of rural reality than if I had relied exclusively on my data from rural 
informants.
I realize that this approach runs the risk of falsely essentializing the rural resident by taking 
urban people’s descriptions of their rural brethren at face value. I am aware of that danger. 
However, I believe this concern can be addressed by taking into account the fact that my 
urban informants views of rural attitudes are largely consistent with my own observations of 
rural behaviour. Furthermore, scholarship on rural Taiwan corroborates the views uttered by 
my urban informants. Anyway, below is a summary of rural residents’ political views and 
attitudes:
•  People expect their elected leaders to serve as benevolent patrons and benefactors, and expect to have 
personalistic ties with them.
•  They have a strong preference for seeking informal channels and institutions when seeking to resolve a 
problem or dispute.
•  They are quite tolerant and forgiving of their politician’s past.
•  They do not necessarily accept official narratives about corruption on the part of their politicians or the 
media.
The first point- that people expect their leader to act like a patron and benefactor is the most 
important of the four characteristics mentioned and even contains and subsumes all the other 
points. The condition of patron is the be all and end all of a rural politician’s existence in the 
minds of voters. The second, third and fourth points are, in my view, logical extensions of the 
rationale of a system of rural patronage. The patron and benefactor’s sphere of influence is 
necessarily strongest within the realm of informal channels and institutions. Indeed, if formal 
institutions could adequately address peoples’ needs, there would not be such pressing need 
for ‘patrons’, ‘bosses’, ‘fixers’, ‘go-betweens’ and other such roles typical of rural politicians. 
The third and fourth points indicates the utter primacy of the condition of politician as patron, 
that other factors such as a politician’s past, the provenance of his wealth and influence, his
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political philosophy, accusations of corruption against him, all do not matter as long as he 
performs his primary duty adequately.
I will show that the rural ‘riddle’ can be solved, once we begin to appreciate rural life as rural 
people see it. Once we try to comprehend the practical demands of living in the country we 
can begin to grasp the values and attitudes that people have, specifically, what do they want 
from politics? And once we have accomplished that we can begin to understand why is it that 
they do what they do, and specifically, what do they look for in a politician?
I would like to qualify a few essential terms here. This chapter started with quotes from urban 
informants who talk about ‘southerners’. It is my view that the ‘south’ and ‘southerners’, rather 
than being terms that denote a bounded reality that is spatially and geographically separate 
from and distinct to the ‘north’, are really terms for the backward ‘other’ in Taiwanese society. 
Taipei residents who are ‘northerners’ often use these two terms to refer to the great mass of 
people living to the south of Taipei who hold different values and attitudes to them.
I believe that for Taiwanese, the concepts ‘north’ and ‘south’ overlap to a large extent with 
‘city’ and ‘countryside’. Thus, ‘northerner’ implies certain characteristics we usually attribute to 
city dwellers such as ‘rational’, ‘impersonal’, ‘efficient’, ‘focused on rules and principles’, 
whereas ‘southerner’ implies characteristics thought to apply to country folk such as 
‘emotional’, ‘personalistic’, ‘unsophisticated’, ‘relative lack of concern for efficiency’ and 
‘emphasis on personal relationships and community’. Just as the ‘south’ is really a term for the 
backward ‘other’ and not a place, it follows that the ‘south’ can be found in the ‘north’, and 
vice-versa. By this I mean that in the cities one can find many people who by attitude and 
outlook can be termed ‘southerners’, and in the country, to a lesser extent, it is possible to find 
individuals who share in the beliefs and values of so-called ‘urbanites’.
By the same token, ‘local’, although nominally the binary opposite of ‘national’, is not 
necessarily identical in meaning to ‘rural’. Received wisdom states that local politics is 
distinguishable from national politics in that, in the former, at least in theory, personalities, not 
issues, and local concerns, not national ones, predominate. This is certainly true of the 
countryside in Shalu, where I did my fieldwork. I maintain the point that urban residents will, 
generally, care more about their leaders political philosophies, moral integrity, principled 
aversion to corruption, level of education, lack of criminal record, etc, than rural people 
regarding their own leaders. They will be less deferential to their elected leaders than country
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folk. However, this is not to say that many of the same forces that operate in the countryside 
do not apply as well in the cities. Candidates run for all sorts of local office, from mayor to 
borough warden, in cities, towns and villages all throughout Taiwan. Local elections in cities 
and towns will sometimes operate along the same lines as their rural counterparts that I am 
describing in this chapter.
This chapter is largely about rural political attitudes and values, but a lot of the characteristics 
of rural politics may also be shared in local elections in the urban areas. Thus, when educated 
Taipei, Taichung or Kaohsiung residents elect a city councillor, they will often look for a patron 
and benefactor who will promise to sort out practical issues and problems. In addition, 
everyone in Taiwan values personal relationships. Likewise, having a personal relationship 
with their political representatives will also be important to many urban residents. Lastly, many 
urban residents will also favour informal to informal institutions of dispute settlement.
Observe the following quote from an urban informant:
Southerners value personal relationships {hen zhongshi renji guanxi). Thus they won’t care that 
their elected politicians are involved in illegal things. They are mistrustful of outsiders. What they do 
want is a fellow villager who will protect their interests. Candidates in the south make a promise to 
the electorate that they will promote their welfare by bringing home construction projects, industry 
and jobs, and local people will vote for candidates who keep their promise.
Eric was an acquaintance of mine. He was a restaurant owner and urban informant from 
Taichung city. The above quote is his observation about country folk. Eric knew I had been 
spending a lot of time in Shalu, a small town with a rural feel to it, on the outskirts of Taichung 
city. Shalu is the stronghold of the famous and controversial local politician turned national 
legislator Yen Ching-piao, and I wanted to find out what is it that people in the constituency 
thought of him and why they re-elected him to the Legislative Yuan in December of 2004. I 
had commented to Eric while on break from fieldwork in Shalu that I was experiencing 
difficulty eliciting comments from informants about their political philosophies. Specifically, I 
found it quite difficult to get my informants to say things that would enable me to infer or 
induce their views on why they voted for the people they do. Ideally, I was hoping for a 
comprehensive description both on an abstract and concrete level, of rural people’s views on 
politics and politicians, from ‘the horses mouth’. I wanted people to tell me not only what they 
thought of their local politician and their reasons for supporting him, I also wanted them to tell
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me something about rural voters and politicians in general. In short, I was hoping to get them 
to articulate their emic theory of politics.
What I got was a lot of opinions about Legislator Yen, specifically his personal qualities, what 
he has done for the community, and how local people feel about him. I was also able to elicit 
people’s concerns about daily life, stories and episodes that capture the essence of their daily 
lives, their hopes for the future and their anxieties. In this sense I felt very privileged to have 
been allowed to take a peek into the lives of people who lived a different reality to that with 
which I was most familiar- the city. My interactions with them have afforded me an opportunity 
to appreciate some aspects of rural life that I had never been able to see in person. However, 
what I did not get was the emic theory of politics in their own voice that I really wanted to hear.
It is not easy to articulate rural attitudes to politics and democracy as abstract conversations 
about it rarely occurred during my fieldwork. Nevertheless, it would be safe to say that people 
are not preoccupied with it, at least in abstract terms, which is not to say that they do not hold 
any opinions, or care at all about politics. It would not be accurate say that my informants 
were not interested in politics, or that they did not have a political philosophy or theory of 
politics. My experience is that rural voters care a lot about politics, not so much in the abstract, 
but in its concrete, daily manifestations, especially in areas of direct concern to their lives and 
welfare.
I found them very interested in politics and political life. They all had opinions on the all the 
major politicians in the country, and talked about the main political parties, and said what they 
liked or did not like about them. When they talked about local political life, however, I 
discovered that they cared mostly about practical issues that had a direct impact on their lives. 
Thus they told me they voted for so and so because he would do this and that. And that so 
and so was voted for one term but did not get re-elected in the following election because he 
failed to do this and that.
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Leaders act like patrons
Independent Legislator Yen Ching-piao’s voter’s surgery (fuwuchu) is located in his hometown 
of Shalu. He rarely keeps office in Shalu, as he is often in Taipei serving in the Legislative 
Yuan. I have gotten to know his brothers quite well though, especially the second youngest, 
Ching-san. 41 years old, married with an 8-year old daughter, Ching-san was very 
approachable and talkative, and more importantly, he was available as he hung out at his 
brother’s surgery all afternoon. I asked him what he does for a living and he said he 'serves 
people'. In course of my dealings with him I would frequently hear him utter the phrase 
‘constituency service’ (xuanmin fuwu) as if it were his eldest brother’s, and by extension, also 
his, sole raison d’etre. Below are his thoughts on the matter:
Oftentimes the gutter or sewer in the neighbourhood is blocked, and the constituents call us for help 
in fixing it. W e immediately get in touch with the relevant local government services and they come 
and deal with it. It’s quicker that way. If we don’t intercede it will be ages before the local 
government does anything about it. W e are on very good terms with the Shalu town mayor and that 
facilitates things.
I have spent many afternoons in the surgery observing scores of local folk call in with the 
express purpose of requesting the honourable Mr. Yen’s assistance in a variety of cases. 
Below are some illustrative examples:
Helping the car accident victim
One afternoon at Legislator Yen's surgery, a man walked in and spoke to Ching-san. The two 
men had a lengthy conversation in Taiwanese, and through Ching-san, I learned that the 
man's son had an accident while riding a scooter. Apparently, he was on a busy motorway 
when a fire truck in front suddenly braked. The son was not at a safe distance behind the fire 
truck, so when he also braked to avoid hitting the fire truck, he was struck from behind by a 
car. He went underneath the car and sustained serious injuries to his cheekbones. The driver 
did not make an effort to tend to the boy. He did not call for an ambulance. Instead he waited 
for the police so that he could make a statement. Although the son’s health insurance would 
cover most of the bills, the father was angry over what he perceived as an injustice.
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Thank god the boy was insured', Ching-san related to me in Mandarin Chinese. Without any 
insurance the total hospital bill would have been over NT$ 300,000. Luckily, the family only 
have to pay out NT$ 10,000. This boy's father is angry because the driver of the car that ran 
his boy over refuses to pay anything. He is angry that he didn't lift a finger to help the boy. He 
says he just stood there waiting for the police. His excuse was that the son's injuries were not 
life threatening (buzhiming de). He says it's the boy's fault, as he didn't keep a safe distance 
behind the truck (me/ baochijuli). Anyway, the driver says the health insurance should take 
care of everything. However, the health insurance will only cover most or the hospital bills, 
while the scooter's insurance will only cover the actual damages incurred to it (qiche sunshi)'.
'At present the driver is unwilling to pay any compensation. So I advised the father to go and 
sue him', Ching-san continued. When the driver sees the court summons and the civil charge 
he'll be intimidated and then might be amenable to settle out of court. He'll make the first 
move and contact the father and offer a settlement and when that happens I'll be there to 
mediate and make sure the family gets a fair deal. In the past, when you're involved in a car 
accident, or when a driver knocks you down or runs you over he would quickly apologize and 
offer money as compensation, as well as pay the hospital bill, and damages to your car or 
scooter. The police are useless, and the courts are slow and ineffective, so most cases are 
settled amicably between the two parties with the aggrieved receiving some compensation. 
Nowadays they won't want to pay you anything. Our job is to help our constituents who are car 
accident victims to get a fair compensation'.
Mediating neighbours’ and spousal disputes
Yen Ching-san also described how he mediated (woxuan) between neighbours’ disputes. 
‘Once, there was a local resident who built a wall outside his house which cut off his 
neighbours’ access to the passageway. The neighbours complained to us and asked us to 
persuade him to tear it down. How do you deal with that kind of problem? The man insisted he 
had sole access to the passageway and prohibited anyone else from using it.’ I volunteered 
that they could seek redress with the police or through lawyers. However, Ching-san 
dismissed the notion that formal institutions were of any use in resolving these kinds of issues. 
‘Judges and the police would not have a clue! They won’t be of any help.’ Ching-san went bn 
to say that he used his influence to persuade the man that he either tore down the wall, or 
allowed others right of access to it, or he would have to financially compensate his neighbours 
for the inconvenience he has caused.
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There is one kind of dispute wherein he says he or his brothers are very reluctant to get 
involved, that is husband and wife quarrels. ‘Getting involved in these issues is like a gamble 
and w e’ll end up getting in trouble (hui daomei). Once one guy was unfaithful and became 
involved with another man’s wife, and her husband eventually found out. That is common 
occurrence in Taiwan. The husband threatened to accuse the adulterer of rape. The guilty 
party denied committing rape, but agreed to pay the husband some compensation instead. 
The adulterer offered NT$ 160,000, but the husband wanted NT$ 200,000. I advised him to 
pay NT$ 100,000 up front and NT$ 50,000 later on as a bargaining tactic. The husband rang 
our surgery and claimed that he knew a Taichung county counsellor (Taizhong xianyiyuan) 
who was a good friend of my eldest brother and he had taken an interest in the case. He said 
we had to give the counsellor “face” (mianzi) by increasing the offer by NT$ 100,000, making it 
NTS 200,000 all in all.’
Dealing with the bureaucracy
One afternoon in the surgery, a voter came in requesting help. He was fortunate that day, 
because Legislator Yen was there in person. This was one of the rare occasions when the 
Legislature was not in session and the honourable Mr. Yen was able to attend to his 
constituents in person. The voter had had a medical problem and had been to a state hospital 
for treatment. Like most salaried workers, he had national medical insurance that normally 
covers a large part of the medical bills one would normally incur if one were ill. He had had his 
illness seen to at hospital, but was now informed that he had to settle a substantial bill. The 
balance was about NT$ 50,000, or about two months an average worker’s salary. He 
disagreed with the amount as he thought it was excessive, so he had tried to speak to the 
relevant hospital staff, trying to get them to reduce, if not eliminate the bill altogether.
Apparently, the hospital staff detailed to him all the medical interventions that had been 
performed as well as all medicines that he had been prescribed. As the man was describing 
all this to Mr. Yen in Taiwanese, I have a hazy understanding of the exact reasons why the 
man thought the bill was unfair. He obviously thought he was right and tried his best to explain 
his side to the hospital staff. He was unsuccessful and it seemed to me he was frustrated as 
he did not fully understand the state hospital employees’ logic and reasoning, and he looked 
to his representative, Mr. Yen, as his last resort.
197
Legislator Yen had one of his secretaries phone the relevant department at the hospital and 
got in touch with that same employee the man had spoken to. Mr. Yen identified himself, and 
said he was phoning on behalf of the man in the surgery. Mr. Yen explained that he thought 
the amount was unfair and he expected the hospital to substantially reduce it. Initially Mr. Yen 
was patient and polite with the employee, but as the conversation went on, he progressively 
got angrier and angrier, and he ended up shouting obscenities into the phone. Finally he 
slammed the phone down on the receiver. As I was only hearing one side of the telephone 
conversation, I don’t know what the other party had said.
All I know was that Mr. Yen was visibly angry and he tried to use his stature as a legislator, 
and his well-known reputation as a former ‘gangster’ and a man capable of acts of violence to 
achieve his ends, by intimidating the poor employee into giving in. I didn’t know it at the time, 
but he was issuing threats to the employee, he said would use his influence to cut funding 
from the hospital if he did not get his way. The matter remained unsolved and the man 
eventually left the surgery. He decided that he was to go back to hospital and try to negotiate 
with them one more time. But the fact that his elected representative did try hard to help him 
with his case seemed to have left a favourable impression on him.
In the case of the car accident victim, Ching-san acted as a legal advisor and held out the 
possibility of mediating an out of court settlement should it come to that. In the case of the 
neighbour’s dispute regarding a wall, Ching-san used his influence to ‘twist the arm’ of the 
offending party and make him more amenable to a compromise solution. In the case of the 
disputed hospital bill, Legislator Yen intervened in person and used his influence to help the 
voter navigate the bureaucracy and even tried to intimidate the state hospital employee into 
agreeing to a lower bill.
What these three examples suggest is my first point about rural attitudes to politics- rural folk 
want a benevolent patron, a benefactor who will assist them with many of their problems. A 
rural politician is judged in terms of his efficaciousness in office. Specifically, people expect 
their elected leaders to help them meet their basic needs, improve their lot, navigate the 
bureaucracy, etc. In addition, they expect to have a strong affective bond, a personalistic type 
of relationship with their local leader. They are not overly concerned about their elected 
leaders’ political views or philosophies. Rural politicians in Taiwan are similar to their Thai 
counterparts in that they both know that ‘the qualities of personal loyalty and generosity are 
still highly valued by country folk. The offering of money to voters is not inconsistent with this,
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for...it is taken as a sign of puissance and largesse appropriate to a man of power’ (McVey 
2000: 16).
Resorting to informal institutions
Ordinary people believe that the police, and the justice system are bureaucratic, slow and 
ineffective, so they try to avpid them especially when they are involved in a financial or 
commercial dispute. Firstly, going to the courts makes one’s dispute public and that makes 
one lose face in society. Secondly, the law courts are a very impersonal and intimidating place 
where judges and lawyers speak the language of the law, using a lot of legal jargon, and not 
everyday language (baihuawen). A lot of people have a negative image of the justice system. 
Below is a comment from a rural informant:
My mum once lost money in an economic activity run as a cooperative where private individuals 
pool their money called biaohui. I asked her why she didn’t sue the guy responsible for it. She 
replied ‘you won’t not get your money back that way’. My mum is suspicious of these formal judicial 
institutions (fazhijigou). So she opted for an out of court settlement (shixia hejie).
‘Let’s settle this thing just between the two of us (shixia jiejue)Y This statement encapsulates 
the most common mode of dispute settlement- the immediate, on the spot, exchange of 
money. Diverse disputes that would normally be arbitrated or decided by the courts or police 
are often simply resolved in this manner. The occasion when this form of dispute settlement 
occurs most commonly is in car and scooter accidents. These are an extremely common 
occurrence in a country where it is estimated that there is over one scooter for every two 
inhabitants and where roads and parking spaces have not kept pace with the rapid increase in 
car ownership in the last two decades.
I have witnessed many accidents involving scooters crashing into each other, and of cars 
crashing into scooters at busy intersections. The police are rarely called unless someone is 
seriously injured. In the case there is an injury serious enough to warrant a visit to the casualty 
department at hospital but not so critical that anything less than immediate medical attention 
would be fatal, then the parties would usually call for and wait patiently for the police to arrive, 
take statements and issue a report. Otherwise they are best avoided. Both parties normally 
discuss and argue over whose fault it was and then they negotiate the sum of money that the 
offending party should have to pay. If it is a relatively small amount of a few thousand 
Taiwanese dollars, the money is usually paid on the spot. However, much bigger amounts
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require time and the aggrieved party has the hassle of chasing up payments, which the 
offending party may be unable or unwilling to pay at a later date.
In addition, when resolving an issue, the foremost consideration is not the law or principles, 
rather, it is about personal relationships (renqing). When deciding on an issue a person will 
first evaluate the quality of his relationship is with the other person (women guanxihaobuhao). 
It is only in the absence of relationships that the law or principles are invoked. Indeed people 
disapprove of those who put abstract principles above relationships when settling issues. 
They think these people are cold-blooded (lengxue).
Given such an absence of trust in institutions one must turn to powerful and influential 
individuals to help, mediate and intercede on their behalf. These powerful individuals may 
operate within the legal system, or sometimes outside it. What is important is the person’s 
effectiveness, not his legitimacy. An informant had this comment to make about the role of 
powerful individuals in the countryside:
The bureaucracy is very slow in the countryside. Say your car gets stolen or your house gets 
burgled, if you go to the police they often can’t help you and all they’ll do is take your statement and 
say ‘we’ll make a record of this’ (women yao zuo yi ge jilu). Mindai (elected officials, from borough 
warden to legislator), who often have criminal pasts, are much more efficient than government 
officials. They have a proven record of'getting things done’ for the neighbourhood. Ordinary people 
don’t trust the authorities to help them.
It is in the context of helplessness and impotence when dealing with formal institutions that 
people resort in the first instance to the common practice of guanshuo. There is no English 
equivalent for this Chinese term, but I would call it a ‘lobby’ or ‘back channel’. A common 
practice in both urban and country areas, it is a practice of which authorities disapprove, as it 
bypasses formal institutions. It manifested itself clearly during my description of one scene in 
Legislator Yen’s surgery. Recall the hospital incident where the voter requested Legislator 
Yen to intercede on his behalf with the relevant department of the state hospital. An urban 
informant had this comment to make on that practice:
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Guanshuo for me means a citizen who uses elected officials to use their influence in order to 
favourably settle a dispute that a citizen has with a government agency. For example, if your car 
has been towed away because you parked it in a restricted zone and you need to pay a large fine to 
redeem it, you may ask your councillor to tell the police to cancel the fine. It has a negative 
connotation in Taiwan, so elected officials are a bit defensive if you say that they actively do it. They 
justify their intervention by saying 'I was a bit concerned on his behalf (wo danxin). But for me 
guanshuo only applies whenever a citizen has to deal with institutions of the state and its 
representatives. Whenever someone intercedes in a private dispute between two people that isn’t 
guanshuo.
What the above examples suggest is my second point- that rural residents have a strong 
preference for seeking informal channels and institutions when seeking to resolve a problem 
or dispute. Such informal channels and institutions typically take the form of on-the-spot 
settlements involving exchanges of money, appealing to personal connections and 
relationships, or the intervention on their behalf of influential individuals. Many people are 
reluctant to resort to the police and the justice system. They often look to influential individuals 
to intercede on their behalf. Besides, as in rural Thai society where ‘justice and protection are 
to be found more in personal relationships than in the law’ (McVey 2000: 14), there is the 
popular idea that one cannot get justice or quick results through recourse to formal channels.
Forgiving past mistakes
The gap in perceptions between town and country regarding rural politicians in Taiwan is 
huge. Urban informants are scathing about the type of politician who gets elected in the 
countryside. They cannot comprehend how it is that people with comparatively low 
educational levels and with prior criminal convictions can serve public office. Perceptions in 
the countryside are markedly different. Few country folk refer to their local elected 
representatives as heidao. The few exceptions when this term is evoked usually involves well- 
educated rural people who see themselves as rural community leaders, by virtue of education, 
moral stature, etc, yet who do not have access to money and resources to make a bid for 
public office, enabling them to enjoy the prestige, and to disburse patronage and largesse that 
access to local office provides. They are discontent with their relative lack of influence and are 
resentful of local politicians.
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The comments of two informants, both rural elementary school teachers, are illustrative: The 
first said ‘Yen Ching-piao is a legal criminal (he/a de liumang) with a dark, powerful influence 
(eshili). You won’t need his help if you are law-abiding and upright. It’s only when you do 
illegal things that you’ll need him. He uses his power and influence to favour his friends 
(buyuzhipiri). The police are afraid of him, so if you have problems with the law you can turn to 
him for help. With him at your side the police will “obey” (qufu) you’. The second said ‘he 
managed to get out and stay out of jail because of his behind the scenes (beihou) and under 
the table connections (goujie shangceng) with some government officials.’
Rural informants, on the contrary, are much less likely to see politicians like Mr. Yen as a 
cancer in the body politic. Moreover, they do not judge him harshly and are ready to overlook 
his turbulent past. Several informants do acknowledge he had made mistakes, but are quite 
forgiving. Many reply ‘some say he was a heidaot but that was in the past. Life is a process of 
growth and learning. He went to jail as other people wanted to bring him down. Many people 
do bad things when they’re young, it’s because they’re ignorant, but may gain wisdom when 
they are older’. What they do stress repeatedly is his virtues, such as his filial piety, amiability, 
and record of service to the community and loyalty to voters. Below is a quote from an 
informant:
Before his mother died, he would visit his mother every day and talk to her everyday. He is very 
good with people. He is very personable. Of course if he hasn’t met you he won’t talk to you, but if 
he knows you, he’ll greet you whenever you bump into him and ask about your family. He calls 
everyone ‘uncle’, or ‘aunt’ (a-pe, a-ma, a-chim) like you were family. When Taiwan was suffering 
from a wave of typhoons this summer and many villages high up in the mountains suffered from 
landslides, Mr. Yen hired a helicopter to bring food and necessities to those isolated towns in the 
mountains far from Shalu. A lot of the people who live in the mountains are poor aboriginals. You 
must have seen it reported in the news.
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As the above quote indicates, many rural politicians express their relationship with their 
constituents using idioms of family and kinsfolk. People I spoke to in Shalu regard him with 
affection and gratitude, noting his humility and shyness, a rare feature in someone as powerful 
as he. As an outsider, I find his transformation from villain (at least according to official views) 
to saint quite stunning. People, however, do not see the contradiction between his violent 
criminal past and his present role as benefactor and champion of the community. When I 
pressed them about this seeming discrepancy between past and present, people would often 
sigh and quote the following proverb:
Killer put down your knife and become a Buddha!
(fangxia tudao, lidi chengfo)
I believe that these are illustrative of my third point- that people are quite tolerant and forgiving 
of their leaders’ past indiscretions and mistakes. They are not overly concerned about the 
origin of their leaders’ power and influence. It is relatively unimportant. A man can and often 
does make mistakes in the past, but can make up for it with good deeds later on in life. I would 
like to take this point a bit further and speculate on the nature of the rural Taiwanese 
perception of virtue in relation to power. In the introductory chapter I talked about traditional 
Thai ideas regarding the social order, specifically, the explanatory power of merit and power in 
the success of a ‘big man’. Merit is not a fixed virtue, but can be added to or subtracted from, 
and individuals rise and fall within the hierarchy according to the relative amount of merit they 
possess at a given time.
A Thai ‘big man’ is perceived to possess a greater store of merit and power. Furthermore, 
power begets power, and power is a sign of goodness and virtue. Thus ‘power itself is proof of 
goodness and virtue and attracts followers. Could we extrapolate this correlation between 
merit and power to rural Taiwan? Yen Ching-piao’s ability to effect changes in the community 
are intimately tied to his power and influence- he can ‘do things for people’ because of who he 
is, not what he believes in. I believe that rural folks’ ideas regarding Yen Ching-piao’s 
redemption through good works and service to the community are intimately related to his 
power and ability as a ‘big man’ to efficaciously ‘get things done’. This power increases his 
virtue in their eyes. Hence, it would not be too preposterous to suggest that, as in the Thai 
case, in rural Taiwan, power is a sign of goodness and virtue, if only because a man needs to 
be powerful in order to do ‘meritorious deeds’ for the community.
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Official stories about corruption
Below is the comment of one rural informant during a focus group discussion wherein the 
topic was corruption stories and rumours regarding Legislator Yen:
W e hear a lot of rumours about Yen Ching-piao, the government has accused him of many crimes 
but there is no evidence. The media says he’s a corrupt ‘big boss’ (laoda) But real ‘big bosses’ are 
always surrounded by their personal bodyguards whenever they go out, but not Mr. Yen. He’ll be 
dressed simply, in a shirt and shorts, whenever he goes strolling in the streets. Yes, he went to 
prison in the past, but that was a long time ago, long before he became a borough warden. This 
was during Operation Cleansweep. He was young and impulsive. And he never killed anybody. I’ll 
tell you about the police. They were also ‘dark’ during the time of Operation Cleansweep. They will 
receive orders from their superiors to round up five criminals. Which five will they arrest? They’ll 
pick on anyone who seems to be mischievous and trouble making. So a lot of people were arrested 
that way. A lot of small-time rascals went to prison, and came out as ‘big bosses’. The media made 
a lot of fuss about this issue. They said a lot of ‘big bosses’ were locked up. But a lot of them were 
just ordinary rascals. But when they came out, suddenly they were all ‘big bosses’. The media ‘built 
them up’ (meiti hongtai) this way. A lot of these small-time rascals came from around here in central 
Taiwan. Now because of the distorted images the public gets from news reporting, they think that 
this place is full of big bosses.
Similarly, it is widely known that locally influential businessmen, entrepreneurs, local 
politicians parlayed their connections at the local level- bribing officials, rigging public tenders, 
setting up construction companies, erecting structures with substandard materials, ensuring 
projects went to favoured friends and business associates, all in order to profit from the 
massively lucrative construction projects (Chin 2003: 144). Informants are reluctant to 
condemn locally elected leaders for exploiting their position in public office for self­
enrichment, by availing themselves of the vast amounts of money earmarked for thousands of 
construction projects for roads, bridges, and buildings to be built in the countryside.
I have tried to elicit negative and disapproving comments from them on the matter. However, 
they tended to react either by replying that corruption was a long established practice in 
Taiwan, and that it did not matter as long as the person in question was ‘good to the 
community’, or by refusing to believe the veracity of the claims, saying there was no evidence 
to prove Legislator Yen engaged in corrupt acts. Regardless of whether my informants 
accepted or rejected the accusation of corruption, they would nearly always aver that 
Legislator Yen has done so much for the community. People reeled off a list of
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accomplishments and contributions that the Honourable Mr. Yen has achieved since 
assuming office. An academic had this to say on the matter:
Generally, rural people don’t care about their representatives’ past lives or corrupt activities as long 
as they take care of the community. People accept that certain prominent individuals may have 
been troublesome in their youth, but they now have proven themselves to be pillars of society. Even 
if they sold drugs or other illegal things, many people won’t think this is necessarily a bad thing. 
Some may even see it as evidence of that person’s power {hen youli) and his ability to harness and 
divert legitimate government resources (zhengfu zhengquan duo ziyuan) to their locality for their 
benefit. Where these individuals do engage in corrupt and underhanded dealings is in the local and 
state assemblies where they have access to the state’s resources in the form of budgets. That is 
where they can manipulate projects and award them to friends and associates, receiving a kickback 
or commission in the process. But their constituents don’t see any of this. All they see are the good 
works their representative has done and will do for the community in the form of roads, bridges, 
schools, hospitals, etc.160
These examples are indicative of my fourth point- that rural residents do not necessarily 
accept official narratives about corruption on the part of politicians, or the boundary between 
legal and illegal activities. Moreover, people aren’t overly concerned with incidences of 
corruption committed by politicians provided that the latter are ‘effective’ in providing benefits 
to the community. Rural informants I had access to resisted these officially sanctioned views 
relayed by the media. They disputed the assertion that most of their elected politicians were 
heidao and seldom used that term when referring to them.
Indeed, in the case of the rural Thai attitudes toward the chaopo, we see a parallel ambiguity 
regarding the boundary between legal and illegal activities. ‘The reasons for the illegality or 
restriction of a particular activity such as gambling, liquor distribution, prostitution, or the 
exploitation of forest reserve land may be as opaque to ordinary folk as are most other official 
requirements. The idea of a civically recognized moral boundary between legal and illegal 
activity is a middle-class urban notion which still has little meaning in provincial Thailand, and 
hence a chaopo’s engagement in criminal activities does not normally prevent ordinary people 
from seeking his patronage’ (McVey 2000: 14-15).
160 Interview with Professor Wang Yeh-li (m ±z:), political science professor at Tunghai University Taichung
City.
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Legislator Yen’s younger brother Yen Ching-san frequently complained to me about the way 
his family and especially his brother have been portrayed in the media. He isn’t impressed 
with media reports of his family’s role in the kidnapping of Temple Vice-Chairman Mr. Jen: ‘Let 
me tell you about the media in Taiwan, they have very little else to report on so they are 
always looking for stories to print. Sure my brother used his connections (touguo guanxi) 
when he tried to do his bit to help find Vice-Chairman Jen Ming-kuen of Jenlangong Temple 
the day he found out he was kidnapped (bei bangzou) that’s all. But the media reported my 
brother as mobilizing gangsters (dong heidao) in order to save him.’
T h at’s ridiculous! Just like when they accuse my brother and Vice-Chairman Jen of using the 
temple to launder money (xiqian). Why would we want to do that? W e wouldn’t dare lay our 
hands on the temple’s money! How long have you been here, 3 years? Do you remember the 
time my brother was sent to jail accused of stealing the temple’s money? Well they couldn’t 
prove a thing! The money from the temple belongs to the temple and we would never touch it! 
About my brother being the temple chairman, well, he just wanted to help out, and they finally 
asked him to run for chairman otherwise things will get messy’. I asked him why Legislator 
Yen is called a mafia don (dage) and he was quite evasive, saying ‘that’s just the way it is, I 
mean, that’s the way the environment (shengtai huanjing) works in Taiwan.’
A form of gossip that Legislator Yen has had to endure is the kind that results from 
unscrupulous individuals who take try to take advantage of his fearsome reputation as a 
‘former gangster’ by creating some sort of imagined association with him. The people 
responsible for perpetuating the ‘gangster’ stereotype of Mr. Yen typically try to pass 
themselves off as one of his natural ‘sons’, or as his foot soldier or henchman. I have heard 
quite a few stories of this type and have marvelled at the perpetrators’ utter boldness in 
thinking they can get away with it. These, rumours and other malicious stories about him only 
serve to highlight the point that Legislator Yen can never totally escape the consequences of 
his reputation as a ‘big boss’.
In addition, what is fascinating is not only that these kinds of stories continue to be told, rather 
that these tales are taken quite seriously by their intended ‘victims’ is indicative of the 
enduring power of the ‘gangster’ myth among certain sections of the population. Legislator 
Yen complained that petty criminals continue to break the law in ‘his name’. ‘People make 
false stories and allegations about me all the time! It’s irritating’, he confessed to me once in 
his surgery. Below is a specimen of a story told to me by an urban informant in Taichung:
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I was still a university student at Tunghai, and one rainy day, my boyfriend and I were riding my 
scooter to college. Halfway to college we were going past a parked truck on the side of the road, 
when suddenly, and without looking, the truck driver opened the door on the driver’s side. W e  
couldn’t stop on time, so my head smashed into the truck door and we both fell onto the road, my 
boyfriend was unhurt but my head was bleeding. My boyfriend tried to stop several cars to see if 
they would drive me to casualty, but no one was willing. By this time a crowd had gathered around 
us. Some people suggested that the truck driver take me to casualty. He agreed to take me and I 
rang the relevant bureaucrat to meet me at hospital in order to help settle the incident. At the 
hospital the truck driver initially had promised to take full responsibility and pay for damages as well 
as the hospital bills. But several days later, at the police station, he changed his mind and refused 
to honour his promise. He even threatened me in front of several officers saying ‘I am Yen Ching- 
piao’s "little brother”, what are you going to do? (Woshi Yen Ching-piao dixia de xiaodi, kan ni 
nenggou zenmeyang?) I know you’re a Tunghai student so I know how to get to you, so beware!’ 
The police officers heard it but couldn’t do anything about it. All they could do was recommend that I 
make an official statement. In the end I didn’t get any money.
Grassroots appeal
I wish to point out here that, in some ways Legislator Yen’s life story is exceptional for a 
typical rural politician. He has achieved unprecedented wealth, fame, power, things to which 
most rural politicians can never aspire. In addition, he has reached the rank of national 
legislator. In the countryside most politicians will not rise much higher than the rank of 
borough warden. Having said this, I wish to argue that in many other ways Legislator Yen is 
typical of many rural politicians, and what I say about him will also apply to hundreds of people 
who occupy public office in the countryside.
It is a fact that a large number of elected politicians in the country tend to have either past or 
pending legal or criminal cases. The government, media and academic literature of the past 
few years have unanimously denounced that unsavoury individuals, so-called heidao 
(gangsters) have succeeded in penetrating political life, especially at the local level. For 
instance, minister of Justice Liao Cheng-hao stated in 1996 that ‘of the 858 city and county 
councillors across Taiwan, 286 had a heidao background’. In addition, the country’s highest 
law enforcement official warned that ‘one third of the locally elected deputies were either 
gangsters or criminals’ and ‘that 25 percent of the Provincial Assembly members and 5 
percent of the legislators and National Assembly deputies had shady backgrounds’ (Chin 
2003: 14). Thus in this aspect, Legislator Yen finds himself in good company.
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Furthermore, my enumeration and interpretation of the reasons why rural politicians, several 
of whom have criminal backgrounds, are popular with the electorate are also echoed in other 
scholarly work. Firstly, they have ‘influence’, which makes them very effective in mediating 
disputes. Secondly, they adhere to a philosophy of ‘service’ to their constituents, helping them 
with their personal problems. Thirdly, they are very generous with their money, especially 
when it comes to ‘helping local communities pave a road, rebuild a temple, or organize other 
community projects. They also faithfully attend funerals and weddings.’ Also, they are very 
good at obtaining construction funds from the central government. Lastly, they invoke sense of 
‘social justice’ among rural folk wherein they get ‘elected because many people believe they 
are victims of an unfair system and that a vote for a heidao figure is a vote against the 
establishment’ (Chin 2003: 128-133). I am telling you this because I am trying to make the 
case that Legislator Yen is in many ways typical of the rural politician and that his appeal as a 
grassroots politician largely reflect the underlying values and attitudes of the countryside in 
general.
I have been describing rural residents’ political attitudes and values because I am trying to 
show why it is that a certain class of politician, often with a criminal background, tends to be 
elected in the countryside. I am arguing that these so-called ‘gangster’ politicians are 
ubiquitous in the countryside due to their grassroots appeal. It seems that what rural 
constituents look for in a mindai (elected deputy) is someone powerful and influential, and who 
also hails from the same socioeconomic strata as the rural electorate. They want someone 
who can truly understand and relate to their lives. In short, they want a local person, an insider 
who looks, talks, and acts like them, but who wields sufficient power and influence in order to 
‘get things done’ for the community.
Nobody, in my view, better embodies these characteristics than the Yen brothers. From a 
working class person’s perspective, ‘they’ve been there, done that and bought the t-shirt’. 
They are of working-class extraction whose family has done a variety of odd jobs and trades. 
They didn’t do well at school- none of the brothers has even finished secondary school. All of 
them have been convicted of various crimes and have spent time ‘inside’. Nevertheless, they 
possess a curious combination of traits. On the one hand, in terms of outlook, values, and 
upbringing, they are as common and ordinary as they come. But on the other hand they are 
ambitious working-class men who have made their share of mistakes and risen above their 
station in life through hard work.
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They smoke heavily and chew betel nut (binlang). Indeed, upon greeting a visitor their first 
gesture is to offer him a cigarette or betel nut. Although I was a non-smoker I found it difficult 
to decline their offers of a cigarette without appearing to be insensitive or disdainful of their 
ways- in the countryside nearly every working-class male smokes. So I would accept the offer, 
light up and puff away, but (like Clinton) I didn’t inhale. I drew the line at chewing betel nut 
though. I tried it once and it made my throat very dry and tasted awful.
They were the salt of the earth. They were much more at home speaking Taiwanese. They 
spoke Mandarin with a strong accent. They didn’t pepper their speech with social niceties. 
Their speech was not the elaborated code of the educated middle-classes. In fact, theirs was 
rather restricted. They said what they meant and meant what they said, and they can be quite 
curt, especially when addressing government officials on behalf of some constituent who 
requested their help. They were ahsali, which means they would quickly decide to do certain 
things and grant favours and requests without much thought or consideration beforehand. In 
practice this meant they will quickly agree to come to your aid when asked, and they will 
instinctively pay the restaurant bill when eating out with a group.
That they are very good at constituency service is not surprising. They are in their element, 
their hometown, and they deal with people they’ve grown up with. They are especially attuned 
to the wants and desires of the common folk and have genuinely obtained their trust and 
respect. The contrast with politicians in the big cities like Taipei and even Taichung are 
striking. City politicians, just like rural ones, tend to mirror the socioeconomic makeup of their 
inhabitants. Likewise voters tend to vote for individuals who share similar outlook and values 
to their own. In the big cities it is quite common for mayors, legislators, even borough 
councillors to be educated to masters and doctoral level.
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To illustrate my point, Mayors Ma Ying-jiu and Jason Hu of Taipei and Taichung cities 
respectively, hold Harvard and Oxford Doctorates in law and international relations, 
respectively. PFP Party Chairman James Soong, who Mr. Yen supported during the 2000 
presidential election, and KMT head and 2000 and 2004 presidential candidate Lien Chan 
both hold Ph.D.s in political science from Georgetown and Chicago, respectively. President 
Chen Shui-bian’s immediate predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, holds a Ph.D. in agricultural 
economics from Cornell. In contrast, many politicians from the countryside, particularly in the 
south, tend to have no more than a school-leaving qualification, if that.
I examined various politicians’ election campaign flyers during the December 2004 legislative 
elections and it was very instructive as I was able to note the differences in style and 
substance between the two types of politicians. One was an urban politician running in 
Taichung city. The other, Legislator Yen was running in rural Shalu in Taichung County. The 
legislative candidate running in Taichung City on the DPP slate was Wu fu-gui. I happened to 
be in the neighbourhood when he was holding a campaign rally near to where I lived in 
Taichung City.
His election flyer (see Photo 17) showed a photo of him standing beside President Chen Shui- 
bian and emblazoned on the front were the following slogans: ‘A warrior for constitutional 
amendment!’ (Xiangai zhanjiang), ‘March on towards the national assembly!’ (Jinjun guohui), 
‘For an upright Taiwan!’ (Ting Taiwan), ‘Strive to rectify our country’s name!’ (Pin zhengming). 
On the reverse side his flyer was a mini CV. At the top is a succinct description of his 
impressive academic qualifications (xueli), chiefly his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees, 
substantial work experience (jingli), and political experience (zhengzhicanyu).
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Photo 17: Wu Fu-gui’s campaign flyer
To leaf through Mr. Yen’s flyer (see Photo 18), in contrast, is an eye-opener. There is no 
mention of his educational attainments (grade-school dropout) or his previous work 
experience (petty thief, manager of illegal gambling joints). The inside cover very briefly 
mentions his political career to date (borough warden, county councillor, provincial councillor, 
Taichung county speaker, legislator). But the lion’s share of space is devoted to text and 
pictures depicting him as a devoted son, concerned neighbour, devout follower of the 
Goddess Mazu, and above all, a defender of the weak. His most celebrated slogans, the ones 
he would utter in his campaign rallies, screamed out in large colour font amid the black 
typeface:
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You must never forget your origins
(Chia kue ji, bai chiu tau).
If you give me ten dollars, I’ll give you back 100
( Chia lang ji kau, huan lang chit dau).
When people do you a favour, it’s a debt that you owe. 
If you make a promise you need to fulfil it
(Lang jing dua na ze, wen lang ka cham si)
Photo 18: Yen C h ing -p iao ’s cam paign flyer
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It may be useful to compare the Taiwanese campaign flyers with similar election manifestos 
from two politicians with slightly contrasting backgrounds in the 1990 rural Ban Thung 
elections for sub district headship (kamman) in Ayuthaya province, Thailand (Arghiros 2001: 
104-106). The two Thai candidates were both village headmen, a rung beneath the sub district 
head. The first candidate was Headman Tri, then 32 years old. He was the offspring of rural 
elite households in the 1980s. Headman Tri was, comparatively, highly educated as he had 
studied at a teacher training college. The second candidate was Headman Han, then 52 
years old, a successful Sino-Thai brick manufacturer who was a self-made man with no formal 
qualifications.
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Below are the messages from two posters carrying Headman Tri’s election manifesto:
Kinsmen of Ban Thung, choose a person close to yourselves (klay tua).
It’s the same as choosing a member of your family.
Please choose Headman Tri, candidate No. 1 to be kamman.
Level of Knowledge: Teacher Training Certificate from Ayuthaya Teacher’s Training College. 
Bold enough to think. Bold enough to act. Bold enough to speak.
He is his own man, and is a genuine son and grandson of Ban Thung people.
Headman Han’s election manifesto was a poster, which had a letter on the reverse side. The 
poster read:
Please choose Headman Han, candidate No. 2 to be the kamman of Ban Thung.
Set on development (phathana). Ventures to sacrifice his private interests.
Has good work results.
In the letter on the reverse side of the poster, he apologized for not being able to campaign in 
person. It reads:
My dear kinsmen, people of Ban Thung sub district.
I apologize to you all that because of time constraints I cannot come and tell you what lies in my 
heart. I would like to point out the thoughts and feelings that have led me to be a candidate. I, 
myself, am a child of Ban Thung by birth. In a way I am able to say that my umbilical cord is buried 
in Ban Thung and every single thing that I now am and have originates entirely in Ban Thung. That 
is to say, Ban Thung has done me a great service, and now I see that I have the opportunity, and 
have reached the time, where I can repay this debt to the land of my mother. Therefore I have 
applied to be the kamman of Ban Thung sub district, and have been given polling No. 2. If, kinsfolk 
and people of Ban Thung, you put your trust in me and choose me to be kamman ... (Arghiros 2001: 
106).
Let us highlight some similarities between the two manifestos. Headman Tri mentions his 
educational achievements, which are very impressive considering the average level of 
attainment in rural Thailand in the early 1990s, and he mentions the word ‘bold’ three times. 
He has done this to differentiate him from Headman Han, as the latter had no formal 
qualifications and alluded to his perceived to lack ‘boldness’. However, both rural candidates 
are quite similar in other ways; both invoked ties of blood and kinship with rural voters and
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both declined to talk about detailed policy platforms or philosophies. Headman Tri called 
himself a ‘member of your own family’ and was ‘a genuine son and grandson of Ban Thung 
people’. Headman Han called himself a ‘child of Ban Thung by birth’ and went even further 
than Headman Tri by mentioning the fact that his umbilical cord was buried there.
This is where comparisons with Wu Fu-gui of Taichung City and Yen Ching-piao of Taichung 
County are revealing. Unlike Wu Fu-gui, both rural Thai politicians and Yen Ching-piao make 
use of metaphors of kinship and blood ties with voters, and are disinterested in detailed policy 
platforms or issues. Interestingly, Headman Han, in contrast to the son of rural gentry 
Headman Tri, used metaphors of ‘humble origins’ and ‘repaying debt’. Thus Headman Han’s 
pronouncement about ‘repaying a debt to the land of my mother’, are uncannily similar to Yen 
Ching-piao’s phrase ‘when people do you a favour, it’s a debt that you owe’. In the same vein 
Headman Han’s use of the phrase ‘every single thing that I now am and have originates 
entirely in Ban Thung’, is quite similar to Yen Ching-piao’s motto ‘You must never forget your 
origins’.
Thus, what matters to voters in the countryside in southern Taiwan is ‘boa gam chim\ a Hoklo 
expression meaning establishing emotional and personal ties with constituents. Candidates 
are either from the area, or they have been serving the area well and know the constituents 
well. Unlike the northern cities, where the candidates can gain support by promoting their 
personal ideologies and appealing to voters with similar ideas, rural constituents do not care 
about the political disputes or issues presented by the media. They do not care about a 
candidate’s political philosophy or platform. Nevertheless, they care very much about whether 
they know the candidate and what the candidate can contribute to the area. Familiarity with 
the constituents, or at least sharing the same origin, is of utmost importance to the candidates. 
A proverb, ‘there is at least familiarity between two if they come from the same place even 
though they may not know each other well’ (ren buqin tuqin), highlights how important it is for 
the candidates to share close ties with constituents.
W e may actually view people like Yen Ching-piao as filling a gap between local interests and 
national politics. This gap is akin to a tension created by participatory democracy where rural 
voters’ interests diverge from that of urban ones, and rural politicians fill the void. Ockey, 
makes this point with reference to rural Thai politics when he says that ‘parties have rarely 
designed policies to appeal to rural voters, leaving the way from rural MPs to seek votes as 
individual patrons...Thus new nakleng (village bandit or strongman) quite frequently win
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election to the parliament in the provinces by bridging the gap and bringing benefits to their 
constituents’ (2004: 20).
Why is it that so many of these local politicians have been charged and often convicted of civil 
and criminal cases? The database of charges brought against elected representatives, not all 
of which are from the countryside, range from defamation and fraud to felonies such as 
murder and abduction, to misdemeanours such as slander and breach of assembly law, to 
charges related to corruption such as breach of electoral law, abuse of power, and vote 
buying. I am not saying that these officials are completely innocent of the charges filed against 
them, or that they are unreservedly guilty. I am not saying either that no local politician has 
ever tried to bully or intimidate people into voting for him, as alleged in the opening comments 
of my chapter.
The list of offences is vast and the case of Legislator Yen, my sole subject who is a rural 
politician, cannot be presumed to be representative of all rural politicians with criminal and civil 
charges. He was first caught in a 1984 martial law crackdown on hoodlums, on charges that 
would not have stood if due process of law were respected. He was later convicted of vote 
buying, for which he spent several months in jail. Vote buying has long been practiced and 
tolerated in the country and it is only since the mid 1990s that the authorities have begun to 
show much less tolerance of the practice. To be perfectly honest, I do not know the answer to 
this question, nor is it the focal point of this chapter, which was to show why people in the 
country vote for a certain kind of politician, and why they are, up to a point, tolerant, even 
forgiving, of past criminal behaviour and of allegations of corrupt acts.
In the next section I intend to talk about a necessary attribute the rural politician has to 
possess in order to perform his ‘duties’ adequately- that is he needs to have the wealth, 
resources and influence sufficient for the task. What is more, rural voters want and expect 
their leaders to be wealthy and influential. The rural politician is expected to have ample 
financial resources at his disposal in order to ‘govern’ in the sense of using his power, 
influence and connections in ‘getting things done’ for the community. Thus, poverty is often 
seen as a negative attribute in an office-holder, whereas wealth, although by itself not a 
sufficient qualification for office, is critical to governing ‘effectively’.
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Rural big man
What is it that people yearn to be or have above all? I posed this question to my Shalu 
informants to better understand what drives the rural psyche. My findings indicate that 
generally, most want to get rich (caifu), have money (Jingqian), material things (wuzhi), a 
settled life (shenghuo anding), and peace (pingan). However, male informants I asked wanted 
all of the above, and more. Men I spoke to yearned for status (diwei), power (youquan), and 
influence (youshi). Men aspired to have leverage or influence over others (you yinxianglf). 
They want to be respected, and don’t want to be looked down on (xiwang bei zunzhong, bu 
xihuan bei ren kanbian). In other words, they wanted to be ‘big men’.
These ‘big men’ were traditionally very important in village life, where they were called upon to 
handle or deal with all manner of things. Aspiring big men who wanted to gain social capital in 
the form of prestige needed two very important prerequisites, money and resources. All the 
above activities an ambitious man needed to undertake to raise his standing among his peers 
are predicated on one fact- that one already has money in the first place. Thus the local 
political arena is the logical extension of village life. It is a locus of activity wherein aspiring 
leaders test their mettle and prove themselves worthy of the cachet ‘big man’. Note a 
traditional Taiwanese saying about the big man:
If you want to be a big man you need to spend a lot of money
(Chuttau sunkak)
Thus, ambitious men from the countryside have had a long history of identifying and seizing 
opportunities to accumulate wealth and power, and raise their status in the community. Yen 
Ching-piao and many of his contemporaries saw their chance in the burgeoning leisure 
industry in the 1980s, which at the time had an ambiguous legal status. They spotted an 
unmet need in the market, where consumers wanted places like gambling dens, brothels, 
karaoke bars, video arcades where they could spend their newly disposable income. These 
illegal, but highly lucrative activities constituted the source of wealth of many newly rich 
individuals. The decision to participate in politics is a natural continuation in the trajectory of a 
man of means who wants to raise his profile in the community.
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Legislator Yen is very modest about the amount of power and influence he wields. Although 
he doesn’t deny the fact that he is an influential person, he insists that whatever influence he 
has within his community is the result of his good deeds, and of his constituency service 
(xuanmin fuwu). However he tries to play down and misrepresent the source and provenance 
of his power, it is obvious that he was not chosen by the electorate just because he had made 
a vow of service to them, or because he was considered particularly honest, or virtuous. In the 
words of one informant ‘What good is an honest, decent man who is a nobody?’
The Shalu electorate voted for him because they wanted someone who was ‘effective’, 
meaning someone with sufficient wealth, resources, and influence in order to ‘get things 
done’, mediate disputes, intercede with the bureaucracy on their behalf, etc. The people 
wanted someone with enough clout and influence to effectively deal with outsiders and to 
represent their interests in the outside world, especially in the corridors of power in Taipei. For 
his part, the rural politician presents himself as the ‘source of material welfare’. ‘In assuming 
the role of the grand patron, the local politician frequently passes off public resources, funds 
and prerogatives as flowing from his personal powers and magnanimity’ (Sidel 1995:159).161
Legislator Yen Ching-piao is a ‘man of prowess’- a kind of political entrepreneur who is 
prevalent in Southeast Asia. He is expected to use ‘his power for his own purposes, his 
benefit and in the interest of those who depend on him’. His rural constituents view broader 
society beyond the confines of Shalu Town as the external world, ‘like the forest, it is there to 
be exploited, it is a shared resource, not the public good’ (Mulder 1996: 221). It is ‘nobody’s 
and everybody’s land, a field of opportunity to be appropriated as the need arises...It is a 
shared resource, but not a common possession’ (Mulder 1996:216). Thus once one accepts 
these basic premises of rural political life, the idea of ‘corruption’ will then sit uneasily in the 
Southeast Asian rural context.
It is instructive to recapitulate on the significant similarities between the Thai and Taiwanese 
rural politicians in the light of Southeast Asian political culture. Thai and Taiwanese rural folk 
do not care about abstract issues and philosophies. They want access to material benefits, 
and expect their politicians to act like patrons. Rural people in Thailand and Taiwan expect 
their politicians be strong in order to defend their interests in external world. Thai and
161 Sidel, J. 1995. “The Philippines: The Languages of Legitimation”. In Muthia Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia. Pp. 136-169. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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Taiwanese rural politicians, likewise, avoid talking about detailed policy platforms and issues 
and are keen to demonstrate their ability to distribute resources to their constituents. They use 
powerful symbols of shared blood and kinship ties to appeal to their voters. Finally, rural Thai 
and Taiwanese folk do not easily agree with the abstract idea of corruption. Indeed, there is 
no indigenous word for ‘corruption’ in the languages of Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Urban-based politicians appeal to their highly educated urban constituents’ own political 
philosophies and ideologies. Often these can be about highly abstract themes like ‘restoring 
morality to politics’, or things which, although they may be desirable in themselves, have no 
practical impact on peoples’ lives like ‘changing the country’s name and asserting 
independence’, or ‘amending the constitution’. These politicians run on an ideological platform 
as well as one that advocates efficient and effective government. Urban voters vote for the 
candidate who most closely resembles their own philosophies and pet peeves. Rural 
politicians, in contrast, have no greater ideology than serving the people and bringing them 
justice that otherwise would be denied to them.
The local politician has an ideology and political philosophy of cultivating strong and close 
interpersonal and affective links with those whose individuals whose votes he seeks. He 
prides himself in his ability to use his personal charisma, local influence, and the clout that his 
office confers in order to right past injustices and grievances that his voters are suffering. He 
uses the power of office to fight to have national resources in the annual budget diverted to his 
hometown to build and construct roads, schools, intercity highways, hospitals, etc.
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Chapter Seven:
Conclusion
This thesis has examined a seemingly ‘peculiar’ aspect of Taiwan’s recent experience of 
democratization. Specifically, it looked at the phenomenon in which a certain group of 
powerful and ‘unscrupulous’ individuals have taken advantage of the island’s democratic 
transition by capturing political office, as well as running folk religion temples, particularly in 
the central and southern parts of the island.
Much research has been undertaken on the topic of politics, as well as local politics in Taiwan, 
particularly in the past twenty years. This study has as its main focus, the same topic of rural 
politics as the earlier research. However, it has managed to adopt a novel approach and has 
arrived at radically different findings regarding the same problem. It has achieved this, 
principally, by adopting two guiding principles. The first is that contemporary politics, 
particularly rural politics, should be analyzed within a broader socio-historical context that also 
emphasizes the views and opinions of the subjects covered in the study. The second is that 
rural Taiwanese politics was cross-culturally compared to its Thai counterpart in order to find 
out the extent of similarity that the Taiwanese case had with a country that is geographically 
close, and which has followed, within the same time period, a similar path of rapid economic 
growth followed by democratic transition.
Its main finding is that, as with the case of Thailand, electoral democracy since the late 1980s 
has created a gap between local interests and national politics, and locally powerful and 
influential individuals in the countryside have stepped in to fill this gap. This gap between local 
interests and national policies is best understood as an urban-rural one, wherein the political 
attitudes and values of the nation’s urban residents stand in sharp contrast with those of the 
rural folk. These rural politicians are not the most savoury of characters. These men are often 
on the wrong side of the law. Nevertheless, they are popular among rural voters because they 
promise to deliver resources and benefits to their constituents. This gap partly explains the 
existence of the narratives of corruption that are present in the island’s scholarly literature, as 
well as the media and culture industries.
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Simply put, on the one hand, urban voters place a great emphasis on abstract ideas and 
policies regarding politics and governance. They are concerned with good governance and 
believe that a well-educated citizenry is crucial to democracy. They are also more concerned 
with their politicians’ political philosophies and platforms and prefer their politicians to be well- 
educated, mild-mannered, and incorruptible ‘gentlemen’. Narratives of corruption serve to 
reflect these same values and attitudes. On the other hand, the people in the country are not 
very concerned about politicians’ abstract philosophies, ideas and policies, rather, they are 
more concerned with the their leaders’ ability to deliver resources and practical benefits to the 
constituents. They are pragmatic in their choice of political leaders and many will vote for 
powerful, influential and well connected people who have a proven record of ‘getting things 
done’ in the community.
Narratives of corruption in the scholarly literature, as well as the media and culture industries 
that started to appear in the early 1990s, have coincided with the country’s political 
democratization and liberalization of the media. These narratives disseminate the notion that 
political corruption has greatly increased since the early 1990s at the same time as the 
country started along the path of political reform. Indeed, these narratives encourage the idea 
that there is something rather strange about the country’s recent experience of democracy. 
They are saying, in effect, that Taiwanese democracy is ‘unconsolidated’ and ‘precarious’, 
mainly due to two factors, one, too many institutions of the ‘informal’ kind have survived and 
continue to exert influence, and second, that institutions of the ‘formal’ kind are too weak. 
Furthermore, these narratives lament the appearance of powerful individuals on the political 
scene, especially in the southern and central Taiwan. They call them heidao and accuse them 
of undermining the nation’s democratic achievements.
These narratives of corruption demonize the activities of many local politicians in Taiwan’s 
political process. In rural Taiwan, many politicians rule on the basis of traditional sources of 
power such as the big man system and patron clientism, and they are quite popular in their 
rural constituencies. Educated urbanites question some national politicians’ and most rural 
politicians’ political legitimacy. They suggest that they are unfit to govern as they believe that a 
sound democracy is not merely about procedural issues and institutions like elections and a 
free press, nor is it only about efficiency and good governance, rather, it is also about leaders’ 
integrity and honesty. Elected leaders’ legitimacy is often disputed and contested, because 
norms and values are keenly contested.
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Narratives of corruption use the term ‘black gold’ to refer to a variety of activities such as 
machine-politics, factionalism, vote buying etc. But paradoxically, these narratives tend to 
obscure a significant fact; that just like in the Thai case, grassroots, local politicians play a 
crucial, yet complex and multi-faceted role in the country’s political and electoral system. They 
provide a platform or vehicle through which rural voices are heard and rural interests are 
represented in the national legislature. Furthermore, local politicians play an essential role 
during presidential elections- they are instrumental in delivering the vote for the main political 
parties who may not have an official and effective presence in all of the island’s small towns 
and villages.
These individuals are not saints. They are often on the wrong side of the law. They are 
capable of violence and coercion, and often exercise this ability in order to further their 
interests. Nevertheless, their presence in contemporary Taiwanese politics should not be seen 
merely as an indication of a ‘lack’ or weakness of formal institutions. Likewise, to accuse their 
existence of being somehow ‘incompatible’ with democracy misses the point.
As this thesis has demonstrated, much like their Thai counterparts, powerful local strongmen 
have existed in Taiwan for a long time. They predate democracy by centuries. These 
strongmen have historically wielded influence at the local level, sometimes assuming the 
functions of government, running folk religion temples, providing basic functions and services 
when the state was weak, other times working quietly, influencing events behind the scenes. 
What electoral democracy has done has been to provide them a platform with which they 
were able to consolidate their local interests, at the same time as it afforded a few of the most 
powerful of their group a presence on the national stage, particularly, in the national 
legislature. While the elite and the intelligentsia worry that these heidao are undermining 
democracy, there is also an element of truth in the notion that that democracy created the 
conditions that made their existence possible, even necessary.
‘The practice of democracy calls forth individuals and groups who can mobilize support, and 
who ultimately vote at the local level’ (Trocki 1998:12). Political decentralization ‘has created 
opportunities for individuals from outside the state apparatus to seek political power through 
the electoral process’. This study has shown that for Taiwan heijin and heidao may actually be
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characteristic of democratic political life, indispensable, as decentralization has created 
opportunities for individuals from outside the state apparatus to seek political power through it.
Academic scholarship has been very consistent in its view that Taiwanese politics is 
dominated by informal institutions and is therefore ‘backward’, 'defective and ‘unconsolidated’, 
or ‘has not yet bedded down’. The assumption, however, is that democracy equals formal 
institutions. It also seems to be an unquestioned assumption that, by extension, the former 
must be incompatible with any form of informal institutions. This thesis has shown that formal 
and informal institutions are not necessarily opposing forces and their relationship can be 
‘complementary, substitutive, or conflicting’ (Lauth 2000:25-26).162 This thesis has also shown 
that the obsession with formal institutions, or the lack of them, in the research on Taiwanese 
politics and government, is indicative of a normative and highly idealized approach that seeks 
to explain, not how politics in Taiwan actually functions, but rather how politics in Taiwan 
should function. In addition, this study, has demonstrated what can be achieved when the 
study of formal and informal institutions, as well as the practice of democracy are embedded 
within the wider socio-economic structures of society as well as the internal values and 
attitudes of its members. It acknowledges its debt to the early ethnographic research on 
traditional rural leadership by Gallin, Pasternak and Crissman. It has built on the seminal work 
of these authors by situating these formal and informal structures of power and influence 
within their appropriate cultural and historical context.
The scholarly literature’s other major unquestioned assumption likewise needs rethinking. It is 
that there is only one possible model of democratic structure and governance that the country 
should emulate- ‘liberal democracy’. The literature considers the various informal institutions 
at play in Taiwan to be ‘in violation’ of the democratic principles of accountability and 
transparency inherent in a ‘liberal democracy’. However, democracy is not an unproblematic 
concept, which can admit no differences, either in form, or style of governance. There is no 
‘ideal’ form of democratic governance. ‘Democracy is one of the most contested and 
controversial concepts in political theory’ and remains an ‘ambiguous concept’ (Abrahamsen 
2000: 67).163 This study has shown that, at least in the case of Taiwan, the practice of 
democracy is at least as important as the concept. These practices include things such as 
patron-clientism, vote buying, etc. They may run counter to the spirit of a ‘liberal democracy’ 
that emphasizes the rule of law, ‘clean’ government, and transparency, among other things.
162 Lauth, H. 2000. “Informal Institutions and Democracy”. Democratization 7(4): 21-50.
163 Abrahamsen, R. 2000. Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. London: Zed 
Books.
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However, this study has shown that these practices are, an inevitable consequence of the 
practice of electoral democracy in a country with a substantial urban-rural divide with respect 
to cultural and political values, as well as having a strong tradition of informal rural leadership. 
It is therefore difficult to envisage how the ideal of a liberal democracy can be implemented in 
practical terms while such conditions persist in the country.
Taiwanese politics will appear anomalous and problematic to the extent that we insist that it 
behave like a western style liberal democracy. Some of its characteristics, like rural strongmen 
with previous or pending criminal convictions who run for political office, do indeed seem 
anomalous, even abhorrent, when seen from the perspective of mainstream political theory. 
These instances are not characteristic of the ‘formal institutions’ and ‘liberal democracy’ 
approach favoured by the overwhelming majority of scholars. However, it loses much of this 
peculiarity when we stop looking for instances of ‘factionalism’, ‘machine politics’, ‘patron 
clientism’ and heidao. When we instead choose to approach the study of Taiwanese politics 
through the two guiding principles adopted in this study, we begin to view it in a very different 
light. By applying the first guiding principle of seeing it within the broader context of the long 
history of informal rural leadership, and understanding the interconnectedness, the 
complementarity that coexists alongside the tension, between formal and informal structures, 
this study has made certain crucial aspects of Taiwanese politics appear rather less strange.
Taiwanese politics will also appear less of an aberration once we apply this study’s other 
guiding principle; that of comparing it cross-culturally with a nearby country with a broadly 
similar experience of democratic transition and economic growth over the recent decades. 
Cross-cultural comparison with nearby Thailand has provided a fresh perspective that can 
illuminate the current received wisdom on Taiwanese politics. Trocki164 has described Burma, 
the Philippines and Thailand as ‘gangster democracies’ in which locally powerful individuals 
have achieved power through the electoral process. Taiwan and Thailand have both had long 
experience of authoritarian regimes and have also managed to implement democratic reforms 
in the last two decades. In both countries, participatory democracy has allowed provincial 
strongmen, chaopo in Thailand, and heidao in Taiwan, to consolidate their local power base 
and to seek a presence in the national political scene. Urban voters care about ‘abstract’ 
issues like policies or the public good and are keen on good, clean government and a well- 
educated citizenry while rural voters care about ‘parochial’ issues, 'leading to direct benefits 
such as roads or bridges’. Heidao occupy a vacant space national politicians are unable to fill.
164 Trocki, C. (ed.) 1998. Gangsters, Democracy and the State in Southeast Asia. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
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Much contemporary research on Thai politics has focused on political corruption, patron- 
clientism and chaopo (godfathers) as the major deficiency of the country’s political system. 
However, rural strongmen have long existed in Thailand. Before the Thai imperial court 
established a strong and effective central bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, ‘early Thai 
administrators were often forced to rely on dubious figures at the periphery to exert control 
and collect taxes, establishing a pattern of collaboration’ (Ockey 1998: 40)165 that was to 
continue under various military regimes in the twentieth century. Thus, powerful rural figures 
of dubious morals have long collaborated with the Thai state, and this pattern of collaboration 
antedates the country’s democratic transition. Sometimes, these men of prowess- phuyai or 
big men achieved official recognition by being elected as phuyaiban or village head.
A phuyai, in Thai, means ‘big man’- phuyai are respected because of their power, their ability 
to dominate and build up an entourage. ‘If one is powerful that is sufficient; the source of that 
power is relatively unimportant’ (Ockey 1998:41). In rural Thailand, beneath the phuyai (big 
man), was the historical nakleng (village strongman), widely admired and respected protector 
of the village. He was a Robin Hood-like figure, a social bandit. He would ensure the return of 
stolen goods and maintain order, and may one day aspire to be phuyaiban (village leader).
Nevertheless, contemporary Thai chaopo, like their historical counterparts, play complex, 
multifaceted roles in contemporary Thai society. Much like the Taiwanese heidao, the chaopo 
are often on the wrong side of the law, yet sometimes collaborate with the authorities and are 
fundamental for political parties in capturing political power in the countryside. The scorn and 
disapproval that is heaped on the political participation of chaopo and heidao in both countries 
by the academic research as well as the media indicates that the contemporary, highly 
centralized and bureaucratic Thai and Taiwanese nation-states disapprove of and discourage 
the existence of rural leaders with alternative sources of power and legitimacy to the state. 
These leaders are called chaopo and heidao and it is insisted that their ‘influence’ is 
necessarily dark and evil. Note the phrases in the vernacular 'muet itthipori (dark influence) in 
Thai, and ‘e shilt (dark influence) in Chinese as evidence for this disapproval.
165 Ockey, J. 1998. “Crime, Society and Politics in Thailand”. In Carl Trocki (ed.) Gangsters, Democracy and the State in 
Southeast Asia. Pp. 39-53. Cornell, NY: SEAP.
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The rural-urban divide that has allowed for the increased prominence of political 
entrepreneurs in the countryside is evident when we examine how rural people in Taiwan view 
politics and politicians. Mulder (1996) has shown how the cultural values of Southeast Asia in 
general, and Thailand, in particular, influence attitudes towards democracy. He asserts that 
Thai culture views political life as belonging to either one of two spheres; the internal world of 
one’s own family, community and village, and the external world. The inner world of family, 
community and village is one where values of hierarchy, moral inequality, moral obligation, 
shared well-being and mutual dependence predominate. Moral, consensual rules of the family 
and community operate to maintain harmony and stability in this inner world.
He states that for rural people, the external world beyond the village and community is 
anonymous and businesslike, unruly and unlawful, morally neutral and beyond the moral, 
consensual rules that bind residents of the inner world (Mulder 1996:221). Furthermore, this 
external world is both threatening and mysterious for rural denizens who know they may not 
understand it, but all the same, want and need someone who can impose their will and 
enforce their order there. Thus politics in the countryside is about having a local person, an 
insider, who is powerful. In the country, ‘politics is about power, about laying claims to the 
external world. Power is an attribute of strong men, of “men of prowess” who can impose their 
will on an unruly, unlawful external world. Such power is morally neutral. Power operates in an 
area that is beyond the moral, consensual rules of the inner world of family and community’ 
(Mulder 1996: 221).
‘Personalized leaders’ and ‘men of prowess’ capable of dominating the external world are 
what rural people want and look for in their politicians. A politician, a ‘man of prowess’ is 
expected to use ‘his power for his own purposes, his benefit and in the interest of those who 
depend on him’. The external world is ‘like the forest, it is there to be exploited, it is a shared 
resource, not the public good’ (Mulder 1996:221). It is ‘nobody’s and everybody’s land, a field 
of opportunity to be appropriated as the need arises...It is a shared resource, but not a 
common possession’ (Mulder 1996: 216).
The traditional cultural values of Southeast Asia I have just described are broadly consistent 
with the findings of this study regarding rural Taiwanese values and attitudes regarding 
political life. My rural informants have limited contact with and do not fully comprehend the 
outside world, and thus want and look for a ‘champion’, a ‘defender*, and ‘protector*. They also 
want a ‘patron’ and ‘benefactor’ who will deliver benefits and distribute resources to the
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community. In addition, they expect their elected leaders to fulfil these roles and will develop 
personal and emotional ties with them.
Rural Taiwanese politicians will appeal to people by evoking notions of shared ties with the 
community based on ideas of debt, gratitude, and even fictive kinship. Once one accepts the 
rationale of rural political life based around the idea of the ‘man of prowess’, the idea of 
‘corruption’ then sits uneasily in the Southeast Asian rural context. This study has shown that 
this is also the case for rural people in Taiwan. They are quite forgiving and tolerant of past 
crimes and corrupt behaviour. For them, there is nothing immoral about a politician who wants 
to help and serve the community. Whatever else he does on the side is his business.
This study has shown several uncanny similarities, both past and present, between Taiwan 
and Thailand. These similarities include, a long tradition of informal rural leadership, a folk 
value system in the countryside at odds with the dominant mores held by the urban 
professional class and which is disseminated through scholarly work and the media, a recent 
experience of fast economic growth followed by political reform, and finally the recent 
existence of rural political entrepreneurs who have appeared to fill this rural-urban gap in 
terms of political values and attitudes.
There has been virtually no social science research that has systematically taken Taiwan and 
the countries of Southeast Asia as points of comparison. The one exception is Kuo Cheng-tian 
(1995)166 who compares the differential paths of economic development that Taiwan and the 
Philippines have taken. All the research has hitherto involved comparisons between Taiwan 
and China (Dickson 1998), as well as with Japan and Korea (Chalmers 1982; Cheng, 
Haggard & Kang 1998; Chu 1987; Doh & Chu 2004; Evans 1995; Gereffi & Wyman 1990; 
Hamilton & Woolsey Biggart 1988; Lin, Jih-wen 1996; Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng 1995).
Could this be so because Taiwan is considered to belong to the ‘East Asian’ cultural and 
economic region and that like should only be compared with like? This study has shown that 
comparisons with the region of Southeast Asia can yield extremely fruitful and productive 
results. If this study is any guide, one can reasonably expect any future inquiries pursuing this 
line of investigation will also yield surprising but invaluable insights.
166 Kuo, Cheng-tian. 1995. Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the Philippines. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.
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Southeast Asia possesses ‘various social and cultural elements which serve to unite large 
parts of the region and distinguish them from China and India’ (King & Wilder 2003: 14).167 
Southeast Asian social organization is generally characterized by the principle of bilateral or 
cognatic reckoning of kinship, relative gender equality, folk religion based on spirit propitiation 
and ancestor and fertility cults, a focus on the sacred qualities of the human head, and lastly, 
the widespread occurrence of the politico-cultural institution of big men. This thesis has shown 
that Taiwan shares with Southeast Asia the institution of the big man. Could Taiwan share 
other social and cultural elements with Southeast Asia? Would it be better to view her as 
belonging to the Southeast Asian sociocultural area?
This study would like to conclude by recommending that more cross culturally comparative 
research be conducted that will further explore any other parallels or similarities between 
aspects of political culture, or any other cultural aspect for that matter, between Taiwan and 
the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Thailand and the Philippines. It is a matter of pure 
speculation, at this early stage, as to where this line of research could ultimately lead. 
Nevertheless, could we envision one day redrawing the dividing line that separates the 
regions of East Asia and Southeast Asia? Could we even rethink the notion of these two 
regions as two distinct culture areas?
167 King, V. & Wilder, W. 2003. The Modern Anthropology o f South-East Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
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